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We focus on a settingwhere agents in a social network consume a product that exhibits positive local net-
work externalities. A seller has access to data on past consumption decisions/prices for a subset of observ-
able agents, and can target these agents with appropriate discounts to exploit network effects and increase
her revenues. A novel feature of the model is that the observable agents potentially interact with additional
latent agents. These latent agents can purchase the same product from a different channel, and are not
observed by the seller. Observable agents influence each other both directly and indirectly through the influ-
ence they exert on the latent agents. The seller knows the connection structure of neither the observable nor
the latent part of the network.
Due to the presence of network externalities, an agent’s consumption decision depends not only on the
price offered to her, but also on the consumption decisions of (and in turn the prices offered to) her neigh-
bors in the underlying network. We investigate how the seller can use the available data to estimate the
matrix that captures the dependence of observable agents’ consumption decisions on the prices offered
to them. We provide an algorithm for estimating this matrix under an approximate sparsity condition,
and obtain convergence rates for the proposed estimator despite the high dimensionality that allows more
agents than observations. Importantly, we then show that this approximate sparsity condition holds under
standard conditions present in the literature and hence our algorithms are applicable to a large class of net-
works. We establish that by using the estimated matrix the seller can construct prices that lead to a small
revenue loss relative to revenue-maximizing prices under complete information, and the optimality gap
vanishes relative to the size of the network. We also illustrate that the presence of latent agents leads to
significant changes in the structure of the revenue-maximizing prices.
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21. Introduction
In various social and economic settings agents influence each other’s decisions through exter-
nalities. The influence structure among agents can be modeled by a social network. The litera-
ture on social networks takes into account this influence structure, and yields predictions about
the outcome of agents’ interactions. For example, Ballester et al. (2006) and Bramoulle´ et al.
(2014) characterize how agents’ network positions (as captured, e.g., through their centrality)
impact their participation in activities that exhibit externalities (such as R&D and crime), while
Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007) and Elliott and Golub (2013) show the impact of the network
structure on agents’ contributions to a public good. Calvo´-Armengol et al. (2009) studies the
strength of network effects empirically and provides evidence on the impact of agents’ positions
in the underlying network on the individual outcomes (in particular, by focusing on students’
school performances and social networks).
Motivated by the prevalence of online social networks, a recent literature on social networks
has focused on understanding how a seller can use the available social network information to
improveher pricing/seeding/marketingdecisions; see, e.g., Kempe et al. (2003), Candogan et al.
(2012), Belloni et al. (2016), Bimpikis et al. (2016) and Zhou and Chen (2016). This literature has
established how the seller can optimally target individuals in the social network, and how the
centralities of the agents in the social network play a role in these targeting decisions. The papers
in this literature often assume that the seller knows which agents interact with each other, or, in
effect, that she fully knows the underlying network structure.
Full information on the network structure can be a strong assumption in many practical set-
tings. The present paper relaxes this assumption and asks the following fundamental question:
how can a seller who does not fully know the underlying social network improve her revenues
using available data on individual outcomes of some agents (e.g., agents’ past decisions)?
Specifically, we focus on a setting where agents embedded in a social network consume a
product that exhibits positive local network externalities, i.e., where agents obtain a higher pay-
3off for the product if their neighbors in the network also consume it. A subset of the agents, here-
after observable agents, purchase the product from a seller who has data on the past consump-
tion decisions of (and prices offered to) these agents. The remaining latent agents consume the
product through a different channel at a higher price. The seller’s objective is to maximize her
revenues by using the available data and designing targeted price discounts for the observable
agents. The seller has no information on the latent agents; e.g., she does not even know the
number of latent agents. Interestingly, while the seller knows the past consumption decisions
of observable agents, none of our results require a knowledge of the network among observable
agents.
Due to the presence of network externalities, each agent’s consumption decision depends on
those of her neighbors in the underlying social network. Hence, the price offered to an agent
impacts the consumption decision of not only this agent, but also those of her neighbors (as
well as their neighbors and so on). As a result, the revenue-maximizing prices of the seller are
a function of the mapping between the prices offered to the (observable) agents and their con-
sumption decisions (which in turn depends on the network structure). Thus, using the avail-
able data for the estimation of this mapping, and leveraging these estimates for the design of
revenue-maximizing prices are first-order questions.
1.1. Main Results
Section 2 introduces a benchmark pricing problem that characterizes the revenue-maximizing
prices that the seller would use, if she knew the underlying network structure fully. Our first
contribution is to characterize the structure of these benchmark prices. In the absence of
latent agents, this benchmark pricing problem reduces to the optimal pricing problem of
Candogan et al. (2012). However, there are strikingdifferences in optimal prices, due to the pres-
ence of latent agents. Specifically, one finding of Candogan et al. (2012) was that if the influence
structure is symmetric (i.e., an agent i influences j as much as she is influenced by her), then
the seller finds it optimal to ignore the network effects, and offer the same price to all agents
4regardless of the network structure. We establish that this no longer is true when there are latent
agents: the seller now finds it optimal to offer higher prices to observable agents who are more
heavily influenced by the central latent agents. Of course, a seller who has no information on
the latent agents cannot implement these benchmark prices. Nonetheless, the dependence of
these prices on the network structure highlights the importance of understanding the underly-
ing network structure for the seller’s revenue optimization problem.
Motivated by this observation, our second contribution is to provide an algorithm to esti-
mate the relationship between the prices offered to the observable agents and their consump-
tion (Section 3). In our model, this relationship is linear and the correspondingmatrix is closely
related to the underlying network structure. We investigate how to estimate this matrix, whose
ith row captures the change in the consumption of agent i due to changes in the prices offered
to the rest. Social networks often involve a large number of agents that are sparsely connected.1
Consequently, our problem is a high-dimensional estimation problem. A natural way to deal
with this high dimensionality and obtain efficient estimators is to exploit the underlying spar-
sity. That being said, even when the underlying network is sparse, the aforementioned matrix
need not be sparse (since it is given by the inverse of a matrix related to the structure of the
network; see Section 3).
Nonetheless, under assumptions that are standard in the social networks literature, we get
around this difficulty by using a notion of approximate sparsity for thismatrix (seeDefinition 3).
Intuitively, this sparsity notion posits that even though the matrix is not sparse, it (as well as its
inverse) admits sparse approximations. Under the approximate sparsity assumption, we pro-
vide an estimator for this matrix, and characterize its convergence rates. We also provide dis-
tributional limits for our estimator that allow for constructing valid confidence intervals. Using
ideas from the theory of bandedmatrices, approximation theory, and spectral theory, we estab-
lish that our approximate sparsity assumption holds for large classes of networks (e.g., when the
1 See, e.g., Ugander et al. (2011), who report that in May 2011, the Facebook graph consisted of 721 million active
nodes, and the average Facebook user in their study had around 190 Facebook friends.
5neighborhoods of agents grow polynomially in the number of hops). For such classes of net-
works, we prove that our estimators yield small approximation errors even when the number
of observations scales logarithmically with the number of observable agents, thereby making
these estimators suitable for large networks.
Our third contribution is to construct prices that are approximately optimal using the matrix
estimate mentioned above. In particular, we study the revenue gap between the benchmark
optimal prices (i.e., the optimal prices under complete information) and the prices calculated
assuming that the mapping between agents’ consumption decisions and prices is given by the
estimatedmatrix. Once again, we show that if the number of observations is at least logarithmic
in the number of observable agents, then a small revenue gap can be achieved andwe provide a
precise characterization of this gap in terms of ameasure of approximate sparsity. These results
indicate that even with the limited amount of available data, the seller can exploit approximate
sparsity to construct prices that approximately maximize revenues.
To the best of our knowledge, the proposed network setting with latent agents is new. Collec-
tively, our results shed light on how in such settings a seller can estimate the mapping between
the prices offered to observable agents and the induced consumption, and use these estimates
to construct approximately optimal prices.
1.2. Related Literature
Our paper is closely related to three streams of research on social networks and pricing:
Seller’s decisions under incomplete network information: A relevant stream of the social net-
works literature assumes that as opposed to knowing the precise network structure, the seller
has access to some summary statistics about the network; e.g., she knows the degree distribu-
tion in the network, which partially reflects the extent of externalities. In such a setting, each
agent’s degree might bemodeled as her private information and the seller’s challenge is to elicit
the relevant information and decide on how to optimally target agents using this information.
6The literature provides various mechanisms for eliciting agents’ private information and opti-
mizing pricing/advertising/product referral decisions (e.g., Hartline et al. 2008, Campbell 2013,
Galeotti et al. 2010, Lobel et al. 2015, Zhang and Chen 2016). By contrast, we assume that past
data on individual outcomes are available for some (observable) agents, and shed light on how
the available data can be employed to better understand the underlying influence structure and
improve pricing decisions.
Learning and pricing problems: There is also a parallel literature on the question of learning
optimal prices through dynamic price experimentation,which is of interest even in the absence
of social interactions (e.g., Harrison et al. 2012, Keskin and Zeevi 2014, Besbes and Zeevi 2015).
This literature assumes that a parameter of the underlying demand system is unknown, and
develops price experimentation policies that do not have a large performance gap relative to
the optimal policy derived in a setting where the underlying demand system is fully known.
Similarly, in our setting the demand system is not fully known, since the underlying network is
not known. On the other hand, due to network externalities, the seller now finds it optimal to
price differentiate agents. Thus, the seller needs to learn an optimal price vector as opposed to a
single price,which leads to amore complex learningproblem. Although it is beyond the scopeof
the present work, it would be interesting to study how this dynamic price experimentation can
be done in a way that minimizes the long-run performance gap in the seller’s profits measured
over the entire experimentation horizon.
Identification and estimation of peer effects: There is a growing body of literature on iden-
tification and estimation of peer effects, where it is often assumed that observations on out-
comes and covariates of all agents are available (e.g., Sacerdote 2001, Calvo´-Armengol et al.
2009, Epple and Romano 2011). The canonical model is the linear specification presented in
Manski (1993), which is consistent with the quadratic payoff structure discussed in the present
paper (although Manski (1993) considers additional covariates). Manski (1993) points out an
identification issue for the estimation of peer effects (the reflection problem): it is not possible
7to disentangle the endogenous effects (which are given by the average decisions of individuals
in a group) and the exogenous (contextual) effects (which are given by the average of the covari-
ates of individuals in the group). Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) and Blume et al. (2015) show that when
the underlying network lacks a regular structure this identification problem disappears. In the
present paper, we assume that an agent’s consumption decision is impacted by the consump-
tion decisions of her neighbors rather than the prices (covariates) the neighbors are exposed to.
Hence, the exogenous effects do not play a role, and the aforementioned identification issue is
not relevant.
Manresa (2013) and Rose (2017) consider the identification and estimation of peer effects
when the network is sparse. These papers rely on panel data, and leverage lasso or instrumen-
tal variable approaches (e.g., due to Gautier and Tsybakov 2014) to the estimation problem. A
relevant recent survey of De Paula et al. (2015) discusses the estimation of the network struc-
ture via penalization methods like lasso, SCAD, and others. In the presence of latent agents the
underlying aggregate influence structure among observable agents is no longer sparse (see Sec-
tion 4). Moreover, as opposed to estimating the influence structure, our focus is on estimating
the inverse of a matrix related to it (which also is not sparse). Hence, the results from this line of
literature are not readily applicable. It is also worth mentioning that the methodology in these
papers can be used to obtain estimators that yield small estimation errors for each row of the
matrices of interest. However, in this paper our estimator yields small estimation errors simulta-
neously for both rows and columns, which is essential for constructing approximately optimal
prices. In our companion paper (Ata et al. 2018), we extend the ideas from the present paper
to also provide estimators for the underlying influence structure that yield good row/column
performance.
2. Model and Preliminaries
This section introduces a model of a social network where agents consume a product that
exhibits local network externalities.We focus ona settingwhere a subset of these agents (observ-
able ones) purchase the product from a platform, which collects data on their consumption
8decisions (Section 2.1). The remaining agents are latent (from the platform’s point of view) in
the sense that they purchase the product from a different channel. Hence, the platform has
no information about their consumption. The platform does not know the underlying network
structure and the strength of network externalities either. In Section 2.2, we glean the impact of
the underlying network structure on observable agents’ consumption decisions. In particular,
we identify two key matrices that capture how observable agents influence each other either
directly or indirectly (through the latent part of the network), and how the consumption of each
observable agent depends on the prices that are offered to the rest, respectively. We also set up
the problem of the estimation of the latter matrix from the data available to the platform. If the
platform knew thismatrix, it could target the observable agents with prices that dependon their
network positions, and improve its revenues. We introduce an associated benchmark optimal
pricing problem in Section 2.3. In subsequent sections, we provide algorithms for the estima-
tion problem we pose in this section, and construct prices that depend on these estimates and
achieve a revenue gap that is vanishing in the size of the network relative to the revenue gener-
ated by the benchmark optimal prices.
2.1. Social Network and Consumption Equilibrium
We consider a social network with a set of agents V and a set of connections among agents
E ⊂ V × V . We represent the social network with a directed graph G = (V,E), where V and E
respectively correspond to nodes and edges. In the social network, the set of agents who are
connected to agent i are referred to as the neighbors of i, denoted by N(i) := {j|(i, j) ∈ E} ∪
{j|(j, i)∈E}.
Agents in the network consume a divisible product that exhibits positive externalities, which
are of a local nature. To be specific, each edge (i, j) ∈ E is associated with a weight Gij > 0 that
captures how much consumption of j influences the payoff of agent i (Gij = 0 if agents i and j
are not connected, i.e., (i, j) /∈ E). Unless otherwise noted, we do not require the weights to be
symmetric; i.e., in general Gij 6=Gji. Intuitively this allows an agent to influence her neighbors
9more than she is influenced by them. We refer to the set of weights {Gij}i,j∈S as the influence
structure in S ⊂ V .
We consider amultiperiodmodel, and assume that agentsmake their consumption decisions
in periods t ∈ Z++. The payoff function of agent i ∈ V has the same structure every period, and
consists of an individual consumption term, a network externality term, and a payment term.
Suppose that in period t, agent i consumes yi ≥ 0 units of the product at unit price pi, and the
remaining agents consume y−i ≥ 0 units of the product. Then, the payoff of agent i is given by
u
(t)
i (yi, y−i, pi) = (ai+ ξ
(t)
i )yi− biy2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
individual consumption
+
∑
j
Gijyiyj︸ ︷︷ ︸
network externality
− piyi︸︷︷︸
payment
. (1)
The first term (ai + ξ
(t)
i )yi − biy2i in the payoff function determines the value the agent derives
from her own consumption of the product. We assume that ai, bi > 0 so that this term is con-
cave, and agents’ marginal payoffs are decreasing in their own consumption. Here ξ(t)i denotes
an (idiosyncratic) taste shock for agent i at time t, which impacts her marginal value and con-
sumption (but is not observable to the researcher). We assume that {ξ(t)i }i,t have zero mean,
and are independent over time, but are possibly correlated across agents. Note that if there are
no taste shocks (i.e., ξ
(t)
i = 0 for all i), the payoffs reduce to those considered in Candogan et al.
(2012).
The term
∑
jGijyiyj captures the positive externality that the consumption of her neighbors
imposes on agent i. The positive externality increases with the consumption (yi) of agent i, as
well as with that of her neighbors in the underlying network (yj for j such that (i, j)∈E). The last
term captures the cost incurred by agent i for consuming yi units of the product at unit price pi.
For a given set of parameters {vi}i∈V , we denote the associated column vector by v, e.g., a, b, p, y
respectively for {ai}i∈V , {bi}i∈V , {pi}i∈V , and {yi}i∈V .
In every period, given a vector of prices p, each agent chooses the consumption level that
maximizes her payoff. Since agents’ payoffs depend on each other’s consumption decisions,
the consumption levels are determined at a correspondingconsumption equilibrium,whichwe
introduce next.
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DEFINITION 1 (CONSUMPTION EQUILIBRIUM). For a given vector of prices p, a vector y ≥ 0 is a
consumption equilibrium in period t if, for all i∈ V ,
yi ∈ argmax
z≥0
u
(t)
i (z, y−i, pi). (2)
Note that a consumption equilibrium corresponds to the Nash equilibrium of the normal form
game with a set of agents V , a strategy set [0,∞) for each agent i, and payoffs given as in (1).2
Hereafter, we denote by p(t) the prices available to agents in period t, and by y(t) the induced
equilibrium consumption levels. Let Λ ∈ R|V |×|V | denote a diagonal matrix whose ith diagonal
entry is givenby 2bi, and letG ∈R|V |×|V | denote amatrixwhose i, jth entry isGij . LetM ∈R|V |×|V |
be such that
M := Λ−G.
Throughout the paper we index the entries of matrices G and M (as well as other network-
related matrices) by the nodes of the underlying network.
If in a consumption equilibrium agents’ consumption amounts are strictly positive, then by
the first-order optimality conditions in (1), it can be seen that in period t the equilibrium con-
sumption levels are given by
y(t) =M−1(a+ ξ(t)− p(t)). (3)
Hence, each agent’s consumption depends linearly on the price offered to her, as well as to the
other agents.
2 This equilibrium concept implicitly assumes that agents know the underlying network structure, and each other’s
payoff functions (including taste shocks, and prices). That being said, in order to determine her optimal consumption
level in (2), agent i needs to observe only her neighbors’ consumption levels. Moreover, it can be shown that for any
set of prices/taste shocks, the induced game among agents is supermodular, and agents’ best-responses converge to
a consumption equilibrium (see, e.g., Candogan et al. 2012).
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2.2. Observable Agents and the Estimation Problem
We assume that a subset VO ⊂ V of the agents participate in an online platform and purchase
the product through this platform. We refer to these agents as observable agents, and assume
that data on past prices offered to them (by the platform), as well as their induced consumption
decisions, are available to the platform. By contrast, no such information about the remaining
agents, hereafter referred to as latent agents, is readily available. We denote the set of latent
agents by VL, and assume that VO ∪VL = V and VO ∩VL = ∅.
Both observable and latent agents can purchase the product at price p¯ > 0 from a different
channel, and this price is public knowledge. This constitutes an outside option for the observ-
able agents. We assume that the price p
(t)
i offered by the online platform to an agent i ∈ V0 is
such that p
(t)
i ≤ p¯. If this were not the case and p(t)i > p¯, then agent iwould prefer to purchase the
product from the outside option.Hence, a revenue-maximizing platformalways finds it optimal
to set p
(t)
i ≤ p¯. Thus, for any i ∈ VO, we ignore the outside option p¯, and focus only on the price
offered by the platform. We assume that the outside option p¯ is not time varying, whereas the
prices offered by the platform to the observable agents possibly are. In other words, p(t) is such
that p
(t)
i = p¯ for all i∈ VL and t∈Z++.
For any vector v ∈R|V |, we represent its entries corresponding to observable and latent nodes
by vO and vL respectively, i.e., v = [vO;vL].
3 Similarly, for any matrix A ∈R|V |×|V |, we express the
blocks corresponding to observable and latent components as follows:
A=

AOO, AOL
ALO, ALL

 .
We denote by Ak,· the kth row of A, by A·,k its kth column. We use e ∈R|V | to denote a vector of
ones.
3 For any column vectors v1, v2, we denote by [v1;v2] the column concatenation, and by [v1, v2] the row concatenation
if they are the same size. We similarly denote row/column concatenation for matrices.
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Wenext introduce two assumptions imposed throughout the paper, and then characterize the
equilibrium consumption levels of observable agents. The first assumption guarantees that the
consumption levels of all agents are strictly positive, and hence can be characterized as in (3).
Note that ifM has an eigenvalue that is close to zero or {ai} are arbitrarily large, then (3) implies
that the equilibrium consumption levels can be arbitrarily large. The second assumption guar-
antees that this is not the case, and the consumption levels are always bounded.
ASSUMPTION 1. The outside option p¯ is such that P(ai+ ξ
(t)
i > p¯) = 1 and, p¯≥ p(t)i for all i∈ V and
t∈Z++.
ASSUMPTION 2. There exists some ζ > 0 such that for each i ∈ V , we have 2bi ≥
∑
jGij + ζ and
2bi ≥
∑
jGji + ζ. In addition, we assume that there exist some a¯, b¯≥ 0 such that ai ≤ a¯, bi ≤ b¯ for
all i∈ V .
If no agent consumes the product, the marginal utility of agent i is given by ai + ξ
(t)
i − p(t)i . The
second part of Assumption 1 implies that all observable agents can access prices that are weakly
lower than the outside option p¯, as discussed above. Together with the first part, this ensures
that themarginal utilities are positive for any realization of taste shocks. As formally established
in Lemma 16 in Appendix G.1, this implies that all agents consume positive amounts of the
product. Assumption 2, on the other hand, guarantees that the matrixM =Λ−G is strictly row
and column diagonally dominant. Here, ζ > 0 is a parameter that captures how large the diago-
nal entries are relative to off-diagonal entries. The positivity of this parameter implies that the
eigenvalues ofM are bounded away from zero. As a result, the eigenvalues ofM−1 are bounded
fromabove,which by (3) can be used to bound the the equilibriumconsumption levels of agents
(see Lemma 17 in Appendix G.1), provided that the prices are nonnegative and taste shocks are
not arbitrarily large. Qualitatively, Assumption 1 implies that the price of the outside option is
13
not prohibitively large, whereas Assumption 2 implies that the network externality that an agent
exerts on the rest of the network (or vice versa) is not too large.4
We next focus on observable agents and restate (3) more explicitly for these agents. To this
end, we introduce the following matrices:
SOL :=MOLM
−1
LL and H :=MOO−MOLM−1LLMLO, (4)
and also the following vectors:5
vO :=H
−1aO −H−1SOL(aL− pL) and ε(t)O :=H−1ξ(t)O −H−1SOLξ(t)L . (5)
LEMMA 1. In period t, the observable agents’ equilibrium consumption levels are given by
y
(t)
O = vO −H−1p(t)O + ε(t)O . (6)
Note that entries of H−1 capture how changes in the prices offered to observable agents
impact their consumption decisions. Similarly, entries of H capture how the consumption of
an agent influences the marginal payoffs of the remaining observable agents. This can be most
clearly seen when VL = ∅. In this case H =M , and hence for i, j ∈ VO such that i 6= j, we have
Hij =−Gij , which captures howmuch agent j’s consumption influences agent i’s payoff. When
VL 6= ∅, Hij has two components: (i) [MOO]ij = −Gij , which captures the direct influence of j’s
consumption on agent i’s payoff, and (ii) [−MOLM−1LLMLO]ij , which captures the indirect influ-
ence of j’s consumption on agent i’s payoff through the latent agents. We refer to H =MOO −
MOLM
−1
LLMLO as the aggregate externality structure among observable agents. We refer to ε
(t)
O as
the consumption shock in period t.
Knowing H−1 is critical for deciding how to offer targeted prices to observable agents so as
to maximize the induced revenues for the platform (see Section 2.3). As can be seen from the
4 Variants of these assumptions have appeared in pricing in social networks literature to ensure that equilibrium solu-
tions are interior and induced pricing problems are concave. See e.g., Ballester et al. (2006), Candogan et al. (2012),
Fainmesser and Galeotti (2015), Zhou and Chen (2015).
5Under Assumption 2, the matricesH ,MLL are invertible; see Lemma 13 of Appendix G.1.
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preceding discussion, this matrix is closely related to the network effects. However, information
on network effects is rarely available, and estimation of network effects is an active research
area even in the absence of latent agents (see, e.g., Bramoulle´ et al. 2009, Calvo´-Armengol et al.
2009, Manresa 2013). In this paper, we assume that aside from past prices/consumption deci-
sions of observable agents (and the price of outside option p¯), the platform does not have any
additional information. In particular, it does not know the underlying network structure (or the
{Gij} parameters), the set VL of latent agents (or its cardinality), parameters {ai, bi}i∈V , or taste
shocks {ξ(t)i }i,t. One of the main questions we tackle in this paper is how H−1 (as well as vO)
can be estimated from the available data. In particular, in Section 3, we assume that the plat-
form observes consumption/price tuples {(y(t)O , p(t)O )}nt=1 and provide estimators for H−1 based
on these observations. Because social networks consist of a large number of agents, this turns
out to be a challenging high-dimensional estimation problem.
REMARK 1 (IDENTIFICATION ISSUES). Observe that in the absence of latent agents H−1 =M−1,
and hence its estimate readily reveals the dependence of consumption levels on prices (by (3)).
However, when there are latent agents it is not possible to identifyM−1, and hence we restrict
attention to estimation of H−1. To see this, consider a network with latent agents, where the
mapping between prices and consumption is as in Lemma 1. Note that another network, which
has no latent agents and admits an influence structure G¯ij = −Hij for i 6= j for all observable
agents, exhibits the same relationship between (observable) prices and consumption decisions.
Thus, either network could explain givenprice/consumptionobservations, and it is not possible
to identify the trueM−1 matrix. 
2.3. Optimal Pricing: A Benchmark Model
A central question we investigate is how the platform should set prices pO to maximize her
expected revenues. Such prices depend on the network structure, which we assume is unknown
to the seller. Nevertheless, in this sectionwe introduce benchmark optimal prices, which are the
15
prices that would maximize the expected revenues of the platform had the network structure
been known. Namely, assuming that the network is known (and recalling that the platform sells
only to the observable agents), we focus on the following optimization problem:
max
pO≤p¯·eO, y
Eξ[〈pO, yO〉]
s.t. yi ∈ argmax
z≥0
ui(z, y−i, pi), i ∈ V,
(7)
where the expectation is taken over taste shocks. The constraint reflects that each agent con-
sumes the payoff-maximizing amount, given the prices and the remaining agents’ consumption
levels. The optimal price vector for problem (7) is denoted by p⋆O. In the remainder of this sec-
tion, we derive the properties of the optimal price vector, and shed light on its dependence on
the network structure. We start with a simple observation: when the constraint pO ≤ p¯ · eO is not
binding, an optimal solution to problem (7) can be obtained in closed form.
LEMMA 2. Suppose that p⋆O < p¯ · eO; then
p⋆O = (H
−1+H−T )−1H−1(aO−SOL(aL− pL)) =HT (H +HT )−1(aO−SOL(aL− pL)).
If the constraint pO ≤ p¯ · eO is binding for some set S ⊂ VO of agents, then for all i ∈ S we have
pi = p¯, and for i∈ VO \S, a similar characterization to the one in Lemma 2 can be obtained.
Lemma 2 implies that the optimal prices explicitly depend on theH andH−1 matrices intro-
duced in the previous subsection. Since these matrices are not readily available, the platform
cannot implement p⋆O. However, as outlined in the previous section, we can first estimate H
−1
from the available data {(y(t)O , p(t)O )}nt=1 and then use it to obtain estimates of p⋆O. We defer this
analysis to Section 4.
We next present two corollaries of this lemma. First, assuming that the influence structure
is symmetric, agents share identical {ai, bi} parameters, and p¯ is not small, we show that the
optimal solution is always interior, and prices admit a simpler characterization:
COROLLARY 1. Suppose that G=GT , ai = a˜, bi = b˜ for all i∈ V . Let
qO :=
a˜
2
eO− 1
2
SOLeL(a˜− p¯). (8)
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If p⋆O < p¯ · eO, then the optimal prices are given by p⋆O = qO. Moreover, for sufficiently large p¯ < a˜,
this is always the case.
Similar to Lemma 2, Corollary 1 characterizes the optimal prices when they are strictly smaller
than p¯. When the influence structure is symmetric, it can be seen that so is the H matrix, and
hence the term (H−1+H−T )−1H−1 in Lemma 2 reduces to I/2. This leads to the simpler expres-
sion in Corollary 1 for optimal prices. Observe that as p¯→ a˜, the second term in (8) goes to zero,
and qO converges to a˜/2< p¯. In this case, the constructed qO is a feasible price vector and satis-
fies optimality conditions. Hence, qO is optimal, and we conclude that the condition p
⋆
O < p¯ · eO
of the corollary is always satisfied for sufficiently large p¯ < a˜.
It was established in Candogan et al. (2012) that when all agents are observable, the optimal
prices set by the platform are independent of the network structure, whenever the underlying
influence structure is symmetric (and ai = a˜, bi = b˜ for all i ∈ V ). Interestingly, Corollary 1 shows
that this is no longer the case when there are latent nodes. In this case, the network structure
manifests itself through the SOL =MOLM
−1
LL term, and impacts the optimal prices. In order to
gain further insight into the impact of the network structure on prices, we first introduce the
notion of Bonacich centrality of agents (see Ballester et al. 2006, Candogan et al. 2012)).
DEFINITION 2 (BONACICH CENTRALITY). For a networkwith (weighted) adjacencymatrix G and
scalar α, the Bonacich centrality vector of parameter α is given by K(α,G) = (I − αG)−11, pro-
vided that (I −αG)−1 is well defined and nonnegative.
We use the shorthand notationsKL(α) :=K(α,GLL) andKO(α) :=K(α,GOO) to denote the cen-
trality of agents after restricting attention to the latent and observable components of the net-
works, respectively. The next result shows that the optimal prices in the symmetric case can be
expressed in terms of the Bonacich centrality of the latent component of the network.
COROLLARY 2. Suppose that G=GT , ai = a˜, bi = b˜ for all i ∈ V . Then, for sufficiently large p¯ < a˜,
the optimal prices are given as follows:
p⋆O =
a˜
2
eO +
a˜− p¯
4b˜
GOLKL
(
1
2b˜
)
.
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Thus, in the symmetric case, the optimal prices of the platform have a simple and intuitive
structure. In particular, the platform first offers a nominal price of a˜/2 to all observable nodes
(captured by the a˜
2
eO term). Then, she considers the centralities of latent agents (captured by
KL( 12b˜ )), and increases the prices offered to observable agents, proportional to how much they
are influenced by the “central” latent agents (captured by the term GOLKL
(
1
2b˜
)
). Note that this
markup term suggests that not all observable agents should receive the sameprice. In particular,
if an observable agent is strongly influenced by a latent agent (and hence the relevant entry of
GOL is large), and if this latent agent is central (and hence the corresponding entry of KL( 12b˜) is
large), then the platform should consider a significant markup for this agent. Intuitively, this is
the case since such observable agents have a strong incentive to consume the product (due to
the positive influence of the latent agents on them), and the platform can improve her profits
by charging higher prices to those agents.
3. An Estimator for Large Networks
This section focuses on the estimation of the H−1 matrix from panel data on the observable
agents, {(y(t)O , p(t)O )}t∈[n], where [n] := {1, . . . , n}. We are particularly interested in large networks,
where the number of observable agents |VO| can exceed the number of periodsn observed in the
data. The linear specification in Lemma 1 can be exploited for the estimation of H−1 provided
that prices p
(t)
O and taste shocks ξ
(t) (similarly ε
(t)
O =H
−1ξ(t)O −H−1SOLξ(t)L ) are orthogonal. That
is,
E[(ε
(t)
O )(1;p
(t)
O )
T ] =E[{y(t)O − (vO−H−1p(t)O )}(1;p(t)O )T ] = 0. (9)
To estimate the coefficients of interest (and in particular, the entries of H−1 and vO) we use
the moment condition (9) with an ℓ1-regularization procedure (which results in a variant of the
Dantzig selector; see Cande`s and Tao (2007), Belloni et al. (2017b)). The use of the ℓ1-penalty is
often motivated by big data applications where underlying models involvemany different vari-
ables, yet the available sample size is substantially smaller. Estimation in such settings becomes
possible only if a relatively small number of variables matter, i.e., if the underlying coefficient
18
vector is sparse. Employing ℓ1-penalty guarantees the sparsity of the estimator, and allows for
estimating the relevant coefficients.
The number of entries of the matrixH−1 is large (|VO|2 – and hence scales quadratically with
the number of observable agents), which naturally results in a high-dimensional estimation set-
ting. Yet, this matrix is not necessarily sparse even if the underlying influence structure is sparse
(i.e., G has a small number of nonzero entries). In particular, as we establish in Lemma 13 of
Appendix G.1, if the network is (strongly) connected, then all entries ofM−1 as well as H−1 are
strictly positive. This is because even if the underlying influence matrix G is sparse, the related
matrices obtained after a matrix inverse operation (such asM−1 = (Λ−G)−1 as well asH−1) are
not sparse.
To deal with this issue, in Section 3.1, we introduce an “approximate sparsity” condition on
H−1. In Section 3.2, we provide our estimation algorithm forH−1, and in Section 3.3, we obtain
rates of convergence for our algorithmunder the approximate sparsity condition.We revisit this
condition in Section 5 and establish that it holds for a large class of networks and influence
structures. Hence, the results of this section are applicable to these general settings.
In order to state the findings of this section, we next introduce additional notation. We use
Φ to denote the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. We define
V¯O := {0} ∪ VO, and index the entries of vectors in R|VO| and R|V¯O| by the elements of VO and V¯O
respectively. For instance, (1;p
(t)
O )j is equal to p
(t)
j if j ∈ VO, and is equal to 1 otherwise, where
(1;p
(t)
O ) ∈ R|V¯O|. We denote by 1kj with k, j ∈ V¯O an indicator variable that takes the value one
if k = j and zero otherwise. We denote by ‖v‖p (for p ∈ {1,2,∞}) the ℓp norm of a vector v, i.e.,
‖v‖p = (
∑
i |vi|p)1/p (with the convention ‖v‖∞ =maxi |vi|). Similarly, for amatrixA, ‖A‖p denotes
the induced matrix p-norm, i.e., ‖A‖p := supx 6=0 ‖Ax‖p‖x‖p . Observe that for p =∞ we get the max-
imum absolute row sum (||A||∞ = maxi
∑
j |Aij |), and for p = 1 we get the maximum absolute
column sum (||A||1 =maxj
∑
i |Aij |) of the relevant matrix.
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3.1. Approximate Sparsity
Before we proceed with the details of our estimation approach, we formalize our approximate
sparsity notion.
DEFINITION 3. We say that amatrix is s-sparse if it has atmost s nonzero entries in each row and
column. Moreover, we say that the matrix H−1 admits an (s, r1)-sparse approximation if there
exists an s-sparsematrix W¯ such that
max
{
‖H−1− W¯‖1,‖H−1− W¯‖∞
}
≤ r1.
Motivated by Definition 3, we say that a network admits an (s, r1)-sparse approximation if
the associated H−1 matrix does so. A given network can admit different sparse approxima-
tions with different parameters (s, r1). There is a clear trade-off between such approximations:
more sparse approximationswill lead to higher approximation errors. To achieve the best trade-
off in the estimation, it may be appropriate to consider less/more sparse approximations (i.e.,
larger/smaller s) depending on the number of available observations. In what follows, we focus
on (sn, r1n)-sparse approximation of networks, when there are n observations {(y(t)O , p(t)O )}nt=1. We
provide the convergence rates of our estimator (in various norms) in terms of sn and r1n.
3.2. The Estimation Algorithm
Our estimator is presented in Algorithm 1. This algorithm builds on different ideas in the high-
dimensional statistics literature. It can be viewed as a thresholded bias-correctedDantzig selec-
tor estimator whose penalty parameter is pivotal.6 Under (approximate) sparsity assumptions,
high-dimensional models are estimable with the introduction of regularization (in this case the
ℓ1-penalty). However, the regularization requires carefully setting penalty parameters and typi-
cally yields estimators that are consistent but not asymptotically normal. Algorithm 1 addresses
both issues through the use of self-normalizedmoderate deviation theory.
6 That is, it does not depend on unknown quantities such as the variance of the noise.
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Algorithm 1 Estimation ofH−1.
Input. The data {(p(t)O , y(t)O ) : t∈ [n]} and the thresholds {µkj}k,j∈VO .
Initialize. M 2n = 1∨maxk∈VO 1n
∑n
t=1(p
(t)
k )
4, τ = 1
4Mn
, and λ= 1√
n
Φ−1
(
1− 1
3n|VO|2
)
.
Step 1. Compute an initial estimate (vˆ, Wˆ ) by solving the following optimization problem:
(Wˆ , vˆ, zˆ)∈ arg min
W˜ ,v˜,z
∑
k∈VO ‖(v˜k, W˜k,·)‖1+ τzk
s.t.
∣∣∣ 1n∑nt=1{y(t)k − (v˜k− W˜k,·p(t)O )}(1;p(t)O )j∣∣∣≤ λzk, k ∈ VO, j ∈ V¯O,{
1
n
∑n
t=1{y(t)k − (v˜k− W˜k,·p(t)O )}2(1;p(t)O )2j
}1/2
≤ zk, k ∈ VO, j ∈ V¯O.
(10)
Step 2. For the design matrix Σˆ := 1
n
∑n
t=1(1;p
(t)
O )(1;p
(t)
O )
T , compute a debiasing matrix Ψˆ by
solving
(zˆ, Ψˆ)∈ argmin
z,Ψ
∑
k∈V¯O
(
1
n
∑n
t=1 |Ψk,·(1;p(t)O )|4
)1/4
+ zk
s.t. |Ψk,·Σˆ·,j −1kj | ≤ λzk, k, j ∈ V¯O,{
1
n
∑n
t=1{Ψk,·(1;p(t)O )(1;p(t)O )j −1kj}2
}1/2
≤ zk, k, j ∈ V¯O.
(11)
Step 3. Compute
(−vˇT ;Wˇ T ) = (−vˆT ;Wˆ T )− Ψˆ
{
1
n
n∑
t=1
(1;p
(t)
O ){y(t)O − (vˆ− Wˆp(t)O )}T
}
. (12)
Step 4. Compute the thresholded estimator
Wˇ µ = (Wˇkj1{|Wˇkj |>µkj})k,j∈VO .
Terminate and return Wˇ µ, vˇ respectively as the estimates ofH−1 and vO.
Step 1 of the algorithm obtains a preliminary estimate (vˆ, Wˆ ) of (vO,H
−1) based on a piv-
otal version of the Dantzig selector estimator; see Cande`s and Tao (2007), Bickel et al. (2009),
Belloni et al. (2017b). This preliminary estimate is not necessarily asymptotically normal, which
necessitates the subsequent debiasing step (Step 3).
Step 2 of the algorithm solves an auxiliary regularized estimation problem (again with pivotal
choices of the penalty parameter) to compute a pseudo-inverse of the (empirical) covariance
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matrix Σˆ (which is rank-deficient due to the high dimensionality). The variant used in Algo-
rithm 1 is similar to the formulations in Javanmard andMontanari (2014) and Zhu and Bradic
(2016) but involves significant differences. First, in addition to handling the network setting, the
specific form of (11) used here is new. Notably, the optimization formulation in (11) is always
feasible (unlike the corresponding problem in Javanmard andMontanari (2014)). Second, it
exploits self-normalization to achieve pivotal choices of the penalty parameter λ. Third, we use
a new objective function andminimize a function of the average (empirical) fourth moment of
Ψk,·(1;p
(t)
O ). Leveraging the optimality of Ψˆ in (11), this novel criterion leads to bounds on the
higher order empirical moments of Ψ¯k,·(1;p
(t)
O ), where Ψ¯ :=E[(1;p
(t)
O )(1;p
(t)
O )
T ]−1. As we shall see
in the next section, such bounds in turn allow us to achieve desired rates of convergence for a
rich class of data-generating processes where it is not required for (i) shocks to beGaussian, and
(ii) Ψˆk,· to converge to Ψ¯k,·.
Step 3 uses the pseudo-inverse Ψˆ of Σˆ computed in Step 2 to reduce the bias in the prelim-
inary estimator Wˆ obtained in Step 1, and leads to the debiased estimator (vˇ, Wˇ ). (This can
be seen as a Newton step from (vˆ, Wˆ ).) In the high-dimensional case such ideas have recently
been used by different authors with different variants and assumptions; see, e.g., Belloni et al.
(2014), Zhang and Zhang (2014), Van de Geer et al. (2014), Javanmard andMontanari (2014),
Belloni et al. (2015a). Similar ideas can be traced back to Neyman and Scott (1965) and Neyman
(1979) in the fixed dimensional case with the use of the so-called orthogonal moment condi-
tions to reduce the impact of estimation errors of nuisance parameters.
Finally, Step 4 thresholds the intermediate estimator Wˇ to obtain Wˇ µ. Themotivation to con-
sider such a thresholded estimator is somewhat subtle, and has to do with the convergence
rates that can be obtained by different estimators. It turns out that under approximate sparsity
assumptions (and an appropriate choice of thresholds), the thresholded estimator enjoys good
rates of convergence for both the rows and columns ofH−1 (see Theorem 1). This is not the case
for the intermediate estimators obtained in Algorithm 1. For instance, it can be seen that Step 1
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of the proposed Algorithm 1, as well as the lasso estimator and its variants, decouple over the
rows ofH−1, and they can be used to obtain convergence rates for the estimation of rows ofH−1.
However, sinceH−1 is not necessarily symmetric, in the high-dimensional setting we consider,
such estimates do not provide meaningful guarantees for column estimates of H−1. Similarly,
it can be shown that the estimator Wˇ obtained in Step 3 has good rates of convergence in the
maximum entry-wise error but it need not be a consistent estimator ofH−1 in matrix 2-norm.
The relevance of achieving good rates of convergence for both the rows and columns is justi-
fied by Lemma 2. This result establishes that the optimal prices depend both onH−1 andH−T ;
thus, controlling the estimation errors for both the rows and columns ofH−1− Wˇ µ is important
for constructing approximately optimal prices. Indeed, we leverage our approach and bounds
on row and column errors to obtain estimates of optimal prices in Section 4.
3.3. Convergence Rates
In order to provide the convergence rates of our algorithm, we require the underlying price and
error processes to be “well-behaved.” In particular, we impose the following assumption:
ASSUMPTION 3. Suppose that the network admits an (sn, r1n)-sparse approximation. Let
c,C,C ′ > 0 be constants such that c <C, and letMε,MΨ be parameters satisfyingMε,MΨ≥ 1. The
following conditions hold:
i. The observed data {(p(t)O , y(t)O ) : t∈ [n]} are i.i.d. random vectors that satisfy (6). Moreover, the
consumption shock term satisfies E[ε
(t)
O | p(t)O ] = 0 for every t∈ [n].
ii. For every t ∈ [n] we have minj∈VO E[(ε(t)j )2 | p(t)O ] ≥ c, maxj∈VO E[|ε(t)j |4 | p(t)O ] ≤ C,
E[maxt∈[n],j∈VO |ε(t)j |4 | {p(t)O }]≤Mε.
iii. The matrix Ψ¯ :=E[(1;p(t)O )(1;p
(t)
O )
T ]−1 is such that
min
k,j∈V¯O
E[{Ψ¯k,·(1;p(t)O )(1;p(t)O )j −1kj}2]≥ c, and max
k,j∈V¯O
E[|Ψ¯k,·(1;p(t)O )(1;p(t)O )j |4]≤C.
Moreover,E[maxt∈[n];j,k∈V¯O |Ψ¯k,·(1;p(t)O )(1;p(t)O )j |4]≤MΨ. Finally, we assume that the eigenval-
ues of Ψ¯ are upper bounded by a constant.
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iv. We have s2n(log |VO|)(logn)3 = o(n),MεMΨ log |VO|= o(n), and C ′ log |VO| ≥ logn.
Assumption 3i. states that the consumption shock term ε
(t)
O is a zero mean conditional on
prices in period t. Assumptions 3ii. and iii. are mild moment conditions on the consumption
shocks and prices. For example, conditional on prices, we require the consumption shocks’
fourth moments to be bounded from above, and their second moments to be bounded from
below. Similarly, the eigenvalues of matrices constructed from expectations of outerproducts
of price vectors are well-behaved. Such moment conditions readily hold for sub-Gaussian and
subexponential distributions as well as more heavy-tailed distributions. These assumptions
are commonly employed in high-dimensional statistics, with a general covariate/observation
structure, and are adapted to our setting (see, e.g., Bickel et al. (2009), Belloni et al. (2017b,a)).
Assumption 3iv. imposes requirements on how the number of agents and the sample size can
relate. In particular, we allow for a high-dimensional setting where |VO| ≫ n.
We proceed with our first result on the estimator provided in Algorithm 1.
THEOREM 1. Under Assumption 3with probability at least 1−o(1) the following statements hold:
i. Uniformly over k ∈ VO we have
√
n{(−vˇk, Wˇk,·)T − (−vk,H−1k,· )T}=−Ψˆ
1√
n
n∑
t=1
ε
(t)
k (1;p
(t)
O )+R
k
n
where ‖Rkn‖∞ =O(n−1/2sn log |VO|+ r1n
√
log |VO|).
ii. If µkj ≥ 2|Wˇkj − (H−1)kj | and µkj ≤C1
√
log |VO|/n for all k, j ∈ VO, then the thresholded esti-
mator Wˇ µ satisfies
‖Wˇ µ−H−1‖∞ ≤ snC2
√
log |VO|
n
+3r1n and ‖Wˇ µ−H−1‖1 ≤ snC2
√
log |VO|
n
+3r1n,
for some constants C1,C2 > 0.
The first part of Theorem1provides an (approximate) linear representationof the (intermedi-
ate) estimator Wˇ of Step 3. With high probability the estimation error is a zero-mean term plus
an approximation errorRkn, which vanishes provided that r1n→ 0 (since sn/
√
n→ 0 by Assump-
tion 3). This result is key to establishing the relevant rates of convergence (Theorem 2 below)
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and also a distributional limit that allows the construction of valid confidence intervals (Theo-
rem 4 in the Appendix). Therefore we will build substantially on Theorem 1i. in what follows.
The secondpart of Theorem1pertains to the thresholded estimator. It states that if the thresh-
olds are chosen to be sufficiently larger than the entry-wise estimation errors, the thresholded
estimator will achieve good rates of convergence both for the rows and for the columns ofH−1.
Of course, the choice of thresholds {µkj}k,j∈VO is key for this result. We deliberately state the
second part of Theorem 1 to allow for different choices of thresholds. A particular choice of
{µkj} can be obtainedusing analytic bounds, based on self-normalizedmoderate deviation the-
ory, that are slightly conservative but computationally trivial, or using a bootstrap procedure
that exploits the correlation structure and still allows for |VO| ≫ n, but is computationally more
demanding and requires stronger conditions.
For concreteness we provide the results based on the self-normalization ideas in Theorem 2
and refer the interested reader to Theorem 4 in the Appendix for the result associated with the
bootstrap procedure. Theorem 2 is based on the following thresholds:
µkj =2(1+ log
−1 n)
σˆkj√
n
Φ−1
(
1− 1
3n|VO|2
)
= 2(1+ log−1 n)σˆkjλ, (13)
where σˆ2kj =
1
n
∑n
t=1{Ψˆk,·(1;p(t)O )(y(t)j − (vˆj − Wˆj,·p(t)O ))}2.
THEOREM 2. Suppose that Assumption 3 holds. Then, with probability at least 1− o(1) the inter-
mediate estimator based on Algorithm 1 satisfies
max
k,j∈VO
|(Wˇ −H−1)kj | ≤C1
√
log |VO|
n
and max
k∈VO
|vˇk − vk| ≤C1
√
log |VO|
n
,
for some constant C1 > 0. Moreover, suppose that r1n = o(1/ logn). Then the thresholds in (13),
with probability at least 1− o(1), yield
C2
√
log |VO|/n≥ µkj ≥ 2|(Wˇ −H−1)kj | simultaneously over k, j ∈ VO, (14)
for some constant C2 > 0. Finally, with probability 1 − o(1) the thresholded estimator based on
these thresholds satisfies
max
k,j∈VO
|(Wˇ µ−H−1)kj | ≤C3
√
log |VO|
n
,as well as (15)
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‖Wˇ µ−H−1‖∞ ≤ snC3
√
log |VO|
n
+3r1n and ‖Wˇ µ−H−1‖1 ≤ snC2
√
log |VO|
n
+3r1n, (16)
for some constant C3 > 0.
Theorem 2 implies that Algorithm 1 provides consistent estimates of the entries ofH−1, uni-
formly over all entries. Having estimates of the entries of H−1 is valuable for understanding
the impact of the price of an agent on another agent’s consumption (accounting for the net-
work externalities through latent agents). Moreover, under the approximate sparsity assump-
tions that imply that r1n = o(1/ logn) (see Section 5), Theorem 2 also shows that there is a
suitable choice of thresholding parameters that allows for the estimator Wˇ µ to have desirable
rates of convergence for the rows and columns. The proposed thresholds are derived using self-
normalizedmoderate deviation theory. This allows us to handle non-Gaussian shocks as well as
the high dimensionality of the estimandmatrix.
REMARK 2 (BOOTSTRAP-BASED THRESHOLDS). Theorem 2 constructs thresholds {µkj}k,j∈VO ,
using self-normalized moderate deviation theory and the union bound, i.e., a Bonferroni cor-
rection. In somecases this could be conservative and it is of interest to pursue a less conservative
choice. To accomplish this one needs to account for the correlation structure. Under stronger
regularity conditions, this can be done through the use of amultiplier bootstrap procedure con-
ditional on the data. In particular, for each k, j ∈ VO define
Tkj :=
1√
n
n∑
t=1
ξˆ(t)
Ψˆk,·(1;p
(t)
O ){y(t)j − (vˆj − Wˆj,·p(t)O )}
σˆkj
,
where σˆ2kj =
1
n
∑n
t=1{Ψˆk,·(1;p(t)O )[y(t)j −(vˆj−Wˆj,·p(t)O )]}2, ξˆ(t) are i.i.d. standardnormal randomvari-
ables independent of the data, and (Wˆ , vˆ) are as given in Step 1 of the algorithm. The associated
critical value we are interested in is
cv∗(1−α) = conditional (1−α)-quantile of max
k,j∈VO
|Tkj | given the data,
which canbe computed by simulation (by redrawing theGaussianmultipliers). Then the thresh-
olds can be set µkj = 2cv
∗
(1−α)σˆkj/
√
n. Such a bootstrap procedure also leads to the construction
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of simultaneous confidence intervals.We refer the interested reader to Section F in the Appendix
for a more detailed discussion. In this appendix, using recent central limit theorems for high-
dimensional vectors (where |VO|2 ≫ n is allowed; see, e.g., Chernozhukov et al. (2014b, 2013a)),
the validity of this procedure is established. 
REMARK 3 (TIME DEPENDENCE). In this work we focus on the impact of latent agents who con-
sume products that exhibit positive network externalities, and throughout the paperwe assume
i.i.d. observations. The key technical tools we rely on, namely, self-normalizedmoderate devia-
tion theory andhigh-dimensional central limit theorems, have beenderivedunder this assump-
tion. However, recent works have been generalizing these tools to allow for time dependence
as well; see Chen et al. (2016) for results of self-normalized moderate deviation theory and
Chernozhukov et al. (2013b), Zhang and Cheng (2014), Zhang et al. (2017), Belloni and Oliveira
(2018) for high-dimensional central limit theorems under various types of dependence. There-
fore it is plausible that most of these tools can be extended to allow for time dependence under
more stringent conditions both on the moments and on the growth of VO and sn relative to n.
Although it is beyond the scope of the present work we view this endeavor as a potentially inter-
esting future research direction. 
REMARK 4 (HANDLING ENDOGENOUS PRICES). In some applications it is of interest to also allow
for endogenous prices, i.e., E[pOǫ
T
O] 6= 0. In such cases it is well known that the moment condi-
tion (9) no longer holds and in turn the proposed procedure does not lead to consistent esti-
mates of the matrixH−1. Nonetheless the tools proposed here can still be useful when suitable
instrumental variables are available; i.e., for each k ∈ VO, we observe a random vector zk(t) such
that E[zk(t)ǫ
(t)
k ] = 0 and E[z
k(t)(p
(t)
O )
T ] is full rank and well-behaved. These instruments yield a
similar moment condition
E[{y(t)O − (vO−H−1p(t)O )}(1;zk(t))T ] = 0, (17)
and Algorithm 1 can be adjusted accordingly. This generalization is of interest as it allows for
covering a different set of applications. However, its analysis poses interesting technical chal-
lenges. The analysis of that new estimator would combine the analysis developed here and the
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analysis of high-dimensional linear instrumental variables developed in Belloni et al. (2017a).
This is being pursued in a companion work Ata et al. (2018). 
REMARK 5 (VARIATION IN PRICES FOR LATENT AGENTS). In this paper, we consider the case in
which the prices that the latent agents are exposed to are fixed. Suppose that this is not the case,
and the prices of the latent agents evolve with respect to a stochastic process {p(t)L }. Then, pro-
vided that observable agents do not have access to these prices or do not find themunfavorable,
we can use a similar characterization to Lemma 1 to express observable agents’ consumption as
y
(t)
O = v˜O−H−1p(t)O + ε˜(t)O , where v˜O :=H−1aO −H−1SOL(aL−E[pL]) (analogous to (5)) and
ε˜
(t)
O :=H
−1ξ(t)O −H−1SOL(ξ(t)L − p(t)L +E[p(t)L ]).
An inspection of the proofs reveals that it suffices to have E[ε˜O | pO] = 0 for the arguments
(and the results of this section) to go through (after replacing vO with v˜O). For example, this
is achieved if the variation in pO is introduced in a randomized experiment, which is possible
in many online platforms. In observational studies, additional considerations may be needed
to justify this condition, since it imposes a restriction on the relation between pL and pO, e.g.,
E[pL−E[pL]|pO] = 0. When such a condition does not hold, it becomes a source of endogeneity,
in which case the comments in Remark 4 become relevant. 
4. Obtaining Approximately Optimal Prices
Up to nowour focus has been on estimating thematrixH−1 from the available data. This section
investigates how these estimates can be used to choose prices that (approximately) maximize
revenues.
Recall that if the seller knew the underlying influence structure, she could maximize her
revenues by using the prices p⋆O characterized in Lemma 2. With some abuse of notation, let
yO(pO) denote the consumption levels of the observable agents in the consumption equilibrium
induced by some price vector pO. Denote the corresponding expected revenues by Π(pO), i.e.,
Π(pO) =E[〈pO, yO(pO)〉].
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Suppose that the seller uses price vector pO instead of p
⋆
O. Her revenue loss from using the
former price vector can bemeasured as follows:
R(pO) :=
Π(p⋆O)−Π(pO)
Π(p⋆O)
. (18)
Here, the numerator gives the absolute revenue difference under the optimal prices and under
price vector pO. The denominator is the revenue under optimal prices. The ratio measures the
revenue loss from using prices pO.
Recall that the prices used by the seller are less than p¯. For a given vector of prices pO, we
denote by pO∧ p¯ ·eO the vector obtainedby capping these prices at p¯, i.e., [pO∧ p¯ ·eO]i =min{p¯, pi}
for all i∈ VO. Using this notation we now state the main result of this section.
THEOREM 3. Suppose that the influence structure admits an (sn, r1n)-sparse approximation,
Assumption 3 holds, and p⋆O < p¯ · eO. Suppose further that sn
√
log(|VO|)/n+ r1n = o(1). Let Wˇ µ
denote the thresholded estimator in Theorem 1, and define
pˆO = [(Wˇ
µ+(Wˇ µ)T )−1vˇO]∧ p¯ · eO. (19)
Then, for some constant C1 > 0, with probability 1− o(1)we have R(pˆO)≤C1
(
s2n
log(|VO|)
n
+ r21n
)
.
Intuitively, if W µ constitutes a good estimate of H−1, then we can exploit this approxima-
tion (together with Lemma 2) to construct approximately optimal prices. Theorem 3 formalizes
this intuition. In particular, this result establishes that a seller can leverage the algorithm of the
previous section to estimate H−1, and compute prices as in (19) using these estimates. More-
over, it is possible to quantify the revenue loss fromusing these approximately optimal prices as
opposed to the optimal prices of Lemma 2. Of course, such an approximation would deliver a
small optimality gap provided that there is sufficient data on past price/consumption observa-
tions. Our theorem sheds light on how this gap diminishes as a function of the number of avail-
able observations. In settings where the underlying influence structure is approximately sparse
(with small sn and r1n), our approach is particularly powerful, and guarantees little revenue loss.
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REMARK 6 (ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR APPROXIMATELY OPTIMAL PRICES). An alternative
approach to construct approximately optimal prices involves first estimating H (as opposed
to H−1), and then using the expression of optimal prices in Lemma 2, given in terms of the
H matrix, to construct a candidate price vector. However, estimating H presents similar
challenges to those of estimating H−1. First, note that in the presence of latent agents the
matrix H is not sparse in general. To see this, note on the one hand that the consumption
of observable agents has direct influence on the consumption of their observable neighbors,
which can be represented by a sparse matrix when the underlying network is sparse. On the
other hand, observable agents also influence other observable agents indirectly through the
influence they exert on the latent agents (who in turn influence other observable agents).
This latter influence structure is not sparse in general. Hence, the matrix H that captures the
aggregate influence that the observable agents exert on each other need not be sparse. Second,
to construct approximately optimal prices through the estimates of theH matrix, it is necessary
to obtain small estimation errors for both rows and columns. When estimating H−1, this was
accomplished by our algorithm in Section 3.We explore how ideas such as approximate sparsity
can be exploited to obtain estimators for the aggregate influence structure H with desirable
guarantees on row/column errors in our companion paper Ata et al. (2018). 
5. Examples of Approximately Sparse Networks
The results in Section 3 rely on approximate sparsity of H−1. The rates of convergence of the
proposed estimators (in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2) are particularly useful if there exists a
sparse approximation toH−1 with a few nonzero entries in each row/column that leads to small
approximation errors, i.e., if we can set the maximum number of nonzero elements in each
row and column (sn) so that s
2
n/n and the approximation error r1n are small. In this section, we
exemplify that this indeed is the case for many classes of networks.
To fix ideas, we start with two special cases: (i) m-banded networks and (ii) matrices that
exhibit polynomial off-diagonal decay of connection strength. Then, we consider a fairly gen-
eral class of networks, wherewe require agents’ neighborhoodsnot to grow too fast. For all these
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cases, we establish (sn, r1n)-sparsity of theH
−1 matrix, and provide results on convergence rates
whenAlgorithm1 is employed. The proofs of the results in this section canbe found in Appendix
E .
5.1. m-Banded Networks
A matrix A ism-banded if its nonzero entries are at mostm entries away from its diagonal, i.e.,
Aij = 0 for |i− j| >m. Motivated by this definition, we say that a network G is m-banded if for
some permutation ℓ : V →{1, . . . , |V |}, its adjacencymatrix satisfies
Gij = 0 if |ℓ(i)− ℓ(j)|>m. (20)
In other words, for anm-banded network a permutation of rows/columns of the corresponding
matricesG andM =Λ−G arem-banded (e.g., consider thematrixGℓ such that (Gℓ)ℓ(i),ℓ(j) :=Gij
for all i, j ∈ V ). This definition captures cases where nodes are embedded at the integer points
on the real line, and they have only “local” connections, i.e., connections with m nodes to the
left andm nodes to the right.7
It is known that if A is an m-banded matrix, then A−1 exhibits “exponential decay” (see
Demko et al. (1984)), where the rate of decay is characterized in terms of the singular values
of AAT . That is, as we get away from the diagonal the magnitude of the entries decays expo-
nentially. We next adapt this result to our setting and obtain an exponential decay result on
the inverse ofM . In this subsection, we discuss our results, using the shorthand notation C˜1 :=
4(m+1) b¯(4b¯−ζ)
ζ2(2b¯−ζ) and λ1 :=
(
2b¯−ζ
2b¯
)1/m
.
LEMMA 3. Suppose that the underlying network G ism-banded. Then, for any i, j ∈ V we have
|(M−1)ij | ≤ C˜1λ|ℓ(i)−ℓ(j)|1 . (21)
Similarly, for i, j ∈ VO, |(H−1)ij | ≤ C˜1λ|ℓ(i)−ℓ(j)|1 .
7We emphasize that in our context the nodes that correspond to observable agents need not be consecutive integers
on the real line. Nevertheless, it can be seen that if the underlying network ism-banded, then the induced subgraph
of observable (similarly latent) agents is alsom-banded.
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This result suggests a natural (sn, r1n)-sparse approximation for H
−1: since entries of H−1
decay (exponentially) in |ℓ(i) − ℓ(j)| for any i, j ∈ VO, for an (sn, r1n)-sparse approximation of
these matrices we just focus on i, j for which |ℓ(i)− ℓ(j)| is small. In particular, let W¯ ∈R|VO|×|VO|
be a matrix, such that for i, j ∈ VO we have
W¯ij =


(H−1)ij for |ℓ(i)− ℓ(j)| ≤ sn−12 ,
0 otherwise.
(22)
Observe that W¯ has at most sn nonzero elements in each row and column by construction. Our
next result establishes that W¯ yields a sparse approximation ofH−1.
LEMMA 4. Suppose that G is m-banded. Let W¯ be given as in (22). Then W¯ is an (sn, r1n)-sparse
approximation ofH−1, where sn = C˜2max{m, logn} and r1n = 1n for some constant C˜2 > 0.
In this result, C˜2 is a constant that depends on C˜1 and λ1, and its precise form is provided in
the proof of the lemma. This result shows that form-banded networks, a sparse approximation
where sn is logarithmic in n and the error term r1n scales with 1/n can be obtained. Thus for
such networks, Algorithm 1 can be used to obtain a consistent estimate of H−1 with desirable
rates. Our next result explicitly characterizes the rates of this estimator.
COROLLARY 3. Suppose that G is m-banded. Consider the estimators Wˇ µ and Wˇ given in Algo-
rithm 1. Under the Assumptions of Theorem 1, with probability 1− o(1)we have
max
{
‖Wˇ µ−H−1‖∞,‖Wˇ µ−H−1‖1
}
≤ C˜3max{m, logn}
√
logVO
n
,
for some constant C˜3 > 0. Moreover,
√
n{(−vˇk, Wˇk,·)T − (−vk,H−1k,· )T}=−Ψˆ
1√
n
n∑
t=1
ε
(t)
k (1;p
(t)
O )+R
k
n
where ‖Rkn‖∞ =O
(
1√
n
max{m, logn} log |VO|
)
.
Weomit the proof of this result, as it is an immediate corollary of Lemma 4, Theorem1, and The-
orem 2. Recall that in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 we have three sets of estimation results. The
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first set focuses on “asymptotic normality” and the second one characterizes the ℓ1, ℓ∞ errors
for the corresponding thresholded estimators. These two sets of results depend on the approx-
imate sparsity of the underlying matrices, and are reported above form-banded networks. The
third set of results pertains to the entry-wise estimation errors for estimators Wˇ , which is inde-
pendent of the specifics of the sparse approximation (sn, r1n) and hence is excluded from our
corollary. In subsequent subsections, as we exemplify other approximately sparse networks, for
compactness we report our results only on ℓ1, ℓ∞ errors. However, we emphasize that similar
bounds for the asymptotic normality results can also be readily obtained by using the bounds
of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 together with the approximate sparsity bounds (sn, r1n) of the
underlying networks.
5.2. Polynomial Decay of Connection Strengths
The m-banded structure discussed in the previous section is very special, and in particular it
disallows for long-range connections considered in small-world models (where agents in addi-
tion to local connections are allowed to have a few long-range connections, eventually leading
to a network with a small diameter; see Watts and Strogatz (1998), Kleinberg (2000)). We next
argue that our results on m-banded networks carry over when such connections are allowed,
provided that their strength is decaying with the distance between agents.
In particular, we next consider networks for which the entries ofG satisfy
Gij ≤ C˜
(1+ |ℓ(i)− ℓ(j)|)θ for some θ > 1, C˜ > 0, and all i, j ∈ V , (23)
where, as before, ℓ : V → {1, . . . , |V |} is some permutation. Thus, the structure in (23) allows
for long-range connections, but requires the connection strength to decay polynomially as the
“distance” increases.8
8Once again, the nodes can be thought of as corresponding to integer points on the real line and the observable
(latent) nodes need not be contiguous. It can be readily seen that if the network satisfies (23), then the induced
subnetworks of observable/latent nodes also satisfy this condition.
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Jaffard’s theorem (Jaffard 1990) is essential for our analysis in this section. This theorem
implies that the inverse of a matrix whose entries decay polynomially with distance from
the diagonal also exhibits similar decay properties. More precisely, the aforementioned result
focuses on infinitematrices and establishes that Banach algebras of matrices with a polynomial
off-diagonal decay property are inverse-closed (Gro¨chenig and Klotz 2010, 2014). A quantitative
version of this result, with explicit bounds on decay parameters, is given in Gro¨chenig and Klotz
(2014). Even though this result is for infinite matrices, viewing finite matrices as diagonal sub-
blocks of infinite matrices immediately yields the following result, which we state without a
proof:
LEMMA 5. Let A ∈ Rk×k be a matrix such that |Aij | ≤ C˜/(1 + |i− j|)θ. Then, |A−1ij | ≤ C˜1/(1 + |i−
j|)θ, where C˜1 is a constant that depends only on θ, C˜, and ‖A−1‖2.
Applying this result to network matrices that satisfy (23), after some algebraicmanipulations,
we obtain the following result:
LEMMA 6. Suppose that (23) holds. Then, max{|M−1ij |, |H−1ij |} ≤ C˜1(1+|ℓ(i)−ℓ(j)|)θ for some constant
C˜1 > 0.
In this result C˜1 depends on C˜, b¯, θ, ζ. This lemma together with the decay property in (23) pro-
vides means of obtaining sparse approximations of H−1. The high-level idea here is similar to
the one in the context of m-banded matrices: prune entries that correspond to pairs of nodes
that are “far away.” More precisely, given number of nonzero elements in each row/column sn,
let W¯ once again be given as in (22). As before, W¯ has at most sn nonzero elements in each row
and column by construction. Our next result establishes that thanks to the polynomial decay
property of the entries of G, the error due to omitting entries that correspond to faraway pairs
of nodes is insignificant.
LEMMA 7. Suppose that (23) holds. Let W¯ be given as in (22). Then W¯ is an (sn, r1n)-sparse
approximation ofH−1, where sn = (n/ log |VO|)1/2θ and r1n ≤ C˜12
θ
θ−1
(
log |VO|
n
)(θ−1)/2θ
.
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Using this result, we obtain the following rates of convergence for the estimator defined in
Algorithm 1:
COROLLARY 4. Suppose that (23) holds. Consider the thresholded estimator Wˇ µ given in Algo-
rithm 1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, with probability 1− o(1)we have
max
{‖Wˇ µ−H−1‖∞,‖Wˇ µ−H−1‖1}≤
(
C˜2+
C˜32
θ
θ− 1
)(
log |VO|
n
)(θ−1)/2θ
,
for some constants C˜2, C˜3 > 0.
This result is an immediate corollary of Lemma 7 andTheorem 1, and hence its proof is omitted.
REMARK 7 (EXPONENTIAL DECAY). Here we restrict attention to polynomial decay of entries of
G. If the decay rate is exponential, i.e., |Mij | ≤ C˜ exp(−θ|ℓ(i)− ℓ(j)|), then a version of Jaffard’s
theorem implies thatM−1 also exhibits exponential decay (Benedetto and Powell 2006). In this
case, by choosing sn, r1n appropriately, it is possible to obtain faster rates of convergence than
those of Corollary 4. Moreover, in this section (as in the previous one) we implicitly assume
that nodes are embedded in a one-dimensional grid. Similar polynomial/exponential decay
results continue to hold if the nodes are embedded in a k > 1-dimensional grid, and the decay of
influence parameters between nodes i and j is expressed in terms of the distance between the
nodes in each dimension (see, e.g., Gro¨chenig and Klotz (2010)). Thus the results of this subsec-
tion readily extend to more general network structures with appropriate decay of connection
strength. 
5.3. A General Class of Networks with Bounded Neighborhood Growth
Our examples thus far have focused on settings where the connections are “local,” or their
strength decays as the distance between nodes increases.While these assumptions simplify the
analysis, they are not necessary for employing our estimator in Algorithm 1. In this section, we
introduce a fairly general model of network connections that allows for strong long-distance
connections and establish that our algorithm still achieves desirable convergence rates.
We start by stating the assumption we impose in this section:
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ASSUMPTION 4. M and MLL are diagonalizable, i.e., M = XDX
−1 and MLL = Y DLLY −1 for
some diagonalmatricesD,DLL and invertiblematricesX and Y . In addition, the condition num-
bers of matrices X and Y are bounded by a constant, i.e., κ(X), κ(Y ) ≤ κ¯ where κ(A) := ||A||2 ×
||A−1||2.
When M = XDX−1, the diagonal entries of D correspond to the eigenvalues of M , and the
columns of X correspond to the right eigenvectors (similarly for MLL). Diagonalizability is a
mild condition since the set of diagonalizable matrices is dense in the set of all (square) matri-
ces, andM is diagonalizable, e.g., if it has |V | distinct eigenvalues (Golub and Van Loan 2012).
The assumption on the condition number of X holds, for instance, ifM admits an orthogonal
set of eigenvectors since in this caseX can be chosen to have orthonormal columns and κ(X) =
1. 9 In general, this assumption requires the eigenvectors ofM corresponding to different eigen-
values to be sufficiently different (i.e., no eigenvector should be well approximated by a linear
combination of other eigenvectors). Assumption 4 similarly requires thatMLL be diagonalizable
with sufficiently different eigenvectors.
It is known that by using spectral theory and approximation theory, elegant approximations
of matrix functions can be obtained (see, e.g., Demko et al. 1984, Benzi and Razouk 2007). For
9 A sufficient condition for M to admit an orthogonal set of eigenvectors is for G (and hence M ) to be symmet-
ric. Another condition is to have bi = b¯ for all i and the underlying weighted directed graph to satisfy
∑
k gkjgki =
∑
k gikgjk. If weights are binary, the latter can be interpreted as a regularity condition, as it guarantees that the total
number of common out-neighbors of i, j (i.e., nodes that are influenced by both i and j) are equal to the total number
of common in-neighbors (i.e., nodes that influence both i and j). In matrix notation, this condition can be stated
as GTG = GGT . Hence, it implies that G is a normal matrix, and that its eigenvectors are orthogonal. When bi = b¯
for all i, this also implies thatM has orthogonal eigenvectors. Thus, while the condition on κ(X) is readily satisfied
by undirected networks, it is also satisfied by directed structures where G is not symmetric. These conditions focus
on the κ(X) = 1 case. However, note that κ¯ can be any constant, and richer structures are allowed. Furthermore, by
allowing κ¯ to depend on |VO|, similar results to the ones in this subsection can be obtained at the expense of looser
bounds.
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completeness, we next outline how under Assumption 2, sparse approximation of matrixM−1
can be obtained using the aforementioned ideas.
Under Assumption 2, it can be shown that singular values ofM belong to the interval [ζ,4b¯−ζ]
(see Lemma 14 in Appendix G.1 for a proof). Let D denote the disc in the complex plane cen-
tered at 2b¯ with radius 2b¯− ζ that contains this interval. Observe that the function h(x) := x−1
is analytic in D. Let πk denote the set of polynomials of degree at most k. Given a subset K of
the complex plane and a function f whose domain containsK , let ||f ||K := supz∈K |f(z)|, and let
ek(K) := infg∈πk ||f−g||K . That is, ek(K) corresponds to the error of the best uniformapproxima-
tion of f with a polynomial of degree k on setK . Wewill use the classic results on approximation
of f(·)with polynomials (see, e.g., Demko et al. (1984) and Section 4.3 of Meinardus (2012)).10
PROPOSITION 1. Let r= (4b¯− ζ)/ζ and q= (√r− 1)/(√r+1). Then, ek(D)≤ (1+r
1/2)2
2ζr
qk+1.
Let g⋆k denote the polynomial that achieves the best possible approximation error ek in Propo-
sition 1. With abuse of notation let h(M) =M−1, and let g⋆k(M) be the corresponding kth-order
matrix polynomial ofM . By diagonalizability ofM we have
||h(M)− g⋆k(M)||2 = ||X(h(D)− g⋆k(D))X−1||2 ≤ ||X−1||2||X||2||h(D)− g⋆k(D)||2
≤ κ(X) max
z∈σ(M)
|h(z)− g⋆k(z)|
≤ C˜qk,
(24)
where σ(M) denotes the set of singular values of M . Here, the second inequality follows
from spectral theory (see Demko et al. (1984)), the last inequality uses Proposition 1, and C˜ =
κ¯q (1+r
1/2)2
2ζr
is a constant.
Equation (24) suggests that M−1 can be approximated through a (matrix) polynomial of M .
When this polynomial has a small degree, it induces a sparse approximation ofM−1. Moreover,
exploiting the fact that H−1 can be expressed in terms of a submatrix ofM−1 (see Lemma 13),
we can employ this result to obtain sparse approximations ofH−1 as well.
10 The best approximating polynomial can also be explicitly obtained.
37
To see this, denote by W¯ the |VO| × |VO| submatrix of g⋆k(M) corresponding to observable
agents, i.e.,
W¯ = [g⋆k(M)]OO. (25)
The submatrix of M−1 corresponding to observable agents is given by H−1. Thus, from the
observations above W¯ can be viewed as a sparse approximation of H−1. In particular, (24)
implies that
‖H−1− W¯‖2 ≤ ‖h(M)− g⋆k(M)‖2≤ C˜qk. (26)
The above discussion suggests that W¯ can serve as an approximation of H−1. We next estab-
lish that W¯ indeed constitutes a sparse approximation and characterize the sparsity parameters
sn, r1n. Before we state our result, we introduce a relevant definition.
DEFINITION 4. Let ρ(i, j) denote the hop distance from node i to j, i.e., the minimum number
of edges on a (directed) path from i to j:
ρ(i, j) :=min{k ∈Z+|i1 = i, ik+1 = j, (iℓ, iℓ+1)∈E for ℓ= 1, . . . , k}.
We say that neighborhoods of agents exhibit exponential/polynomial growth if the following
conditions hold:
(i) Exponential growth: the number of agents that are at most k hops away from i is bounded
by an exponential function with exponent k; i.e., there exist constants Ce, de > 0 such that
|{j ∈ V | ρ(i, j)≤ k}∪ {j ∈ V | ρ(j, i)≤ k}| ≤Cedke , for all i∈ V , k ∈Z+.
(ii) Polynomial growth: the number of agents that are at most k hops away from i is bounded
by a polynomial of k; i.e., there exist constants Cp, dp > 0 such that
|{j ∈ V | ρ(i, j)≤ k}∪ {j ∈ V | ρ(j, i)≤ k}| ≤Cpkdp, for all i∈ V , k ∈Z+.
LEMMA 8. Suppose that Assumption 4 holds. Let W¯ be defined as in (25), for some appropriately
chosen k, and let q < 1 be defined as in Proposition 1.
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(i) If the neighborhoods exhibit exponential growth, then the matrix W¯ is an (sn, r1n)-sparse
approximation ofH−1, where for ν = logde/q(de) and some constants C˜1, C˜2 > 0we have
sn = C˜1
( √
n|VO|
log(|VO|)
)ν
, and r1n = C˜2|VO|ν/2
(
log(|VO|)√
n
)1−ν
.
(ii) If the neighborhoods exhibit polynomial growth, then W¯ is an (sn, r1n)-sparse approxima-
tion ofH−1, where for some constants C˜3, C˜4 > 0we have
sn = C˜3
(
n
log(|VO|)
)1/4
, and r1n = C˜4
√
|VO|q

( n
log(|VO |)
) 1
4dp


.
The constants C˜1, C˜2, C˜3, C˜4 are independent of n and |VO| but can depend on the parameters
C˜,Ce,Cp, de, dp, q, p¯, ζ. Their precise characterizations are given in the proof of the lemma. Note
that this lemma implies that when neighborhood growth is polynomial, it is possible to choose
a sparse approximation that scales with a root of the number of observations n, while ensuring
that the approximation error r1n decays exponentially fast. This observationallows for achieving
small approximation errors with sparse structures.
With exponential neighborhood growth, achieving small approximation errors requires
employing less sparse structures. In this case, for the approximation error r1n to be O(1),
it is necessary to have n = Ω(log(|VO|)2|VO|ν/(1−ν)). On the other hand, in this case, sn =
Ω(|VO|ν/2(1−ν)). This implies that in order to ensure a small approximation error it is necessary
to have the sparsity parameter scale with a root of |VO|. Note that when ν is small, the degree of
the root is large and hence it is possible to achieve a small error while still ensuring a significant
degree of sparsity. This is the case, for instance, when q is small. In terms of the primitives, such
cases correspond to settings where 4b¯− ζ ≈ ζ and hence the singular values of M are close to
each other.
It is intuitive that with exponential neighborhood growth, small approximation errors neces-
sitate less sparse approximations. This is so because polynomial approximations aremore accu-
rate when higher orders of polynomials are employed. But with exponential neighborhood
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growth, such approximations naturally induce less sparse structures. When the neighborhood
growth is slower than exponential, it is possible to obtain sparser approximations (e.g., as in the
case of polynomial neighborhood growth).
Using Lemma 8, we next obtain an immediate corollary (stated without a proof) of Theorem 1
that characterizes the rates of convergence for the thresholded estimator of Algorithm 1.
COROLLARY 5. Suppose that Assumption 4 holds. Consider the thresholded estimator Wˇ µ given in
Algorithm 1. In the exponential neighborhood growth case, under the assumptions of Theorem 1,
with probability 1− o(1)we have
max{‖Wˇ µ−H−1‖∞,‖Wˇ µ−H−1‖1} ≤ C˜5
√
log |VO|
n
( √
n|VO|
log(|VO|)
)ν
+ C˜6|VO|ν/2
(
log(|VO|)√
n
)1−ν
,
for some constants C˜5, C˜6 > 0. Similarly, for the polynomial neighborhood growth case, we have
max{‖Wˇ µ−H−1‖∞,‖Wˇ µ−H−1‖1} ≤ C˜7 4
√
log |VO|
n
+ C˜8
√
|VO|q

( n
log(|VO |)
) 1
4dp


for some constants C˜7, C˜8 > 0.
6. Conclusions
We studied the estimation and pricing problems in social networks in the presence of latent
agents. The agents consumeproducts that exhibit positivenetwork externalities, and a seller has
data on the past consumption decisions/prices for observable agents. We show that by using
the available data, it is possible to estimate a matrix that captures how the prices offered to
observable agents impact the consumption of other observable agents. Our estimator for this
matrix yields good estimation error guarantees under an approximate sparsity assumption. This
assumption holds for a rich class of networks, making our estimators applicable in interesting
high-dimensional settings. We show that by using the estimates of this matrix it is possible to
construct prices that approximately maximize the revenues of the seller. The optimal prices
critically dependon the underlying influence structure and, due to the presenceof latent agents,
they exhibit important differences from what has been reported in the literature.
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Our work is the first to focus on pricing and estimation problems in social networks in the
presence of latent agents. It opensup a number of interesting research avenues, two of whichwe
highlight here. First, suppose that the seller does not have historical data on the consumption
decisions of agents. It would be interesting to study how the seller can experiment with a vector
of prices to learn the underlying demand system, and improve her long-run revenues. Such a
study would facilitate improved decisionmaking in social networks even in the absence of read-
ily available data, and leverage tools from networks and online convex optimization. Second, it
may be possible to infer the presence of latent agents and how they are connected to observable
ones from the individual outcomes of observable agents. It would be interesting to study how
and under what conditions such inferences can be drawn.
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Appendix
In Appendix A we remind the reader our notation. In Appendices B – E, we present the proofs
of the results stated in Sections 2 – 5 respectively. In Appendix F, we provide simultaneous con-
fidence intervals for our estimator, and also present an alternative bootstrap-based approach
for choosing the threshold parameters. Various auxiliary results and technical lemmas that are
used in these appendices are presented in Appendix G.
A. Notation
We start by summarizing the notation that will be used throughout the appendix.
• E[X]: Expectation of random vectorX .
• En[X] = 1n
∑n
t=1X
(t), for random vectors {X(t)}t∈[n], where [n] = {1, . . . , n}.
• ‖A‖p: Matrix p-norm for p∈ {1,2,∞}. Defined similarly for vectors.
• ‖A‖e,∞: Entry-wisemaximum absolute entry ofA, i.e., ‖A‖e,∞ =maxi,j |Aij |.
• ‖β‖0: Number of nonzero entries of a given vector β.
• λ= 1√
n
Φ−1
(
1− 1
3n|VO|2
)
, where Φ denotes the cumulative density function of the standard
normal distribution.
• V¯O := {0} ∪ VO, and for k, j ∈ V¯O, 1kj = 1 if k = j and 1kj = 0 otherwise. We index the entries
of vectors inR|VO | andR|V¯O| by the elements of VO and V¯O respectively. For instance, (1;p
(t)
O )j
is equal to p
(t)
j if j ∈ VO, and is equal to 1 otherwise, where (1;p(t)O )∈R|V¯O|.
• M 2n = 1∨maxk∈VO 1n
∑n
t=1(p
(t)
k )
4.
• Σˆ = 1
n
∑n
t=1(1;p
(t)
O )(1;p
(t)
O )
T .
• Ψ¯ =E[(1;p(t)O )(1;p(t)O )T ]−1.
B. Proofs of Sections 2
Proof of Lemma 1. By Lemma 16, agents’ equilibrium consumption levels are positive. Thus,
first-order optimality conditions hold with equality in equilibrium. In matrix notation, these
conditions can be stated as y(t) =M−1(a+ ξ(t)− p(t)). Using Lemma 13 to expressM−1 in block
format, and focusing on entries of y(t) associated with observable agents, the claim follows. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Using Lemma 1 to express agent’s equilibrium consumption levels, the
optimization problem in (7) can be rewritten as follows:
max
pO≤p¯·eO
Eξ[〈pO,H−1(aO + ξO− pO)−H−1SOL(aL+ ξL− pL)〉]
Recalling that Eξ[ξ] = 0, this problem can alternatively be written as follows:
max
pO≤p¯·eO
〈pO,H−1(aO− pO −SOL(aL− pL))〉. (27)
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Since, the optimal solution is assumed to satisfy p⋆O < p¯ · eO, first-order conditions yield
H−1(aO − p⋆O−SOL(aL− pL))−H−Tp⋆O =0.
Rearranging terms, we obtain
H−1(aO−SOL(aL− pL)) = (H−1+H−T )p⋆O. (28)
By Lemma 13, (H−1 + H−T ) is positive definite, and invertible. Thus, the previous equality
implies that
p⋆O = (H
−1+H−T )−1H−1(aO −SOL(aL− pL)).
Since (H−1+H−T )−1H−1 =HT (H +HT )−1, this can alternatively be expressed as
p⋆O =H
T (H +HT )−1(aO−SOL(aL− pL)),
as claimed. 
Proof of Corollary 1. Observe that whenG=GT , we haveM =MT ,MOO =M
T
OO,MLL=M
T
LL,
MOL =M
T
LO, andH =H
T . In this case, we have the following identity (H−1+H−T )−1H−1 = I/2.
Moreover, when p⋆O < p¯ ·eO, p⋆O is given as in Lemma 2. Using the characterization in this lemma,
together with the aforementioned identity, yields
p⋆O =
1
2
(aO−SOL(aL− pL)) = qO,
where the last equality follows since aO = a˜ ·eO, aL = a˜ ·eL, and pL = p¯ ·eL under the assumptions
of the corollary.
Thus, to complete the proof, it suffices to show that p⋆O < p¯ · eO for sufficiently large p¯. Observe
that as p¯→ a˜, we have qO→ a˜2eO. Hence, for sufficiently large p¯ < a˜, we have qO ≈ a˜2eO < p¯ · eO.
Recall that the platform’s optimization problem is equivalently given by (27). On the other
hand, the constructed q0 is feasible in this problem, and it can be readily checked that it satisfies
the first-order optimality conditions (given in (28)). Hence, p⋆O = q0 < p¯ ·eO is an optimal solution
for sufficiently large p¯ < a˜. 
Proof of Corollary 2. Recall that for sufficiently large p¯ < a˜, the optimal price vector is as
given in Corollary 1. Also recall that SOL =MOLM
−1
LL , andM
−1
LLeL = (2b˜I −GLL)−1eL = 12bKL( 12b˜).
Substituting this expression in the optimal price vector provided in Corollary 1, it follows that
p⋆O =
a˜
2
eO − a˜−p¯4b˜ MOLKL( 12b˜). The result follows by noting that M = Λ−G = 2b˜I −G; thus, MOL
(which consists of the off-diagonal entries ofM ) is equal to −GOL. 
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C. Proofs of Section 3
C.1. Proof of Theorem 1
In this subsection, we establish a more general version of Theorem 1. In particular, as opposed
to imposing Assumption 3, we impose the following weaker assumption, and show that Algo-
rithm 1 obtains the rates given in the statement of the theorem under this assumption.
ASSUMPTION 5. Suppose that the network admits an (sn, r1n)-sparse approximation. Let
c, c′,C,C ′ > 0 be constants such that c <C.
i. The observed data {(p(t)O , y(t)O ) : t∈ [n]} are i.i.d. random vectors that satisfy (6). Moreover, the
data satisfyE[(ε
(t)
O )(p
(t)
O )
T ] = 0 for every t∈ [n], and
min
k∈VO ,j∈V¯O
E
[
{(ε(t)k )(1;p(t)O )j}2
]
≥ c, and max
k∈VO ,j∈V¯O
E
[∣∣(ε(t)k )(1;p(t)O )j∣∣4
]
≤C.
Finally, there existsMε ≥ 0 such that E
[
maxt∈[n];k∈VO |ε(t)k |4
]≤Mε and n−1Mε log |VO|= o(1).
ii. The matrix Ψ¯ :=E[(1;p
(t)
O )(1;p
(t)
O )
T ]−1 is such that
min
k,j∈V¯O
E[{Ψ¯k,·(1;p(t)O )(1;p(t)O )j −1kj}2]≥ c, and max
k,j∈V¯O
E[|Ψ¯k,·(1;p(t)O )(1;p(t)O )j −1kj |4]≤C.
Moreover, there exists MΨ ≥ 0 such that E[maxt∈[n];j,k∈V¯O |Ψ¯k,·(1;p(t)O )(1;p(t)O )j − 1kj |4] ≤MΨ
and n−1MΨ log |VO|= o(1). Finally, we assume that the eigenvalues of Ψ¯ are upper bounded
by a constant.
iii. Given the (sn, r1n)-sparse approximation of the influence structure, define the restricted
eigenvalue of Σˆ as
κ2c¯ = min
J⊂VO ,|J|≤sn
min
‖∆Jc‖1≤c¯‖∆J‖1
sn
∆T Σˆ∆
‖∆‖21
, (29)
where ∆ ∈ R|V¯O|, and for any index set J ⊂ |V¯O|, ∆J corresponds to a vector whose entries
consist of the entries of ∆ whose indices belong to J (similarly for J c := V¯O \ J). For c¯ = 3,
with probability at least 1 − o(1) we have that λMnsn/κ2c¯ ≤ 1/8 and κ2c¯ ≥ c′, where Mn =√
1∨maxk∈VO 1n
∑n
t=1(p
(t)
k )
4 as given in Algorithm 1.
iv. C ′ logVO ≥ logn and n−1 log |VO|= o(1).
The main technical difference of Assumption 3 from Assumption 5 is the restricted eigenvalue
condition (see Bickel et al. (2009)). We exploit this condition in the proof of Theorem 1, when
bounding estimation errors. For the sake of exposition, we decided to defer this technical con-
dition to the appendix, and opted to use the slightly stronger Assumption 3 in Section 3. We
establish in Appendix G.3 that in fact Assumption 5 is implied by Assumption 3. That is, the
assumptions stated earlier readily imply the restricted eigenvalue condition. This observation
also implies that Theorem 1 applies for a more general class of problem instances.
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In order to achieve desirable rates for estimators, it is often necessary to have the eigenvalues
of the designmatrix bounded away from zero. In our case, such a condition can be written as
xT Σˆx> c′1‖x‖2 > 0 (30)
for some constant c′1 and x∈R|VO| with x 6= 0. On the other hand, due to high dimensionality this
condition does not hold unless there is abundant data. This can be seen by noting that for n <
|V¯O| the matrix Σˆ = 1n
∑n
t=1(1;p
(t)
O )(1;p
(t)
O )
T is rank-deficient. Yet, despite the rank deficiency, (30)
can still hold for a subset of values of x ∈R|VO|. In fact, under approximate sparsity conditions,
in order to obtain desirable rates in estimation, it suffices for (30) to hold for x 6= 0 such that
‖xJc‖1 ≤ c¯‖xJ‖1 for some set of indices J ≤ sn. In settings where sn≪ n, the restricted eigenvalue
can be bounded away from zero for many common design matrices with high probability as
required in Assumption 5iii., which can then be leveraged for characterizing rates of estimators.
Before we establish Theorem 1, we provide three lemmas that characterize some feasi-
ble/optimal solutions of the optimization problems given in Algorithm 1. In proving these lem-
mas, as well as Theorem 1, for k ∈ VO we use the shorthand notation:
δˆk := (−vk,H−1k,· )T − (−vˆk, Wˆk,·)T = (−vk+ vˆk,H−1k,· − Wˆk,·)T ∈R|V¯O|. (31)
LEMMA 9. Let z¯ ∈R|V¯O| be such that z¯k :=maxj∈V¯O
√
1
n
∑n
t=1{Ψ¯k(1;p(t)O )(1;p(t)O )j −1kj}2 for k ∈ V¯O.
Under Assumption 5, with probability 1− o(1)we have that
(i) (z¯, Ψ¯) is feasible in (11);
(ii) (zˆ, Ψˆ) is such thatmaxk∈V¯O zˆk ≤C1 for some constant C1 ≥ 0;
(iii)
√
Ψˆk,·ΣˆΨˆTk,· ≤ 1+ zˆk for every k ∈ V¯O;
(iv)
√
Ψˆk,·ΣˆΨˆTk,· ≥ (1−λzˆk)/
√
Σˆkk for every k ∈ V¯O;
(v) 1
n
∑n
t=1 |Ψˆk,·(1;p(t)O )|4≤C2 for every k ∈ V¯O, and some constant C2 ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 9. To show (i) let Z
(t)
ij := Ψ¯i,·(1;p
(t)
O )(1;p
(t)
O )j − 1ij for t ∈ [n], and i, j ∈ V¯O.
Denote byX(t) a vector of length |V¯O| × |V¯O|whose entries consist of {Z(t)ij }i∈V¯O ,j∈V¯O .
Observe that Ψ¯i,·E[(1;p
(t)
O )(1;p
(t)
O )j] = Ψ¯i,·(Ψ¯
−1)·,j = 1ij . Thus, it follows that E[Z
(t)
ij ] = 0.
Assumption 5i. implies that {X(t)} are independent vectors. By Assumption 5ii., we have
E[(Z
(t)
ij )
2]≥ c andE[|Z(t)ij |4]≤C for all t∈ [n], i, j ∈ V¯O. Note that by Jensen’s inequality we have
E[|Z(t)ij |ℓ]4/ℓ ≤E[|Z(t)ij |4]≤C (32)
for ℓ ∈ {2,3}, which in particular implies that E[|Z(t)ij |3] ≤ C ′1 for some constant C ′1 > 0.
Moreover, Assumption 5ii. also implies that MΨ ≥ E[maxt∈[n] ‖X(t)‖4∞], where MΨ is such that
MΨlog |VO|/n= o(1). Finally, by Assumption 5iv., we haveC ′ log |VO| ≥ logn and log |VO|/n= o(1).
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Thus, the conditions of Lemma 21 (with L= 4) hold for the constructed {Z(t)ij }, and with proba-
bility 1− o(1)we have
λ≥ max
i,j∈V¯O
∣∣∣ 1n∑nt=1Z(t)ij ∣∣∣√
1
n
∑n
t=1{Z(t)ij }2
≥max
i∈V¯O
maxj∈V¯O
∣∣∣ 1n∑nt=1Z(t)ij ∣∣∣
maxj∈V¯O
√
1
n
∑n
t=1{Z(t)ij }2
=max
i∈V¯O
maxj∈V¯O
∣∣∣ 1n∑nt=1{Ψ¯i,·(1;p(t)O )(1;p(t)O )j −1ij}∣∣∣
maxj∈V¯O
√
1
n
∑n
t=1{Ψ¯i,·(1;p(t)O )(1;p(t)O )j −1ij}2
=max
i∈V¯O
maxj∈V¯O |Ψ¯i,·Σˆ·,j −1ij |
z¯i
.
(33)
Hence, we conclude that (z¯, Ψ¯) satisfies the first constraint of (11) with probability 1 − o(1).
Moreover, by construction of z¯ it follows that (z¯, Ψ¯) always satisfies the second constraint of (11).
Thus, (z¯, Ψ¯) is feasible in (11) with probability at least 1− o(1).
To show (ii) suppose that (z¯, Ψ¯) is feasible, which occurs with probability 1− o(1) by (i), and
consider the optimal solution (zˆ, Ψˆ) of (11). Since (11) decouples over k ∈ V¯O, the optimality of
the latter implies that(
1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψˆk,·(1;p(t)O )|4
)1/4
+ zˆk ≤
(
1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψ¯k·(1;p(t)O )|4
)1/4
+ z¯k. (34)
Observe that Lemma 21 implies that with probability 1− o(1),
max
i,j∈V¯O
1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψ¯i,·(1;ptO)(1;ptO)j −1ij |4 = max
i,j∈V¯O
1
n
n∑
t=1
|Z(t)ij |4 ≤C ′2 (35)
for some constant C ′2 > 0. This observation, together with the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality,
implies that
max
j,k∈V¯O
1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψ¯k(1;p(t)O )(1;p(t)O )j −1kj |2 = max
j,k∈V¯O ,
1
n
n∑
t=1
|Z(t)kj |2 ≤C ′3 (36)
for some constant C ′3 > 0 with probability 1− o(1). By the definition of z¯k, this implies that with
probability 1− o(1), we havemaxk∈V¯O z¯k ≤
√
C ′3.
Note that for any scalars a1, a2, we have (a1 + a2)
4 ≤max{(2a1)4, (2a2)4} ≤ 16(a41 + a42). Setting
a1 = Ψ¯i,·(1;ptO)(1;p
t
O)j −1ij , and a2 = 1ij ≤ 1, this implies that
max
i,j∈V¯O
1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψ¯i,·(1;p(t)O )(1;p(t)O )j −1ij |4 ≥C ′4 max
i,j∈V¯O
1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψ¯i,·(1;p(t)O )(1;p(t)O )j|4− 1
≥C ′4max
i∈V¯O
1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψ¯i,·(1;p(t)O )|4− 1,
(37)
for some constant C ′4 > 0. Combining this observation with (35) yields
max
k∈V¯O ,
1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψ¯k,·(1;p(t)O )|4 ≤C ′5 (38)
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for some constant C ′5 > 0with probability 1− o(1).
Since (z¯, Ψ¯) is feasible in (11) with probability 1− o(1), and both the quantitymaxk∈V¯O z¯k and
maxk∈VO
1
n
∑n
t=1 |Ψ¯k,·(1;p(t)O )|4 are bounded by a constant, (34) implies (ii) and (v).
To show (iii) note that√
Ψˆk,·ΣˆΨˆTk,· =
√
1
n
∑n
t=1 Ψˆk,·(1;p
(t)
O )(1;p
(t)
O )
T ΨˆTk,·
=
√
1
n
∑n
t=1{Ψˆk,·(1;p(t)O )}2
≤maxj∈V¯O
√
1
n
∑n
t=1{Ψˆk,·(1;p(t)O )(1;p(t)O )j}2
≤maxj∈V¯O
√
1
n
∑n
t=1{Ψˆk,·(1;p(t)O )(1;p(t)O )j −1kj}2+1
≤ 1+ zˆk,
where the first inequality follows sincemaxj∈V¯O (1;p
(t)
O )j ≥ 1, and the secondone uses the triangle
inequality and |1kj | ≤ 1. The last inequality follows since (zˆ, Ψˆ) is feasible in (11).
Relation (iv) follows from (zˆ, Ψˆ) being feasible in (11). Indeed by the Cauchy–Schwarz inequal-
ity we have
Ψˆk,·Σˆ·,k =
1
n
n∑
t=1
Ψˆk,·(1;p
(t)
O )(1;p
(t)
O )
T
k ≤
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψˆk,·(1;p(t)O )|2
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
t=1
|(1;p(t)O )k|2
=
√
Ψˆk,·ΣˆΨˆTk,·
√
Σˆkk.
(39)
On the other hand, by the feasibility of (zˆ, Ψˆ) we have 1 − Ψˆk,·Σˆ·k ≤ |Ψˆk,·Σˆ·k − 1| ≤ λzˆk. After
rearranging terms this inequality together with (39) implies (iv). 
LEMMA 10. Let z¯ ∈ R|VO| be such that z¯k := maxj∈V¯O
√
1
n
∑n
t=1{(y(t)k − vk+H−1k,· p(t)O )}2(1;p(t)O )2j for
k ∈ VO. Under Assumption 5, with probability 1− o(1)we have that (H−1, vO, z¯) is feasible in (10),
maxk∈VO z¯k ≤C1,maxk∈VO zˆk ≤C1 for some constant C1 ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 10. Let Z
(t)
ij := (y
(t)
i − vi+H−1i,· p(t)O )(1;p(t)O )j for t ∈ [n], i ∈ VO, j ∈ V¯O. Denote
byX(t) a vector of length |VO| × |V¯O|whose entries consist of {Z(t)ij }i∈VO ,j∈V¯O .
By Lemma 1, we have (y
(t)
i − vi +H−1i,· p(t)O ) = ε(t)i for all i ∈ VO. Hence, Z(t)ij can be equivalently
expressed as follows: Z
(t)
ij = ε
(t)
i (1;p
(t)
O )j . By Assumption 5i. it follows that E[Z
(t)
ij ] = 0, and {X(t)}
are independent vectors. This assumption also implies that E[(Z
(t)
ij )
2] ≥ c, and E[|Z(t)ij |4] ≤ C,
which in turn yields (using Jensen’s inequality) that E[|Z(t)ij |ℓ]≤ Cℓ/4 for ℓ ∈ {2,3} and all t ∈ [n],
i∈ VO, j ∈ V¯O. Note that using Assumption 5i. (and the fact that prices are bounded by p¯) we also
obtain
E[max
t∈[n]
‖X(t)‖2∞]≤ p¯2E[max
t∈[n]
‖ε(t)O ‖2∞]≤ p¯2(E[max
t∈[n]
‖ε(t)O ‖4∞])1/2 ≤
√
Mεp¯
2,
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whereMε is such thatMε
log |VO |
n
= o(1). This in turn implies that
√
Mε
log |VO|
n
= o(1), since log |VO |
n
=
o(1). Finally, by Assumption 5iv., we have C ′ log |VO| ≥ logn and log |VO|n = o(1). Thus, the condi-
tions of Lemma 21 hold (with L= 2) for the constructed {Z(t)ij }, and with probability 1− o(1)we
have
λ≥ max
i∈VO ,j∈V¯O
∣∣∣ 1n∑nt=1Z(t)ij ∣∣∣√
1
n
∑n
t=1{Z(t)ij }2
≥max
i∈VO
maxj∈V¯O
∣∣∣ 1n∑nt=1Z(t)ij ∣∣∣
maxj∈V¯O
√
1
n
∑n
t=1{Z(t)ij }2
=max
i∈VO
maxj∈V¯O
∣∣∣ 1n∑nt=1(y(t)i − vi+H−1i,· p(t)O )(1;p(t)O )j∣∣∣
maxj∈V¯O
√
1
n
∑n
t=1{(y(t)i − vi+H−1i,· p(t)O )(1;p(t)O )j}2
=max
i∈VO
maxj∈V¯O
∣∣∣ 1n∑nt=1(y(t)i − vi+H−1i,· p(t)O )(1;p(t)O )j∣∣∣
z¯i
.
(40)
Observe that by construction (H−1, vO, z¯) satisfies the second constraint of (10). In addition, (40)
implies that the first condition of (10) is also satisfiedwith probability 1−o(1). Thus, (H−1, vO, z¯)
is feasible in (10) with probability 1− o(1), as claimed.
We conclude the proof by showing thatmaxk∈VO zˆk andmaxk∈VO z¯k are bounded by a constant
(with probability 1− o(1)). Suppose that (H−1, vO, z¯) is feasible, and consider the optimal solu-
tion (Wˆ , vˆ, zˆ) of (10). Since (10) decouples over k ∈ VO, the optimality of the latter implies that
‖(vˆk, Wˆk,·)‖1+ τ zˆk ≤‖(vk,H−1k,· )‖1+ τ z¯k, (41)
where τ =1/(4Mn). Note thatmaxk∈VO |vk|= ‖vO‖∞ andmaxk∈VO ‖H−1k,· ‖1 = ‖H−1‖∞ are bounded
by constants (see Lemmas 14 and 18). Moreover, by definitionM 2n = 1∨maxk∈VO 1n
∑n
t=1(p
(t)
k )
4≤
p¯4, and hence τ > c′1 for some constant c
′
1 > 0. Thus, (41) implies that to complete the proof it
suffices to show thatmaxk∈VO z¯k is bounded by a constant.
Observe that Lemma 21 also implies that
max
j∈V¯O ,k∈VO ,
1
n
n∑
t=1
|Z(t)kj |2 = max
j∈V¯O ,k∈VO ,
1
n
n∑
t=1
|(y(t)k − vk+H−1k,· p(t)O )(1;p(t)O )j|2 ≤C ′1 (42)
for some constant C ′1 > 0 with probability 1− o(1). By the definition of z¯k, this implies that with
probability 1− o(1), we havemaxk∈V¯O z¯k ≤
√
C ′1. Hence, the claim follows. 
LEMMA 11. Under Assumption 5 with probability 1− o(1) for all k ∈ VO we have
‖(vˆk, Wˆk,·)− (vk,H−1k,· )‖1 ≤C1r1n+C1λsn/κ2c¯,
where c¯= 3 and C1 > 0 is some constant.
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Proof of Lemma 11. For notational convenience letWk =H
−1
k,· , Wˆk = Wˆk,·, and
z2k(v
′, β′) =max
j∈V¯O
1
n
n∑
t=1
(y(t)k − v′+β′p(t)O )2(1;p(t)O )2j
for u′ ∈ R, β′ ∈ R1×|VO|. By Lemma 10, under Assumption 5 we have that {Wk, vk, zk(vk,Wk)}k is
feasible in (10) with probability at least 1− o(1).
Consider the optimal solution {Wˆk, vˆk, zˆk}k of (10). The definition of zk(·, ·) and the feasibility
of this solution imply that zk(vˆk, Wˆk)≤ zˆk for all k. Observe that (10) decouples over k. Using this
observation, the inequality zk(vˆk, Wˆk) ≤ zˆk, and the optimality of {Wˆk, vˆk, zˆk}k, we obtain that
with probability at least 1− o(1), for all k ∈ VO, the following inequality holds:
‖(vˆk, Wˆk)‖1+ τzk(vˆk, Wˆk)≤‖(vˆk, Wˆk)‖1+ τ zˆk ≤ ‖(vk,Wk)‖1+ τzk(vk,Wk), (43)
where τ = 1/(4Mn), M
2
n = 1 ∨maxk∈VO 1n
∑n
t=1(p
(t)
k )
4, as in Algorithm 1. Rearranging terms, this
yields
‖(vˆk, Wˆk)‖1 ≤‖(vk,Wk)‖1+ τ
(
zk(vk,Wk)− zk(vˆk, Wˆk)
)
. (44)
By the definition of zk(·, ·) it follows that
zk(v
′′, β′′)− zk(v′, β′)≤max
j∈V¯O
|hk,j(v′′, β′′)−hk,j(v′, β′)| , (45)
where β′, β′′ ∈R1×|VO|, v′, v′′ ∈R, and hk,j(v′, β′) := 1√n
√∑n
t=1(1;p
(t)
O )
2
j(y
(t)
k − v′+β′p(t)O )2. It follows
from Lemma 20 that
|hk,j(v′′, β′′)−hk,j(v′, β′)| ≤Mk,j‖(v′′, β′′)− (v′, β′)‖1, (46)
whereMk,j =maxi∈V¯O
√
1
n
(∑n
t=1(1;p
(t)
O )
2
j(1;p
(t)
O )
2
i
)
. Equations (45) and (46) jointly imply that
zk(v
′′, β′′)− zk(v′, β′)≤max
j∈V¯O
Mk,j‖(v′′, β′′)− (v′, β′)‖1. (47)
On the other hand,
max
j∈V¯O
Mk,j ≤ max
i,j∈V¯O
√√√√ 1
n
(
n∑
t=1
(1;p
(t)
O )
2
j(1;p
(t)
O )
2
i
)
(48)
For i ∈ V¯O let Xi denote a vector of length n, whose tth entry is given by (1;p(t)O )2i . Using this to
rewrite the above inequality we obtain
max
j∈V¯O
Mk,j ≤ max
i,j∈V¯O
√
1
n
〈Xi,Xj〉 ≤ max
i,j∈V¯O
√
1
n
‖Xi‖2 · ‖Xj‖2 =max
j∈V¯O
√
1
n
‖Xj‖22
=max
j∈V¯O
√
1
n
〈Xj,Xj〉=max
j∈VO
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
t=1
(
(p
(t)
j )
4
)
∨ 1=Mn,
(49)
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where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product between the relevant vectors and we use the fact that the
inner product between the two vectors is smaller than the product of their norms. Combining
this with (47), we obtain
zk(v
′′, β′′)− zk(v′, β′)≤Mn‖(v′′, β′′)− (v′, β′)‖1. (50)
Using this inequality with (44) (and recalling that τ =1/(4Mn)), we conclude that
‖(vˆk, Wˆk)‖1 ≤‖(vk,Wk)‖1+ 1
4
‖(vk,Wk)− (vˆk, Wˆk)‖1. (51)
Let W¯ denote an (sn, r1n)-sparse approximation of H
−1. Denote by W¯k the row of W¯ corre-
sponding to k ∈ VO, and let Tk be the set of indices of nonzero entries of W¯k·. Note that by the
definition of sparse approximation, we have |Tk| ≤ sn. Moreover, there exists a sparse approxi-
mation where W¯kTk =WkTk (henceforth, with some abuse of notation, for any matrix A and a
subset of its columns S, we denote byAkS the row vector, whose entries consist of {Akj}j∈S). Let
W¯ be such an approximation, and note that ‖WkT c
k
‖1 ≤ r1n.
Note that ‖(vˆk, Wˆk)‖1 = ‖(vˆk, WˆkTk)‖1 + ‖WˆkT ck ‖1, and ‖(vk,Wk)‖1 = ‖(vk,WkTk)‖1 + ‖WkT ck ‖1.
Moreover, by the triangle inequality, we have ‖(vk,WkTk )‖1 − ‖(vˆk, WˆkTk)‖1 ≤ ‖(vˆk, WˆkTk ) −
(vk,WkTk)‖1. Combining these observations with (51) we obtain
‖WˆkT c
k
‖1 ≤ ‖(vˆk, WˆkTk)− (vk,WkTk )‖1+ ‖WkT ck ‖1+
1
4
‖(vk,Wk)− (vˆk, Wˆk)‖1. (52)
To complete the proof, we consider two cases: (a) ‖(vˆk, WˆkTk) − (vk,WkTk)‖1 ≤ 2r1n and (b)
‖(vˆk, WˆkTk )− (vk,WkTk)‖1 > 2r1n. In the first case, (52) implies that
‖WˆkT c
k
‖1 ≤ 3r1n+ 1
4
‖(vk,Wk)− (vˆk, Wˆk)‖1 = 3r1n+ 1
4
(
‖(vˆk, WˆkTk)− (vk,WkTk)‖1+ ‖WˆkT ck −WkT ck‖1
)
≤ 3r1n+ 1
4
(
2r1n+ ‖WˆkT c
k
‖1+ ‖WkT c
k
‖1
)
≤ 3r1n+ 1
4
(
3r1n+ ‖WˆkT c
k
‖1
)
,
(53)
where the first and third inequalities use ‖WkT c
k
‖1 ≤ r1n, and the second one uses the triangle
inequality. Rearranging terms, we conclude ‖WˆkT c
k
‖1 ≤ 5r1n. Together with our assumption in
case (a) (and using the notation in (31)), these observations yield
‖δˆk‖1 = ‖(−vˆk, Wˆk)− (−vk,Wk)‖1 ≤ ‖(vˆk, WˆkTk)− (vk,WkTk )‖1+ ‖WˆkT ck ‖1+ ‖WkT ck ‖1 ≤ 8r1n, (54)
where we make use of the fact that negating an entry of a vector does not change its (ℓ1) norm.
Next consider case (b). Note that in this case we have 2‖WkT c
k
‖1 ≤ 2r1n < ‖(vˆk, WˆkTk ) −
(vk,WkTk)‖1. Using this observation together with (52) and the triangle inequality we have
‖WˆkT c
k
−WkT c
k
‖1 ≤‖WˆkT c
k
‖1+ ‖WkT c
k
‖1
≤‖(vˆk, WˆkTk )− (vk,WkTk)‖1+2‖WkT ck‖1+
1
4
‖(vk,Wk)− (vˆk, Wˆk)‖1
≤ (2+1/4)‖(vˆk, WˆkTk )− (vk,WkTk)‖1+
1
4
‖WkT c
k
− WˆkT c
k
‖1.
(55)
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Thus, rearranging terms, we conclude that
‖WˆkT c
k
−WkT c
k
‖1 ≤ 3‖(vˆk, WˆkTk)− (vk,WkTk )‖1. (56)
The definition of the restricted eigenvalues (see (29)) and (56) imply that
κ23 ≤ sn
(δˆk)T Σˆ(δˆk)
‖δˆk‖21
. (57)
We next use this inequality to obtain a bound on ‖δˆk‖1.
To this end, first observe that
Σˆδˆk = Σˆ(−vk,Wk)T − Σˆ(−vˆk, Wˆk)T
=
1
n
n∑
t=1
(−vk+Wkp(t)O )(1;p(t)O )−
1
n
n∑
t=1
(−vˆk+ Wˆkp(t)O )(1;p(t)O ).
(58)
Using this inequality, we conclude that with probability 1− o(1) the following holds:
(δˆk)T Σˆδˆk ≤‖δˆk‖1‖Σˆδˆk‖∞
≤‖δˆk‖1‖ 1n
∑n
t=1(y
(t)
k − vˆk+ Wˆkp(t)O )(1;p(t)O )‖∞+ ‖δˆk‖1‖ 1n
∑n
t=1 ε
(t)
k (1;p
(t)
O )‖∞
≤‖δˆk‖1λzˆk + ‖δˆk‖1λzk(vk,Wk).
(59)
Here the first inequality follows from Holder’s inequality, and the second one follows from the
triangle inequality. Recall that {vˆk, Wˆk, zˆk}k is optimal and {vk,Wk, zk(vk,Wk)}k is feasible in (10)
with probability at least 1− o(1). These observations imply that the third inequality holds with
probability 1− o(1).
Using τ = 1/(4Mn) to rewrite the second inequality of (43) we conclude that with probability
1− o(1) the following inequality holds:
zˆk ≤ zk(vk,Wk)+ 4Mn‖(vk,Wk)‖1− 4Mn‖(vˆk, Wˆk)‖1
≤ zk(vk,Wk)+ 4Mn‖(vk,Wk)− (vˆk, Wˆk)‖1 = zk(vk,Wk)+ 4Mn‖δˆk‖1.
(60)
Using this inequality to bound zˆk in (59), we obtain
(δˆk)T Σˆδˆk ≤ 2‖δˆk‖1λzk(vk,Wk)+ 4λMn‖δˆk‖21. (61)
Lemma 10 implies that zk(vk,Wk) is bounded with probability 1 − o(1). This observation
together with (57) and (61) yields
κ23‖δˆk‖21
sn
≤ λC ′1‖δˆk‖1+4λMn‖δˆk‖21, (62)
for some constant C ′1. Rearranging the terms this inequality can be written as follows:(
κ23
sn
− 4λMn
)
‖δˆk‖1 ≤ λC ′1. (63)
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By Assumption 5, 4λsnMn
κ23
≤ 1/2; hence the previous inequality implies that
κ23
2sn
‖δˆk‖1 ≤ λC ′1. (64)
Thus, for some constant C ′2 we obtain
‖δˆk‖1 ≤C ′2
λsn
κ23
. (65)
Combining (54) and (65) we conclude that for some constant C ′3 ≥ 0, we have ‖δˆk‖1 ≤ C ′3r1n +
C ′3λsn/κ
2
3, and the claim follows. 
Proof of Theorem 1. The identity y
(t)
O = vO −H−1p(t)O + ε(t)O (Lemma 1), together with Step 3 of
Algorithm 1, implies that
(−vˇk, Wˇk,·)T = (−vˆk, Wˆk,·)T − ΨˆEn[{yk − (vˆk− Wˆk,·pO)}(1;pO)]
= (−vˆk, Wˆk,·)T − ΨˆEn
[(
{yk− (vk−H−1k,· pO)}+(vk− vˆk,−H−1k,· + Wˆk,·)(1;pO)
)
(1;pO)
]
= (−vˆk, Wˆk,·)T +ΨˆEn[(1;pO)(1;pO)T δˆk]− ΨˆEn[εk(1;pO)]
= (−vk,H−1k,· )T + {ΨˆEn[(1;pO)(1;pO)T ]− I}δˆk − ΨˆEn[εk(1;pO)]
= (−vk,H−1k,· )T − ΨˆEn[εk(1;pO)]+ (A1),
(66)
for all k ∈ VO, where A1 := {ΨˆEn[(1;pO)(1;pO)T ] − I}δˆk, and δˆk is as defined in (31). Here, the
second equality follows by adding/subtracting the same term, and the rest of the equalities are
obtained via straightforward algebraic manipulation.
We boundA1 using Holder’s inequality as follows:
‖A1‖∞ = ‖{ΨˆEn[(1;pO)(1;pO)T ]− I}δˆk‖∞
= ‖{ΨˆΣˆ− I}δˆk‖∞
≤ ‖ΨˆΣˆ− I‖e,∞‖δˆk‖1.
(67)
By Lemma 11 with probability 1− o(1)we have
max
k∈VO
‖δˆk‖1 ≤ C ′1r1n+C ′1λsn/κ2c¯,
for some constant C ′1 ≥ 0 and c¯= 3. Using Lemma 19 and the fact that κ2c¯ is lower bounded by a
constant (Assumption 5), this inequality implies that
max
k∈VO
‖δˆk‖1 ≤C ′2sn
√
logVO/n+C
′
2r1n,
for some constant C ′2 ≥ 0.
Moreover, by feasibility of {Ψˆk, zˆk}k in (11), Lemma 19, and Lemma 9, with probability 1−o(1)
we have that
‖ΨˆΣˆ− I‖e,∞ ≤ λ‖zˆ‖∞ ≤C ′3
√
log |VO|
n
,
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for some constantC ′3 ≥ 0. Using these observationswith (67), we conclude that with probability
1− o(1) the following holds:
‖A1‖∞ ≤ C
′
4sn log |VO|
n
+
C ′4r1n
√
log |VO|√
n
,
for some constant C ′4 ≥ 0.
Thus, (66) implies that with probability 1− o(1)we have
√
n{(−vˇk, Wˇk,·)T − (−vk,H−1k,· )T}=−
√
nΨˆEn[εk(1;pO)]+
√
nA1, (68)
where ‖√nA1‖∞ =O(n−1/2sn log |VO|+ r1n
√
log |VO|), and the first part of the claim follows.
For the second part of the claim, consider an (sn, r1n)-sparse approximation ofH
−1, denoted
by W¯ . For each row k, let Tk denote the support of W¯k,·. Similarly, for each column ℓ, let Tˆℓ denote
the support of W¯·,ℓ. Note that there always exists a sparse approximation W¯ where W¯kTk =H
−1
kTk
and W¯Tˆℓℓ =H
−1
Tˆℓℓ
for all k, ℓ∈ VO. Let W¯ be such an approximation.
Note that we have
‖Wˇ µk,·−H−1k,· ‖1 ≤‖Wˇ µk,·− W¯k,·‖1+ ‖W¯k,·−H−1k,· ‖1
≤‖Wˇ µkTk −H−1kTk‖1+ ‖Wˇ
µ
kT c
k
‖1+ r1n,
(69)
where the first inequality follows from the triangle inequality, and in the second inequality we
use the fact that ‖W¯k,·−H−1k,· ‖1 ≤ r1n since W¯ is an (sn, r1n)-sparse approximation ofH−1.
Since |Tk| ≤ sn it can be readily seen that
‖Wˇ µkTk −H−1kTk‖1 ≤ snmaxj∈Tk |Wˇ
µ
kj − (H−1)kj |. (70)
Also note that using the triangle inequality µkj ≥ 2|Wˇkj− (H−1)kj | implies that µkj ≥ 2|(H−1)kj |−
2|Wˇkj |. Thus, if |Wˇkj | ≤ µkj , then Wˇ µkj = 0, and |(H−1)kj | ≤ 32µkj . Hence, in this case, we obtain
|Wˇ µkj − (H−1)kj | ≤ 32µkj . Conversely, if |Wˇkj | > µkj , then Wˇ µkj = Wˇkj . Hence |Wˇ µkj − (H−1)kj | =
|Wˇkj − (H−1)kj | ≤ 12µkj . Thus, these cases (together with the fact that µkj ≤ C
√
log |VO|/n for all
k, j) imply that
|Wˇ µkj − (H−1)kj | ≤
3
2
µkj ≤C ′5
√
log |VO|
n
, (71)
for some constant C ′5 ≥ 0. Hence, using (70), we obtain
‖Wˇ µkTk −H−1kTk‖1 ≤C ′5sn
√
log |VO|
n
. (72)
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Finally, using the triangle inequality, µkj ≥ 2|Wˇkj − (H−1)kj | also implies that µkj ≥ 2|Wˇkj | −
2|(H−1)kj |. Hence, if |(H−1)kj | ≤ µkj/2, then µkj ≥ |Wˇkj |. Using this observation it follows that
‖Wˇ µkT c
k
‖1 =
∑
j∈T c
k
|Wˇ µkj |=
∑
j∈T c
k
|Wˇkj |1{Wˇkj >µkj}
≤
∑
j∈T c
k
{|Wˇkj −H−1kj |+ |H−1kj |}1{|(H−1)kj |>µkj/2}
≤ ‖H−1kT c
k
‖1+
∑
j∈T c
k
µkj
2
1{|(H−1)kj |>µkj/2}
≤ r1n+
∑
j∈T c
k
(µkj/2)
|(H−1)kj |
(µkj/2)
≤ 2r1n.
(73)
Here the last line makes use of the fact that ‖H−1kT c
k
‖1 ≤ r1n (approximate sparsity).
Using (72) and (73), we obtain from (69) that
‖Wˇ µk,·−H−1k,· ‖1 ≤C ′5sn
√
log |VO|
n
+3r1n.
Thus, we obtain ‖Wˇ µ−H−1‖∞ =maxk∈VO ‖Wˇ µk,·−H−1k,· ‖1 ≤C ′5sn
√
log |VO|
n
+3r1n, as claimed.
Following a similar approach to (69) for columns of Wˇ µ andH−1 we obtain
‖Wˇ µ·,ℓ−H−1·,ℓ ‖1 ≤‖Wˇ µTˆℓℓ−H
−1
Tˆℓℓ
‖1+ ‖Wˇ µTˆ c
ℓ
ℓ
‖1+ r1n. (74)
In addition, since |Tˆℓ| ≤ sn, by repeating the approach in (70) and using (71) it can also be shown
that
‖Wˇ µ
Tˆℓℓ
−H−1
Tˆℓℓ
‖1 ≤ snmax
j∈Tˆℓ
|Wˇ µjℓ− (H−1)jℓ| ≤C ′5sn
√
log |VO|
n
. (75)
Finally, repeating the steps of (73) to bound ‖Wˇ µ
Tˆ c
ℓ
ℓ
‖1, we also obtain ‖Wˇ µTˆ c
ℓ
ℓ
‖1 ≤ 2r1n. Together
with (74) and (75), this inequality implies that
‖Wˇ µ−H−1‖1 =max
ℓ∈VO
‖Wˇ µ·,ℓ−H−1·,ℓ ‖1 ≤C ′5sn
√
log |VO|
n
+3r1n.
Hence, the claim follows. 
C.2. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 2. By Theorem 1(i) and the triangle inequality, with probability 1− o(1)we
have
max
k∈VO
|vˇk− vk| ∨ max
k,j∈VO
|Wˇkj −H−1kj | ≤ max
k∈V¯O ,j∈VO
∣∣∣∣∣Ψˆk,· 1n
n∑
t=1
(1;p
(t)
O )ε
(t)
j
∣∣∣∣∣+n−1/2maxk∈VO ‖Rkn‖∞,
where maxk∈VO ‖Rkn‖∞ = O(n−1/2sn log |VO| + r1n
√
log |VO|). Note that n−1/2sn
√
log |VO| = o(1)
(by Assumption 3). Moreover, since by Lemma 14 H−1 admits a bounded matrix 1-norm and
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a matrix ∞-norm, it follows that it is always possible to find a sparse approximation with
r1n ≤ C ′1 for some constant C ′1 ≥ 0 . Using these observations, we have that maxk∈VO ‖Rkn‖∞ ≤
2C ′1
√
log |VO|, which in turn implies that
max
k∈VO
|vˇk− vk| ∨ max
k,j∈VO
|Wˇkj −H−1kj | ≤ max
k∈V¯O ,j∈VO
∣∣∣∣∣Ψˆk,· 1n
n∑
t=1
(1;p(t)O )ε
(t)
j
∣∣∣∣∣+2C ′1
√
logVO
n
, (76)
with probability 1− o(1). Next, we bound the first term on the right-hand side of (76).
Observe that by Lemma 9(v), with probability 1− o(1)we have
1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )|4 ≤C ′2 (77)
for all k ∈ V¯O and some constant C ′2 > 0. Moreover, with probability 1− o(1)we also have
1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )|2 = Ψˆk,·ΣˆΨˆTk,· ≥ (1−λzˆk)2/Σˆkk ≥ c′1 (78)
for all k and some constant c′1 > 0. Here, the equality follows from the definition of Σˆ, and
the first inequality follows from Lemma 9(iv). The second inequality follows from the fact that
prices and hence Σˆkk are bounded by a constant, zˆk is bounded from above by a constant
(Lemma 9(ii)), and λ= o(1) by Lemma 19 and Assumption 3. Thus, we conclude that the event
E = { 1
n
∑n
t=1 |Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )|4 ≤ C ′2, 1n
∑n
t=1 |Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )|2 ≥ c′1, for all k ∈ V¯O}, occurs with probability
1 − o(1). In what follows, with some abuse, we use the notation {p˜(t)O } ∈ E to express that the
sequence of prices {p˜(t)O } satisfies the conditions of this event.
Let Z(t)ij = Ψˆi·(1;p
(t)
O )ε
(t)
j for t ∈ [n], and i ∈ V¯O, j ∈ VO. Denote by X(t) a vector of length
|V¯O| × |VO| whose entries consist of {Z(t)ij }i∈V¯O ,j∈VO . Note that Step 2 of Algorithm 1 and
Ψˆ rely only on {p(t)O }. Hence, the definition of Z(t)ij and Assumption 3 imply that E[Z(t)ij |
{p(t)O }] = Ψˆi·(1;p(t)O )E[ε(t)j | p(t)O ] = 0. Moreover, Assumption 3 yields minj∈VO E[|ε(t)j |2 | p(t)O ]≥ c and
maxj∈VO E[|ε(t)j |4 | p(t)O ]≤C. Thus, for {p(t)O } ∈ E we have
1
n
n∑
t=1
E[|Z(t)ij |2 | {p(t)O }] =
1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψˆi·(1;p(t)O )|2E[|ε(t)j |2 | p(t)O ]≥ c′2,
1
n
n∑
t=1
E[|Z(t)ij |4 | {p(t)O }] =
1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψˆi·(1;p(t)O )|4E[|ε(t)j |4 | p(t)O ]≤C ′3,
for some constants c′2,C
′
3 > 0.
Observe that {X(t)} are independent vectors conditionally on {p(t)O , t ∈ [n]}. Furthermore, for
{p(t)O } ∈ E , we have
E
[
max
t∈[n]
‖X(t)‖4∞ | {p(t)O }
]
≤
(
max
t∈[n],i∈V¯O
|Ψˆi·(1;p(t)O )|4
)(
E
[
max
t∈[n],j∈VO
|ε(t)j |4 | p(t)O
])
≤C ′2Mε,
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where we use Assumption 3. Finally, by Assumption 3 we also have Mε log |VO| = o(n), and
log |VO|/n= o(1), C ′5 log |VO| ≥ logn for some constant C ′5. These observations collectively imply
that {Z(t)ij } conditional on {p(t)O } ∈ E satisfy the conditions of Lemma 21 (with L = 4). Hence,
together with the fact that E occurs with probability 1− o(1), we obtain
λ≥ max
i∈V¯O ,j∈VO
∣∣∣ 1n∑nt=1 Ψˆi·(1;p(t)O )ε(t)j ∣∣∣√
1
n
∑n
t=1
∣∣∣Ψˆi·(1;p(t)O )ε(t)j ∣∣∣2
. (79)
This in turn yields
max
i∈V¯O ,j∈VO
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
t=1
Ψˆi·(1;p
(t)
O )ε
(t)
j
∣∣∣∣∣≤ λ maxi∈V¯O ,j∈VO
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
t=1
∣∣∣Ψˆi·(1;p(t)O )ε(t)j ∣∣∣2
≤ λ max
i∈V¯O ,j∈VO
4
√√√√( 1
n
n∑
t=1
∣∣∣Ψˆi·(1;p(t)O )∣∣∣4
)(
1
n
n∑
t=1
∣∣∣ε(t)j ∣∣∣4
)
,
(80)
where, the second inequality follows from the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality.
Note that under Assumption 3, {ε(t)O } vectors also satisfy the conditions of Lemma 21 (with
L= 4), which implies that with probability 1−o(1), we have 1
n
∑n
t=1
∣∣∣ε(t)j ∣∣∣4 ≤C ′6 for some constant
C ′6 > 0. This observation, together with (80), implies that maxi∈V¯O ,j∈VO
∣∣∣ 1n∑nt=1 Ψˆi·(1;p(t)O )ε(t)j ∣∣∣ ≤
C ′7λ for some constant C
′
7 > 0. Hence, Lemma 19 implies that
max
i∈V¯O,j∈VO
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
t=1
Ψˆi·(1;p
(t)
O )ε
(t)
j
∣∣∣∣∣≤C ′7λ≤C ′8
√
log |VO|
n
, (81)
for some constant C ′8 > 0, with probability 1 − o(1). Substituting the bound (81) in (76), we
conclude that with probability 1 − o(1) we have maxk∈VO |vˇk − vk| ∨ maxk,j∈VO |Wˇkj − H−1kj | ≤
C ′9
√
log |VO|
n
, for some constant C ′9 > 0.
Next we prove the second claim. Let µkj be defined as in (13), and set σ¯
2
kj :=
1
n
∑n
t=1 |Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )ε(t)j |2. Note that Theorem 1(i) implies that
|(Wˇ −H−1)kj | ≤
∣∣∣∣∣1n
n∑
t=1
Ψˆk·(1;p
(t)
O )ε
(t)
j
∣∣∣∣∣+n−1/2|(Rkn)j |,
for all k, j ∈ VO with probability 1− o(1). Using this observation together with (79) implies that
with probability 1− o(1), uniformly over k, j ∈ VO, we have
|(Wˇ −H−1)kj | ≤ λ
(
1
n
∑n
t=1 |Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )ε(t)j |2
)1/2
+n−1/2|(Rkn)j|
≤ λσ¯kj +n−1/2|(Rkn)j|
≤ λσˆkj +λ|σ¯kj − σˆkj |+n−1/2|(Rkn)j|
≤ λσˆkj + 1lognλσˆkj − 1lognλσˆkj +λ|σ¯kj − σˆkj |+n−1/2|(Rkn)j |
≤ 1
2
µkj − 1lognλσˆkj +λ|σ¯kj − σˆkj |+n−1/2|(Rkn)j|,
(82)
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where the second inequality uses the definition of σ¯kj , the third one is obtained by the triangle
inequality, and the fourth one is obtained by adding/subtracting the same term. Finally, the last
inequality follows from the definition of µkj in (13).
Note that
|σ¯kj − σˆkj |=
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )ε(t)j |2−
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )(y(t)j − (vˆj − Wˆj,·p(t)O ))|2
≤
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )(ε(t)j − y(t)j +(vˆj − Wˆj,·p(t)O ))|2
≤
(
max
t∈[n]
∣∣∣(vj − vˆj + Wˆj,·p(t)O −H−1j,· p(t)O )∣∣∣
)√√√√ 1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )|2,
(83)
where the first inequality follows by observing that for any two vectors B1, B2, we have ‖B1‖2−
‖B2‖2 ≤ ‖B1−B2‖2, and the second inequality follows from Lemma 1. On the other hand,∣∣∣(vj − vˆj + Wˆj,·p(t)O −H−1j,· p(t)O )∣∣∣≤ ‖(vˆj, Wˆj,·)− (vj,H−1j,· )‖1p¯, (84)
usingHolder’s inequality and the fact that ‖(1;p(t)O )‖∞ ≤ p¯. Also note that for all k ∈ VO with prob-
ability 1− o(1), we have(
n∑
t=1
1
n
|Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )|2
)2
≤ n
n∑
t=1
1
n2
|Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )|4 ≤C ′2, (85)
where the first inequality follows from the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality, and the second one fol-
lows from (77). Using (83), (84), (85), and Lemma 11, we conclude that
|σ¯kj − σˆkj | ≤C ′10‖(vˆj , Wˆj,·)− (vj,H−1j,· )‖1 ≤C ′11r1n+C ′11λsn/κ23 (86)
for all k, j ∈ VO and some constants C ′10,C ′11 > 0 with probability 1 − o(1). Since Assumption 3
implies Assumption 5 (see Lemma 24), and Assumption 5 implies that κ23 is lower bounded by a
constant, we equivalently obtain
|σ¯kj − σˆkj | ≤C ′11r1n+C ′12λsn (87)
for some constant C ′12 > 0. Using this together with (82), we conclude that
|(Wˇ −H−1)kj | ≤ 12µkj − 1lognλσˆkj +λ (C ′11r1n+C ′12λsn)+n−1/2|(Rkn)j|, (88)
for all k, j ∈ VO with probability 1− o(1). Note that if
λ (C ′11r1n+C
′
12λsn)+n
−1/2 max
k,j∈VO
|(Rkn)j | ≤
1
logn
λ min
k,j∈VO
σˆkj , (89)
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then (88) implies that
µkj ≥ 2|(Wˇ −H−1)kj | simultaneously over k, j ∈ VO. (90)
Suppose that mink,j∈VO σˆkj is bounded away from zero. We next show that in this case
(89) and hence (90) hold. To see this, note that Theorem 1 implies that maxk,j∈VO |(Rkn)j | =
O(n−1/2sn log |VO| + r1n
√
log |VO|). Moreover, by Lemma 19, we have C ′13
√
log |VO |
n
≥ λ ≥
c′2
√
log (n|VO |)
n
for some constants c′2,C
′
13 > 0. Thus, (89) holds if
r1n+
√
log |VO|
n
sn+
n−1/2sn log |VO|+ r1n
√
log |VO|√
log(n|VO|)
= o(1/ logn). (91)
Note that log(n|VO|) = logn+ log(|VO|)≥ log(|VO|). In addition, for Theorem 2 it is assumed that
r1n = o(1/ logn), and byAssumption 3we have
s2n(log |VO|)
n
= o(1/ logn3). These observations imply
that (91) holds, which in turn implies (89) and (90).
We proceed by establishing that mink,j∈VO σˆkj is bounded away from zero with probability
1− o(1). Observe that since r1n = o(1/ logn), and λsn ≤C ′13
√
log |VO|
n
sn = o(1/ logn) by Lemma 19
and Assumption 3, (87) also implies that |σ¯kj − σˆkj |= o(1/ logn) for all k, j ∈ VO with probability
1− o(1). Using this observation, it follows that
min
k∈V¯O ,j∈VO
σˆkj ≥ min
k∈V¯O ,j∈VO
σ¯kj −C ′14(1/ logn), (92)
with probability 1 − o(1) for some constant C ′14 > 0. We next show that mink∈V¯O ,j∈VO σ¯kj is
bounded away from zero with probability 1− o(1) using a truncation argument.
Let Akj =
1
n
∑n
t=1E[|Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )ε(t)j |21{|ε(t)j | ≤
√
logn} | {p(t)O }]. Recalling that {p(t)O } ∈ E with
probability 1− o(1), and using the union bound, we obtain
P (∃k, j : σ¯2kj <Akj − γ¯)≤P (∃k, j : σ¯2kj <Akj − γ¯ | E)+ o(1)
≤ |VO|2max
k,j
P
(
1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )ε(t)j |2 <Akj − γ¯ | E
)
+ o(1)
≤ |VO|2max
k,j
P
(
1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )ε(t)j |21{|ε(t)j | ≤
√
logn}<Akj − γ¯ | E
)
+ o(1),
(93)
where γ¯ is a parameter to be specified later.
Note that conditional on {p(t)O }, {|Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )ε(t)j |21{|ε(t)j | ≤
√
logn}}t are independent ran-
dom variables, and the expectation of 1
n
∑n
t=1 |Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )ε(t)j |21{|ε(t)j | ≤
√
logn} is given by Akj .
Furthermore, |Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )ε(t)j |21{|ε(t)j | ≤
√
logn} is bounded by |Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )
√
logn|2. Thus, using
Hoeffding’s inequality conditional on {p(t)O }, we obtain
P
(
1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )ε(t)j |21{|ε(t)j | ≤
√
logn}<Akj − γ¯ | {p(t)O }
)
≤ exp
(
−2γ¯2n2∑n
t=1 |Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )|4(logn)2
)
.
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Taking the expectation over {p(t)O } ∈ E , and using this inequality together with (93) yields
P (∃k, j : σ¯2kj <Akj − γ¯)≤ |VO|2max
k,j
E
[
exp
(
−2γ¯2n
/
{ 1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )|4 log2 n}
)
| E
]
+ o(1).
(94)
Finally, using (77) together with this inequality, we conclude that
P (∃k, j : σ¯2kj <Akj − γ¯)≤ |VO|2 exp
(−C ′15γ¯2n
log2n
)
+ o(1), (95)
for some constant C ′15 > 0.
Note that the definition of Akj implies that
1
n
∑n
t=1E[|Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )ε(t)j |2 | {p(t)O }]−Akj ≤ 1n
∑n
t=1E[|Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )ε(t)j |21{|ε(t)j |>
√
logn} | {p(t)O }]
≤ 1
n
∑n
t=1 |Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )|2E[|ε(t)j |21{|ε(t)j |>
√
logn} | {p(t)O }]
≤ 1
n
∑n
t=1 |Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )|2E[|ε(t)j |4/ logn | {p(t)O }],
where in the third line we make use of the fact that when |ε(t)j |>
√
logn, we have |ε(t)j |2/logn> 1.
Note that Assumption 3 implies that E[|ε(t)j |4 | {p(t)O }] is bounded by a constant for all j ∈ VO.
Similarly Lemma 9 implies that with probability 1− o(1)we have that 1
n
∑n
t=1 |Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )|2 is also
bounded by a constant for all k ∈ VO. Thus, with probability 1−o(1), uniformly over k, j ∈ VO, we
obtain
1
n
n∑
t=1
E[|Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )ε(t)j |2 | {p(t)O }]−Akj ≤C ′16/ logn (96)
for some constant C ′16 > 0. On the other hand, with probability 1− o(1)we have
1
n
n∑
t=1
E[|Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )ε(t)j |2 | {p(t)O }] =
1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )|2E[|ε(t)j |2 | p(t)O ]
≥ c 1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )|2
≥ c(1−λzˆk)2/Σˆkk
≥ c′3> 0,
(97)
for some constant c′3. Here, the first inequality follows from Assumption 3, and the second one
follows from Lemma 9. The third inequality uses Lemma 19 as well as the fact that zˆk and Σˆkk are
bounded by constants (respectively due to Lemma 9 and the fact that the prices are bounded
by p¯).
Observe that by letting γ¯ :=C ′17(logn)(log(|VO|2n))1/2/n1/2 for some constantC ′17 > 0weobtain
from (95) that with probability 1− o(1), for all k, j ∈ VO, we have σ¯2kj >Akj − γ¯. Hence, it follows
thatmink,j∈VO σ¯
2
kj >mink,j∈VO Akj − γ¯ with probability 1− o(1). On the other hand, (96) and (97)
imply that with probability 1 − o(1), we also have mink,j∈VO Akj > c′4 for some constant c′4 > 0.
Combining these observations, and also noting that γ¯ = o(1), we obtain σ¯2kj > c
′
5 with probability
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1− o(1) for some constant c′5 > 0 and all k, j ∈ VO. By (92), we conclude that mink∈V¯O ,j∈VO σˆkj is
bounded away from zero with probability 1− o(1). Hence, (89) and (90) hold with probability
1− o(1), as argued before.
Finally, observe that following an identical approach to (93), and using Hoeffding’s inequality
(with the same γ¯), we also obtain with probability 1− o(1), uniformly over all k, j, that
σ¯2kj <Akj + γ¯. (98)
Also note that with probability 1− o(1) for all k, j ∈ VO and some constant C ′18 > 0we have
Akj ≤ 1
n
n∑
t=1
E[|Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )ε(t)j |2 | {p(t)O }]≤
1
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )|2E[|ε(t)j |2 | {p(t)O }]
≤
√
C
n
n∑
t=1
|Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )|2 ≤C ′18.
(99)
Here, the last line follows fromAssumption 3 (which by Jensen’s inequality implies thatE[|ε(t)j |2 |
p
(t)
O ] ≤ C1/2) and (85). Observe that (98), (99), and the fact that γ¯ = o(1) imply that for all k, j ∈
VO, σ¯kj is bounded by a constant with probability 1− o(1). Since |σ¯kj − σˆkj |= o(1/ logn) (for all
k, j ∈ VO with probability 1− o(1)), we conclude that for all k, j ∈ VO, σˆkj is bounded by a con-
stant with probability 1− o(1). Thus, by the definition of µkj (see (13)) we obtain µkj ≤ 3λσˆkj ≤
C ′19λ, for some constantC
′
19 > 0. By Lemma 19, we conclude that with probability 1− o(1), µkj ≤
C ′20
√
log |VO|/n for some constant C ′20 > 0. Hence, the constructed {µkj} satisfy (14) with proba-
bility 1− o(1). Note that this readily implies the claim in (15). Moreover, Theorem 1 implies the
rates claimed in (16), completing the proof. 
D. Proofs of Section 4
Proof of Theorem 3. Let Aˆ := (Wˇ µ+(Wˇ µ)T ), andA := (H−1+H−T ). By Lemma 2, the optimal
prices are given by p⋆O =A
−1vO. Using a similar notation, the price vector pˆO can alternatively be
given by pˆO = [Aˆ
−1vˇO]∧ p¯eO.
Observe that by the assumption that p⋆O < p¯eO, we obtain
‖p⋆O − pˆO‖2 = ‖A−1vO − [Aˆ−1vˇO]∧ p¯eO‖2 ≤‖A−1vO − Aˆ−1vˇO‖2
≤‖(A−1− Aˆ−1)(vˇO− vO)‖2+ ‖(A−1− Aˆ−1)vO‖2+ ‖A−1(vO − vˇO)‖2
≤‖Aˆ−1−A−1‖2‖vˇO − vO‖2+ ‖Aˆ−1−A−1‖2‖vO‖2+ ‖A−1‖2‖vˇO − vO‖2.
(100)
Here, the second line follows from the triangle inequality, and the third one follows from the
definition of matrix p-norms.
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By Lemma 15 of Appendix G.1, we have ‖A−1‖2 ≤ 8b¯4/ζ3. Note that it follows from Theorem 1
that with probability at least 1− o(1)we have
‖A− Aˆ‖2 = ‖H−1− Wˇ µ+H−T − (Wˇ µ)T‖2 ≤ 2‖H−1− Wˇ µ‖2
≤ 2
√
‖H−1− Wˇ µ‖1‖H−1− Wˇ µ‖∞ ≤ 2snC ′1
√
log(|VO|)/n+6r1n,
(101)
for some constant C ′1 > 0. In addition, using the results of Dwyer andWaugh (1953) (see equa-
tion (4.3)), it follows that
‖Aˆ−1−A−1‖2 ≤ ‖Aˆ−A‖2‖A
−1‖22
1−‖Aˆ−A‖2‖A−1‖2
, (102)
provided that ‖Aˆ−A‖2‖A−1‖2 < 1. The latter condition holds, since ‖A−1‖2 ≤ 8b¯4/ζ3 and by the
assumptions of the theoremwe have 2snC
′
1
√
log(|VO|)/n+6r1n= o(1)which together with (101)
implies the inequality. Expressing (102) more explicitly, once again using the fact that ‖A−1‖2 ≤
8b¯4/ζ3 together with (101), we obtain
‖Aˆ−1−A−1‖2 ≤
(
8b¯4
ζ3
)2
2snC
′
1
√
log(|VO|)/n+6r1n
1− 8b¯4
ζ3
(2snC ′1
√
log(|VO|)/n+6r1n)
≤ 4
(
8b¯4
ζ3
)2 (
snC
′
1
√
log(|VO|)/n+3r1n
)
.
(103)
Similarly, by Theorem 2, with probability 1 − o(1) we have ‖vˇO − vO‖2 ≤ C ′2
√|VO|√ log |VO|n , for
some constantC ′2 > 0. Combining these inequalitieswith (100), (103), and the fact that ‖A−1‖2 ≤
8b¯4/ζ3 we obtain
‖p⋆O − pˆO‖2 ≤ ‖vˇO − vO‖2(‖Aˆ−1−A−1‖2+ ‖A−1‖2)+ ‖Aˆ−1−A−1‖2‖vO‖2
≤C ′2
√
|VO|
√
log |VO|
n
(
4
(
8b¯4
ζ3
)2(
snC
′
1
√
log(|VO|)/n+3r1n
)
+8
b¯4
ζ3
)
+4
(
8b¯4
ζ3
)2 (
snC
′
1
√
log(|VO|)/n+3r1n
)
‖vO‖2
≤C ′3
√
|VO|
√
log(|VO|)
n
+C ′4‖vO‖2
(
sn
√
log(|VO|)/n+ r1n
)
,
(104)
where C ′3 = 9C
′
2
b¯4
ζ3
, C ′4 = 4
(
8b¯4
ζ3
)2
max{C ′1,3}, and where we use
(
snC
′
1
√
log(|VO|)/n+3r1n
)
+
8 b¯
4
ζ3
≤ 9 b¯4
ζ3
since sn
√
log(|VO|)/n+ r1n = o(1).
To complete the proof, we make use of the following lemma, whose proof is given at the end
of this proof.
LEMMA 12. Suppose that p⋆O < p¯ · eO. Then for any other price vector pO ≤ p¯eO we have
Π(p⋆O)−Π(pO)≤
1
2ζ
‖p⋆O − pO‖22. (105)
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Lemma 12 together with (104) implies that
Π(p⋆O)−Π(pˆO)≤
1
2ζ
(
C ′3
√
|VO|
√
log(|VO|)
n
+C ′4‖vO‖2
(
sn
√
log(|VO|)/n+ r1n
))2
≤ 1
2ζ
(
2(C ′3)
2|VO| log(|VO|)
n
+2(C ′4)
2‖vO‖22
(
sn
√
log(|VO|)/n+ r1n
)2)
≤ 1
2ζ
(
2(C ′3)
2|VO| log(|VO|)
n
+4(C ′4)
2‖vO‖22
(
s2nlog(|VO|)/n+ r21n
))
,
(106)
where we use (x+ y)2 ≤ 2x2+2y2.
On the other hand, we have Π(p⋆O) = Ω(|VO|). This readily follows since setting prices pO = p¯2
guarantees Π(pO) = Ω(|VO|) (and by Assumptions 1 and 2 we have a¯≥ ai > p¯ > 0 for all i). More-
over, it follows fromLemma 18 that ‖vO‖22 ≤C ′5|VO| for some constantC ′5 > 0. These observations
together with (106) imply that for some constant C ′6 > 0, we have
R(pˆO)≤C ′6
(
s2n
log(|VO|)
n
+ r21n
)
.
Hence, the claim follows. 
Proof of Lemma 12. By Lemma 1, the expected revenues for a given price vector pO can be
expressed as
Π(pO) =E[〈pO, yO(pO)〉] = pTOvO −
1
2
pTO(H
−1+H−T )pO.
Since revenues are quadratic in prices, second-order Taylor expansion (around p⋆O) is exact.
Thus, we have
Π(pO) =Π(p
⋆
O)+ (pO− p⋆O)T∇Π(p⋆O)+ (pO− p⋆O)T
∇2Π(p⋆O)
2
(pO− p⋆O)
=Π(p⋆O)+ (pO− p⋆O)T
(H−1+H−T )
4
(pO− p⋆O),
(107)
where we use the optimality condition ∇Π(p⋆O) = 0 (which holds since p⋆O < p¯eO). Rearranging
terms, this inequality implies that
|Π(p⋆O)−Π(pO)| ≤
∣∣∣∣(pO− p⋆O)T (H−1+H−T )4 (pO− p⋆O)
∣∣∣∣≤ 14‖H−1+H−T‖2‖pO − p⋆O‖22.
By Lemma 14 ||(H−1 +H−T )||2 ≤ 2||H−1||2 ≤ 2ζ , which together with the previous inequality
immediately implies the desired result. 
E. Proofs of Section 5
Proof of Lemma 3. LetM ℓ be amatrix such that (M ℓ)ℓ(i),ℓ(j) =Mij for all i, j ∈ V . Observe that
by definitionM ℓ ism-banded.Moreover, it can be seen thatM ℓ = P˜ TMP˜ for some permutation
matrix P˜ . This implies that (M ℓ)−1 = P˜ TM−1P˜ , and hence (M ℓ)−1ℓ(i),ℓ(j) = (M
−1)ij for all i, j ∈ V .
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Let σmax(A) and σmin(A) denote respectively the largest and smallest singular values of some
matrixA. Using Assumption 2, it is possible to bound singular values ofA=MMT . In particular,
we have
σmax(MM
T )≤‖MMT‖2 ≤‖M‖22 ≤ (4b¯− ζ)2,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 14 of Appendix G.1. In addition, observing
σmin(MM
T ) = 1/σmax((MM
T )−1) = 1/σmax(M−TM−1), we have
σmin(MM
T ) = 1/σmax(M
−TM−1) = 1/‖M−TM−1‖2 ≥ 1/‖M−1‖22 ≥ ζ2,
where once again the last inequality follows from Lemma 14. Let u= (4b¯− ζ)2 and l= ζ2 denote
the upper and lower bounds on σmax(MM
T ) and σmin(MM
T ) respectively, and let
r= u/l=
(
4b¯− ζ
ζ
)2
(108)
denote their ratio. Observe that (M ℓ)(M ℓ)T = P˜ TMMT P˜ . Since P˜ is a unitary matrix (P˜ P˜ T = I),
it follows that (M ℓ)(M ℓ)T andMMT share the same singular values, and hence the aforemen-
tioned singular value bounds also apply to (M ℓ)(M ℓ)T .
Proposition 2.3 in Demko et al. (1984) implies that when M ℓ is m-banded and satisfies the
aforementioned singular value bounds, the entries of (M ℓ)−1 exhibit exponential decay as we
get away from the diagonal. That is, we have
|(M ℓ)−1ij | ≤C ′λ|i−j|1 . (109)
Here
λ1 =
(√
r− 1√
r+1
)1/m
=
(
4b¯−ζ
ζ
− 1
4b¯−ζ
ζ
+1
)1/m
=
(
2b¯− ζ
2b¯
)1/m
,
where the last quantity is strictly positive by Assumption 2 as long as the set of edges in the
network is nonempty. In addition,
C ′ = (m+1)‖M ℓ‖2λ−m1 max
{
1
l
,
(1+
√
r)2
2lr
}
≤ (m+1)‖M‖2
(
2b¯
2b¯− ζ
)
max
{
1
l
,
(1+ 4b¯−ζ
ζ
)2
2u
}
≤ (m+1)(4b¯− ζ)
(
2b¯
2b¯− ζ
)
max
{
1
ζ2
,
( 4b¯
ζ
)2
2(4b¯− ζ)2
}
≤ (m+1)(4b¯− ζ)
(
2b¯
2b¯− ζ
)
max
{
1
ζ2
,
2
ζ2
}
= 4(m+1)
b¯(4b¯− ζ)
ζ2(2b¯− ζ) =C1,
(110)
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where in the first inequality we use the fact that ‖M ℓ‖2 = ‖P˜ TMP˜‖2 ≤‖P˜‖22‖M‖2 ≤‖M‖2, in the
second inequality we use Lemma 14, and in the last inequality we use the fact that 4b¯− ζ ≥ 2b¯,
which follows from Assumption 2.
Note that (109) implies that
|M−1ij |= |(M ℓ)−1ℓ(i),ℓ(j)| ≤C ′λ|ℓ(i)−ℓ(j)|1 .
Substituting the upper bound of C ′ from (110) and the expression for λ1 in this inequality, we
establish the first part of the claim. Note that by Lemma 13 of Appendix G.1, H−1 = [M−1]OO.
Thus, the bound onH−1ij also follows from the bound onM
−1
ij . 
Proof of Lemma 4. Observe that Lemma 3 implies that
‖W¯ −H−1‖∞ =max
k∈VO
∑
j:|ℓ(k)−ℓ(j)|>(sn−1)/2
|H−1kj | ≤ 2
∞∑
j=⌊sn/2⌋
C˜1λ
j
1 ≤
2C˜1λ
⌊sn/2⌋
1
1−λ1 ≤
2C˜1λ
sn/2
1
λ1(1−λ1)
‖W¯ −H−1‖1 =max
k∈VO
∑
j:|ℓ(k)−ℓ(j)|>(sn−1)/2
|H−1jk | ≤ 2
∞∑
j=⌊sn/2⌋
C˜1λ
j
1 ≤
2C˜1λ
⌊sn/2⌋
1
1−λ1 ≤
2C˜1λ
sn/2
1
λ1(1−λ1)
(111)
for all k ∈ VO. Here, we use the fact that summation over j such that |ℓ(k)− ℓ(j)|> (sn− 1)/2 is
smaller than summation over j such that |ℓ(k)− ℓ(j)| ≥ (sn− 1)/2. The latter is equal to summa-
tion over j such that |ℓ(k)− ℓ(j)| ≥ ⌈(sn− 1)/2⌉, and ⌈(sn− 1)/2⌉≥ ⌊sn/2⌋.
Let C˜2 > 0 be a constant such that
sn = C˜2max{m, logn} ≥ 2
logλ−11
log
(
2C˜1n
λ1(1−λ1)
)
.
For such C˜2, we obtain
2λ
sn/2
1
λ1(1−λ1) ≤
2
λ1(1−λ1)
λ1(1−λ1)
2C˜1n
≤ 1
C˜1n
.
These inequalities, together with (111), imply that W¯ is an (sn, r1n)-sparse approximation ofH
−1
for r1n = 1/n. 
Proof of Lemma 6. Recall thatM =Λ−G, Gij ≥ 0, and Λii = 2bi ≤ 2b¯. Thus, using this obser-
vation with (23), and choosingC ′0 =max{C˜,2b¯}, we conclude that
|M |ij ≤ C
′
0
(1+ |ℓ(i)− ℓ(j)|)θ . (112)
As before, let M ℓ be a matrix such that (M ℓ)ℓ(i),ℓ(j) = Mij for all i, j ∈ V . Observe that (112)
implies that
|M ℓij | ≤
C ′0
(1+ |i− j|)θ , (113)
for any i, j. Also recall thatM ℓ = P˜ TMP˜ for somepermutationmatrix P˜ , and (M ℓ)−1 = P˜ TM−1P˜ .
This in turn implies that (M ℓ)−1ℓ(i),ℓ(j) =M
−1
ij for all i, j ∈ V .
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By Lemma 5 this implies that
|(M ℓ)−1ij | ≤C ′1/(1+ |i− j|)θ, (114)
where C ′1 depends on C
′
0, θ, and ‖(M ℓ)−1‖2. On the other hand, by Lemma 14, we have
‖(M ℓ)−1‖2 = ‖P˜ TM−1P˜‖2 ≤‖M−1‖2 ≤ 1/ζ,
where we use the fact that P˜ is a permutation matrix and hence ‖P˜‖2 = 1. Thus, recalling that
C ′0 =max{C˜,2b¯}, we conclude that C ′1 depends only on C˜, b¯, θ, ζ.
Thus, using (114), we immediately obtain that for i, j ∈ VO,
|M−1ij |= |(M ℓ)−1ℓ(i),ℓ(j)| ≤C ′1/(1+ |ℓ(i)− ℓ(j)|)θ. (115)
Moreover, by Lemma 13, H−1 is a diagonal subblock of M−1. Hence, for i, j ∈ VO we also have
|H−1ij |= |M−1ij |. This observation, together with (115), implies that the matrixH−1 itself exhibits
the polynomial decay property (with identical parameters toM−1). 
Proof of Lemma 7. Using Lemma 6, we obtain
‖W¯ −H−1‖∞ =max
k∈VO
∑
j:|ℓ(k)−ℓ(j)|>(sn−1)/2
|H−1kj | ≤max
k∈VO
∑
j:|ℓ(k)−ℓ(j)|≥⌈(sn−1)/2⌉
|H−1kj | ≤ 2
∞∑
j=⌈(sn−1)/2⌉
C1
(1+ j)θ
= 2C˜1
∞∑
j=⌈(sn−1)/2⌉+1
j−θ ≤ 2C˜1
∫ ∞
sn/2
x−θdx
≤ 2 C˜1
θ− 1
(sn
2
)−θ+1
=
C˜12
θ
θ− 1sn
−θ+1.
Here, the second line uses the fact that (⌈(sn− 1)/2⌉+1)− (sn/2)≥ 1/2, and ℓ−θ ≤
∫ ℓ+1/2
ℓ−1/2 x
−θdx
for any ℓ≥ 1 since x−θ is convex in x≥ 0.
Since the column and row entries ofH−1 decay at the same rate under the assumptions of the
lemma, we also obtain
‖W¯ −H−1‖1 ≤ C˜12
θ
θ− 1sn
−θ+1. (116)
From (116) it follows that W¯ is an (sn, r1n)-sparse approximation ofH
−1 where
r1n ≤ C˜12
θ
θ− 1sn
−θ+1. (117)
Let sn= {n/ log(VO)}1/2θ as assumed in the statement of the lemma. Then (117) yields
r1n ≤ C˜12
θ
θ− 1
(
log |VO|
n
)(θ−1)/2θ
, (118)
and the claim follows. 
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Proof of Lemma 8. (i) Let k= ⌈logde/q(
√
n|VO|/ log(|VO|))⌉, and recall that W¯ is the |VO| × |VO|
submatrix of g⋆k(M). Observe that anymatrix polynomial of degree k is such that its (i, j)th entry
is nonzero only if ρ(i, j) ≤ k. By the exponential growth assumption, the number of nonzero
entries in each row/column of W¯ is bounded by
Ced
⌈logde/q(
√
n|VO|/ log(|VO|))⌉
e ≤Cededlogde/q(
√
n|VO |/ log(|VO|))
e =Cede
( √
n|VO|
log(|VO|)
)logde/q(de)
.
Using the shorthand notation ν = logde/q(de), these observations collectively imply that W¯ is
sn =Cede
(√
n|VO|
log(|VO|)
)ν
-sparse.
Observe that using the aforementioned choice of k, we have
qk ≤ qlogde/q(
√
n|VO|/ log(|VO|)) =
( √
n|VO|
log(|VO|)
)logde/q(q)
=
(
log(|VO|)√
n|VO|
)logde/q(1/q)
=
(
log(|VO|)√
n|VO|
)1−logde/q(de)
=
(
log(|VO|)√
n|VO|
)1−ν
.
By (26) we have
‖H−1ℓ,· − W¯ℓ,·‖2,‖H−1·,ℓ − W¯·,ℓ‖2 ≤‖H−1− W¯‖2 ≤ C˜qk ≤ C˜
(
log(|VO|)√
n|VO|
)1−ν
. (119)
Note that by (119), we obtain
‖W¯ −H−1‖∞ =max
ℓ
‖W¯ℓ,·−H−1ℓ,· ‖1 ≤ |VO|1/2max
ℓ
‖W¯ℓ,·−H−1ℓ,· ‖2 ≤ |VO|1/2‖W¯ −H−1‖2
≤ C˜|VO|1/2
(
log(|VO|)√
n|VO|
)1−ν
= C˜|VO|ν/2
(
log(|VO|)√
n
)1−ν
.
(120)
Using the fact that ‖A‖1 = ‖AT ‖∞ for anymatrixA, and proceeding similarly, it also follows that
‖W¯ −H−1‖1 ≤ C˜|VO|ν/2
(
log(|VO|)√
n
)1−ν
. These inequalities imply that
r1n = C˜|VO|ν/2
(
log(|VO|)√
n
)1−ν
.
Hence, the claim follows.
(ii) Let
k=
⌊
d⋆
√
(n/ log(|VO|))
⌋
,
for some d⋆ ≥ 0, whichwe specify later. Once again recalling that W¯ is the |VO|×|VO| submatrix of
g⋆k(M), and noting that anymatrix polynomial of degree k is such that its (i, j)th entry is nonzero
only if ρ(i, j)≤ k, we can bound the number of nonzero entries in each row/column of W¯ by
Cp
(
n
log(|VO|)
)dp/d⋆
.
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Observe that using the aforementioned choice of k, we have
qk ≤ q d⋆
√
(n/ log(|VO |))−1.
From (26) we have
‖H−1ℓ,· − W¯ℓ,·‖2,‖H−1·,ℓ − W¯·,ℓ‖2 ≤‖H−1− W¯‖2 ≤ C˜qk ≤ C˜q
d⋆
√
(n/ log(|VO|))−1. (121)
Finally, as before, we have ‖W¯ − H−1‖∞ = maxℓ ‖W¯ℓ,· − H−1ℓ,· ‖1 ≤
√
VO‖W¯ − H−1‖2 ≤
C˜
√|VO|q d⋆√(n/ log(|VO|))−1, where we use (121). Proceeding similarly, it also follows that ‖W¯ −
H−1‖1 ≤ C˜
√|VO|q d⋆√(n/ log(|VO|))−1. These inequalities imply that r1n = C˜√|VO|q d⋆√(n/ log(|VO|))−1.
The claim follows by choosing d⋆= 4dp. 
F. Simultaneous Confidence Intervals via Bootstrap and Setting Threshold Parameters
In this section, we discuss the construction of simultaneous confidence intervals for all |VO|2
coefficients of theH−1 matrix. This is of interest in itself, as it allows for controlling the noise in
estimation, which sheds light on the impact that a change in the price offered to one agent has
on the expected consumption of another agent. Moreover, the same construction will allow us
to provide data-driven choices for the threshold values µkj , k, j ∈ VO used in Algorithm 1.
The construction of such simultaneous confidence intervals with asymptotic exact coverage
is nonstandard as (i) there are model selection mistakes in the regularized estimators used in
Algorithm 1, and (ii) the number of coefficients is potentially much larger than the sample size.
In particular, the latter implies that as the sample size grows so does the dimension of the esti-
mation errors and hence there is no limiting distribution. Instead, we construct a sequence of
Gaussian processes that provide a suitable approximation of the maximum estimation error via
amultiplier bootstrap approximation. Although themaximumerror is a scalar, it is not clear that
there is a limiting distribution. However, our approximations hold for each n with errors van-
ishing sufficiently fast so that the distortions on the coverage of the confidence regions vanish
too. This result relies on the recent central limit theorems for themaximumof high-dimensional
vectors developed in Chernozhukov et al. (2014b, 2015, 2013a, 2014a).
We start by stating an additional assumption on which our analysis in this section relies:
ASSUMPTION 6. With probability 1 − o(1) we have that maxk∈V¯O ‖Ψˆk,· − Ψ¯k,·‖1 ≤ dn, for some
(fixed) sequence dn→ 0.
Assumption 6 is implied by standard assumptions in the high-dimensional statistics liter-
ature. Indeed, since for each k ∈ VO, Ψˆk,· is estimated via an ℓ1-regularized procedure, it suf-
fices to have Ψ¯k,· approximately sparse and the expected value of the design matrix associ-
ated with the price vector to have eigenvalues bounded away from zero and from above; see,
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e.g., Bickel et al. (2009), Belloni et al. (2014), Zhang and Zhang (2014), Van de Geer et al. (2014),
Javanmard andMontanari (2014). It is plausible that we can relax this condition as done in the
analysis of Theorem 2.
Our starting point is the (approximate) linear representation established in Theorem 1,
namely,
√
n{Wˇ T −H−T }=− 1√
n
n∑
t=1
ΨˆVO,·(1;p
(t)
O )(ε
(t))T + R˜n, (122)
where R˜n collects all the approximation errors except in the first row of [R
1
n, · · · ,R|VO|n ], and ΨˆVO,·
is the submatrix of Ψˆ obtained by restricting attention to rows {Ψˆk,·}k∈VO . We will approximate
cv(1−α), i.e., the (1−α)-quantile of the random variable
max
k,j∈VO
∣∣∣∣∣ 1√n
n∑
t=1
Ψˆk,·(1;p(t))ε
(t)
j
σkj
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where σ2kj =
1
n
∑n
t=1E[{Ψ¯k,·(1;p(t)O )ε(t)j }2]. The confidence intervals will then ensure that with
provability converging to 1−α, simultaneously over k, j ∈ VO, we have
Wˇkj − cv(1−α) σkj√
n
≤H−1kj ≤ Wˇkj +cv(1−α)
σkj√
n
, (123)
provided that the approximation errors R˜n do not impact the coverage.
11
To approximate the quantile cv(1−α) and obtain the correct coverage one needs to account
for the correlation structure. This is done through the use of a multiplier bootstrap procedure
conditional on the data as follows. For each k, j ∈ VO, define
Tkj :=
1√
n
n∑
i=1
ξˆ(t)
Ψˆk,·(1;p
(t)
O ){y(t)j − (vˆj − Wˆj,·p(t)O )}
σˆkj
where σˆ2kj =
1
n
∑n
t=1{Ψˆk,·(1;p(t)O )[y(t)j − (vˆj−Wˆj,·p(t)O )]}2, and ξˆ(t) are i.i.d. standard normal random
variables independent of the data. The associated critical value we are interested in is
cv∗(1−α) = conditional (1−α)-quantile of max
k,j∈VO
|Tkj | given the data.
The next result shows that despite the high dimensionality, the Gaussianmultiplier bootstrap
can be used to approximate the quantiles cv(1−α) of the distribution and obtain simultaneous
confidence intervals of the form of (123). To state the result concisely we let Bn ≥ 1 be a param-
eter such that
B4n ≥E[ max
k,j∈[VO ]
|Ψ¯k·(1;p(t)O )ǫ(t)j |4]. (124)
11 It follows that a sufficient condition for that ismaxk,j∈VO |(R˜n)kj |= o(log
−1/2 |VO|), which is implied by our condi-
tions and Theorem 1.
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In the proof of our result, we leverage new central limit theorems of Belloni et al. (2018) for the
maximum of the entries of the average of high-dimensional vectors, and the linear represen-
tation derived in Theorem 1. This allows us to construct confidence intervals that are simulta-
neously valid even if the number of components exceeds the sample size. In what follows, {δn}
denotes a fixed sequence satisfying δn→ 0.
THEOREM 4. In addition to Assumptions 3 and 6, suppose that dn log(VOn)+n
−1/2sn log
3/2(VO)+
r1n log(nVO) ≤ δn and {n−1B4n log7(n|VO|)}1/6 ≤ δn. Then, the critical value cv∗(1−α) computed via
the multiplier bootstrap procedure satisfies
lim
n→∞
∣∣∣∣P
(
Wˇkj −
cv∗(1−α)σˆkj√
n
≤H−1kj ≤ Wˇkj +
cv∗(1−α)σˆkj√
n
, for all k, j ∈ VO
)
− (1−α)
∣∣∣∣= 0.
Therefore, setting µkj = 2cv
∗
(1−α)σˆkj/
√
n, for k, j ∈ VO, with probability converging to 1−αwe have
µkj ≥ 2|(Wˇ −H−1)kj | simultaneously over k, j ∈ VO,
as required in Theorem 1(ii).
Proof of Theorem 4. By Theorem 1 we have that (122) holds. This corresponds to the many
approximate means setting considered in Belloni et al. (2018) with p = |VO|2. It will be conve-
nient for us to associate each j′ ∈ [p] with (k, j) ∈ VO × VO, where j′ = (k − 1)VO + j. We will
verify Conditions M, E, and A in Belloni et al. (2018) (which collectively imply Condition W in
Belloni et al. (2018) using the choice of weightswj′ = 1/σkj and wˆj′ =1/σˆkj) and invokeTheorem
2.6 in Belloni et al. (2018) to establish the claims.
Define Ztj′ = Ψ¯k·(1;p
(t)
O )ε
(t)
j and Zˆtj′ = Ψˆk·(1;p
(t)
O ){yj − (vˆj − Wˆj·p(t)O )} for j′ ∈ [p]. Note that Con-
dition E of Belloni et al. (2018) immediately holds by our assumptions onBn.
To verify ConditionM of Belloni et al. (2018), note that
1
n
∑n
t=1E[Z
2
tj′ ] = σ
2
kj =E[{Ψ¯k·(1;p(t)O )}2E[ε2j | p(t)O ]]
≥ cE[{Ψ¯k·(1;p(t)O )}2]
= cΨ¯k,·Ψ¯−1Ψ¯Tk,· = Ψ¯k,k
≥ c/p¯2,
where we used Assumption 3(i) in the second line, and the fact that Ψ¯ =E[(1;p
(t)
O )(1;p
(t)
O )
T ]−1in
the third and fourth lines. Thus σ2kj =
1
n
∑n
t=1E[Z
2
tj′ ] are bounded away from zero, satisfying
(after appropriate normalization) the first requirement of ConditionM.
The second part of ConditionM requires bounds on the third and fourthmoments of Ztj′ . For
the third moment we have for all j′ ∈ [p] that
1
n
∑n
t=1E[|Ztj′ |3] =E[|Ψ¯k·(1;p(t)O )|3E[|εj |3 | p(t)O ]]≤C ′1,
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for some constant C ′1 > 0 under Assumptions 3(i)–(iii). Similarly, for the fourth moments we
have
1
n
∑n
t=1E[|Ztj′ |4] ≤B4n,
by definition of Bn. These observations imply that the second part of conditionM also follows.
Next we verify Condition A. We rewrite (122) to obtain
√
n{Wˇ T −H−T }=− 1√
n
n∑
t=1
Ψ¯VO,·(1;p
(t)
O )(ε
(t))T + R˜′n, (125)
where R˜′n = R˜n+(Ψ¯VO ,·−ΨˆVO ,·) 1√n
∑n
t=1(1;p
(t)
O )(ε
(t))T . Note that with probability 1−o(1)we have
maxk,j∈VO |(R˜′n)kj | ≤maxk,j∈VO |(R˜n)kj |+maxk∈VO ‖Ψ¯k,·− Ψˆk,·‖1maxj∈VO
∥∥∥ 1√n∑nt=1(1;p(t)O )ε(t)j ∥∥∥∞
≤C ′2{n−1/2sn log |VO|+ r1n
√
log |VO|}+C ′2dn
√
log(VO),
for some constant C ′2 > 0. Here we apply Theorem 1 to control R˜n. To control the second term
we apply Holder’s inequality, and use Lemma 22 and Assumption 6 to bound each term. Using
the assumptions of the theorem on sn, r1n, dn, and δn we have that with probability 1− o(1)
maxk,j∈VO |(R˜′n)kj | ≤C ′3δn log−1/2(VOn),
for some constant C ′3 > 0, which establishes the first part of Condition A.
To show the second part of Condition A, note that
max
j′∈[p]
1
n
∑n
t=1(Zˆtj′ −Ztj′)2 ≤ 2maxk,j∈VO 1n
∑n
t=1({Ψˆk,·− Ψ¯k,·}(1;p(t)O )ε(t)j )2
+2maxk,j∈VO
1
n
∑n
t=1{Ψˆk,·(1;p(t)O ){vj − vˆj +(Wˆj,·−H−1j· )p(t)O }}2
≤ 2maxk∈VO ‖Ψˆk,·− Ψ¯k,·‖21maxt∈[n] ‖(1;p(t)O )‖2∞maxj∈VO 1n
∑n
t=1(ε
(t)
j )
2
+2maxj∈VO ‖(vˆj, Wˆj·)− (vj,H−1j· )‖21maxt∈[n] ‖(1;p(t)O )‖2∞maxk∈VO 1n
∑n
t=1{Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )}2
≤ 2d2np¯2C ′4+C ′4{n−1/2
√
s2n log(VOn)+ r1n}2p¯2C ′4
for some constant C ′4 > 0, where the last inequality holds with probability 1 − o(1). Here,
we make use of the fact that with probability 1 − o(1) we have maxk∈VO ‖Ψˆk· − Ψ¯k·‖1 ≤ dn by
Assumption 6; maxj∈VO ‖(vˆj , Wˆj·) − (vj,H−1j· )‖1 ≤ C ′5{n−1/2
√
s2n log(VOn) + r1n} for some con-
stant C ′5 > 0 by Lemma 11; maxj∈VO
1
n
∑n
t=1(ε
(t)
j )
2 ≤ C ′6 for some constant C ′6 > 0 by Lemma 22;
maxk∈VO
1
n
∑n
t=1{Ψˆk·(1;p(t)O )}2 ≤ C ′7 for some constant C ′7 > 0 by Lemma 21; as well as the fact
that |p(t)j | ≤ p¯.
Since p¯ is a bounded constant, and dn log(VOn) + n
−1/2sn log
3/2(VO) + r1n log(nVO)≤ δn by the
assumptions of the theorem, with probability 1− o(1)we have
max
j′∈[p]
1
n
∑n
t=1(Zˆtj′ −Ztj′)2≤C ′8δ2n/ log2(VOn),
for some constantC ′8 > 0. This completes the verificationof ConditionA part (ii). Thus, Theorem
2.6 of Belloni et al. (2018) applies, and readily implies the first claim of the theorem. The second
claim then follows by definition of the (simultaneous) confidence regions. 
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G. Auxiliary Results
In this section, we provide some auxiliary results and technical lemmas that are used in our
analysis throughout the paper. In particular, in Section G.1 we derive various properties of M
andH matrices and their inverses. In addition, we provide some properties of the consumption
equilibria. In SectionG.2, we derive some technical lemmas onwhich the analysis of Algorithm1
builds. In Section G.3, we focus on Assumptions 3 and 5, and establish that the former implies
the latter. Finally, in Section G.4, for completeness, we state some known concentration bounds
and other useful results from the literature, which we leverage when deriving our results.
G.1. Matrix Identities and Preliminary Results on Consumption Equilibria
In this section, we provide various identities onM andHmatrices and some preliminary results
on consumption equilibria.
Identities on M and H Matrices. Our first result, Lemma 13, characterizes properties of M
andH as well as their inverses. This result also sheds light on when the entries of some of these
matrices are nonzero. This characterization exploits whether the underlying network is strongly
connected. We say that a directed network is strongly connected if it is possible to reach any
node from every other node by traversing directed edges in the underlying network.
LEMMA 13. Under Assumption 2, we have the following:
(i) M +MT is positive definite.
(ii) MLL,MOO, andM are invertible.
(iii) ForH = (MOO−MOLM−1LLMLO), SOL =MOLM−1LL and SLO =M−1LLMLO, we have that
M−1 =
[
H−1, −H−1SOL
−SLOH−1, M−1LL +SLOH−1SOL
]
. (126)
(iv) M−1+M−T andH−1+H−T are positive definite.
(v) M−1 = (
∑∞
k=0(Λ
−1G)k)Λ−1. Moreover, if the underlying network is strongly connected, then
all entries ofM−1 andH−1 are positive.
(vi) Suppose that the induced subnetwork of latent agents is strongly connected. Let i, j ∈ VO, i 6= j
be such that (i, j) /∈ E. If there is a directed edge from i to a latent agent and another edge
from a latent agent to j, thenHij < 0.
Proof of Lemma 13. (i) Under Assumption 2, the matrix M + MT = (Λ − G) + (Λ − GT )
is (strictly) diagonally dominant. The Gershgorin circle theorem (see, e.g., Horn and Johnson
(2012)) implies that all of the matrix’s eigenvalues are positive, and hence positive definiteness
readily follows.
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(ii) Assumption 2 also implies that MLL +M
T
LL is diagonally dominant and hence positive
definite. Note that we have
yTLMLLyL =
1
2
yTL(MLL+M
T
LL)yL> 0
for yL 6=0. Thus, we conclude thatMLL is nonsingular and invertible. Repeating same argument
forMOO andM , we obtain that these matrices are also nonsingular and invertible.
(iii) SinceMLL is nonsingular, it can be verified that M can be expressed in terms of the fol-
lowing matrix multiplication:
M =
[
IO, MOLM
−1
LL
0, IL
][
MOO−MOLM−1LLMLO, 0
0, MLL
][
IO, 0
M−1LLMLO, IL
]
. (127)
Since M is invertible, it follows that the middle term is also invertible (as otherwise M would
necessarily be rank-deficient). It can be seen that its inverse is given as by[
MOO−MOLM−1LLMLO, 0
0, MLL
]−1
=
[
H, 0
0, MLL
]−1
=
[
H−1, 0
0, M−1LL
]
.
On the other hand, the inverses of the matrices on left/right-hand side of (127) can be written
as [
IO, 0
M−1LLMLO, IL
]−1
=
[
IO, 0
−M−1LLMLO, IL
]
=
[
IO, 0
−SLO, IL
]
and [
IO, MOLM
−1
LL
0, IL
]−1
=
[
IO, −MOLM−1LL
0, IL
]
=
[
IO, −SOL
0, IL
]
.
Using these observations together with (127), we get
M−1 =
[
IO, 0
−SLO, IL
][
H−1, 0
0, M−1LL
][
IO, −SOL
0, IL
]
. (128)
The claim follows bymultiplying these matrices.
(iv) Fix any y ∈R|V | such that y 6= 0. Define yˆ=M−1y, and observe that sinceM−1 is invertible
and full rank, we have yˆ 6= 0. We have
yT (M−1+M−T )y= yTM−T (M +MT )M−1y= yˆT (M +MT )yˆ > 0,
where the inequality follows from part (i). Since y 6= 0 is arbitrary, it follows that (M−1 +M−T )
is positive definite. By part (iii)H−1+H−T is a submatrix of (M−1+M−T ), and hence it follows
that this matrix is also positive definite.
(v) By Assumption 2,Λ−1G is amatrixwith nonnegative entries and row sums strictly bounded
by one.Hence, the Perron–Frobenious theorem (see, e.g., Horn and Johnson (2012)) implies that
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the spectral radius of Λ−1G is bounded by one. Thus, the inverse of M−1 admits the following
power series representation, which by the bound on the spectral radius of Λ−1G is convergent:
M−1 = (Λ−G)−1 = (I −Λ−1G)−1Λ−1 =
( ∞∑
k=0
(Λ−1G)k
)
Λ−1. (129)
Since Λ is a diagonal matrix with strictly positive diagonal entries, and entries of G are non-
negative, (129) implies that if the underlying network is strongly connected, then for large
enough k, all entries of (Λ−1G)k are strictly positive (recall that Gij > 0 when (i, j) ∈ E). Hence,
all entries of M−1 are also strictly positive. The result for H−1 trivially follows since H−1 is a
submatrix ofM−1.
(vi) Recall that H = (MOO −MOLM−1LLMLO). Following the same approach as before, we con-
clude thatMLL =ΛLL−GLL is diagonally dominant, and since the induced subnetwork of latent
agents is strongly connected we conclude that all entries of M−1LL are positive. Thus, if i, j ∈ VO
are such that i 6= j and there is a directed edge from i to latent agents and another edge from a
latent agent to j, then Tij > 0, where T =MOLM
−1
LLMLO. If, in addition, there is no edge between
i, j, then (MOO)ij = 0. SinceH =MOO −T , it follows thatHij =−Tij < 0. 
We proceed by characterizing norms of matricesM andH as well as some relatedmatrices. It
is possible to provide bounds on various norms of a matrix A (and its inverse) when the matrix
satisfies diagonal dominance assumptions (similar to Assumption 2). We next summarize such
a result due to Varah (1975).
THEOREM 5 (Varah (1975)). Assume that for some ζ > 0, matrix A is such that either (a) Aii ≥∑
j|j 6=i |Aij | + ζ, or (b) Aii ≥
∑
j|j 6=i |Aji| + ζ. We have the following bounds on the norm of A
and A−1:
(i) If (a) holds, then ||A||∞ ≥ ζ and ||A−1||∞ ≤ 1ζ .
(ii) If (b) holds, then ||A||1 ≥ ζ and ||A−1||1 ≤ 1ζ .
(iii) If both (a) and (b) hold, then ||A−1||−12 = σmin(A) ≥ ζ, where σmin(A) denotes the smallest
singular value ofA.
Using this theorem, we next provide a result on norms of matricesM andH.
LEMMA 14. Under Assumption 2, we have the following:
(i) ‖M‖p ≤ 4b¯− ζ and ‖M−1‖p ≤ 1ζ for p∈ {1,∞}.
(ii) ‖H‖p ≤ 4b¯2ζ and ‖H−1‖p ≤ 1ζ for p∈ {1,∞}.
(iii) ‖M‖2 ≤ 4b¯− ζ, ‖H‖2 ≤ 4b¯2ζ , ‖M−1‖2 ≤ 1ζ , and ‖H−1‖2 ≤ 1ζ .
(iv) Singular values ofM belong to the interval [ζ,4b¯− ζ].
79
Proof of Lemma 14. (i) By definition, ||M ||∞ = maxi
∑
j |Mij | ≤ 4b¯ − ζ, where the inequality
follows since
∑
j |Mij |= 2bi +
∑
j|j 6=i |Mij | ≤ 4bi − ζ and b¯≥ bi for all i. The same argument also
yields ||M ||1 =maxj
∑
i |Mij | ≤ 4b¯− ζ.
Using Assumption 2, Theorem 5 readily implies that ‖M−1‖p ≤ 1ζ for p∈ {1,∞}.
(ii) Recall that H = MOO −MOLM−1LLMLO. Using the fact that matrix norms are subadditive
and submultiplicative, we obtain ‖H‖p ≤ ‖MOO‖p + ‖MOL‖p‖M−1LL‖p‖MLO‖p. Observe that by
Assumption 2, we have that absolute row/column sums ofMOL andMLO are bounded by 2b¯−
ζ. Thus, for p ∈ {1,∞}, we have ‖MOL‖p,‖MLO‖p ≤ 2b¯ − ζ. Since MOO and MLL are diagonal
blocks ofM , they also satisfy Assumption 2. Thus, using the first part of the lemma, we obtain
‖MOO‖p ≤ 4b¯− ζ, and ‖M−1LL‖p ≤ 1ζ . Combining these observations, for p∈ {1,∞}, we obtain
‖H‖p ≤ ‖MOO‖p+ ‖MOL‖p‖M−1LL‖p‖MLO‖p ≤ 4b¯− ζ +
(2b¯− ζ)2
ζ
=
4b¯2
ζ
.
Observing thatH−1 is a submatrix ofM−1 (see Lemma 13), we have that ‖H−1‖p ≤ ‖M−1‖p for
any p-norm. By the first part of the lemma, we obtain ‖H−1‖p ≤ 1ζ .
(iii) Using Holder’s inequality, we have ‖A‖2 ≤
√‖A‖1‖A‖∞ for any matrix A. The result then
immediately follows from parts (i) and (ii) of the lemma.
(iv) Since the largest singular value ofM is given by ‖M‖2, part (i) immediately implies that it
is upper bounded by 4b¯− ζ. On the other hand, employing the version of the classic Gershgorin
theorem for singular values, we have that the smallest singular value is bounded from below by
mini
(
|Mii− 12
(∑
j 6=i |Mij |+
∑
j 6=i |Mji|
))
(see Johnson (1989)). Once again, using Assumption 2
we conclude that the smallest singular value ofM is bounded frombelowbymini 2bi−(2bi−ζ) =
ζ. Hence, singular values ofM are contained in the interval [ζ,4b¯− ζ]. 
Leveraging the characterization in this result, we next provide a useful characterization of the
normsof the inverse of theH−1+H−T matrix, which plays a key role in our analysis of the seller’s
revenues.
LEMMA 15. Let A=H−1+H−T . We have ‖A−1‖2 ≤ 8b¯4ζ3 and ‖A−1‖1 ≤ 8b¯
4
ζ3
.
Proof of Lemma 15. It follows from the definition of A that
‖A−1‖2 = ‖(H−1+H−T )−1‖2 = ‖HT (HT +H)−1H‖2 ≤‖H‖22‖(HT +H)−1‖2. (130)
Let IO be the |VO|×|VO| identitymatrix, and letD be a |V |×|V |matrixD= [IO,0; 0,0], where 0’s
denote blocks of appropriate size whose entries are all equal to zero. Consider some ζ ′ ∈ (0, ζ).
Observe thatMζ′ =M − ζ ′D is strictly (row and column) diagonally dominant by Assumption 2.
Consider the matrix Hζ′ = MOO − ζ ′IO −MOLM−1LLMLO = H − ζ ′IO. Observe that Hζ′ is the
Schur complement ofMLL inMζ′ , i.e.,Hζ′ =Mζ′/MLL, where ‘/’ denotes the Schur complement.
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It follows from Lei et al. (2003) that whenMζ′ is strictly (row/column) diagonally dominant, so
is Hζ′ . Since this is true for any ζ
′ ∈ (0, ζ), and Hζ′ =H − ζ ′IO, it follows that H is also (row and
column) diagonally dominant, with a diagonal dominance gap of at least ζ. This implies that
HT +H is diagonally dominant with a diagonal dominance gap of 2ζ. Thus, from Gershgorin’s
theorem, it follows that all singular values are greater than 2ζ. Thus ‖(HT +H)−1‖2 ≤ 12ζ .
By Lemma 14 we have ‖H‖2 ≤ 4b¯2ζ . Now, using (130), we obtain
‖A−1‖2 ≤ ‖H‖22‖(HT +H)−1‖2 ≤
(
4b¯2
ζ
)2
1
2ζ
=
8b¯4
ζ3
.
Hence the first claim follows.
Following a similar approach, note that ‖A−1‖1 ≤‖H‖21‖(HT +H)−1‖1. As before, observe that
HT +H is diagonally dominant, with a gap of 2ζ between the diagonal entries and the sum of
the corresponding off-diagonal entries. Thus, by Theorem 5, we have ||(HT +H)−1||1 ≤ 1/2ζ.
Lemma 14 yields
‖H‖1 ≤ 4b¯
2
ζ
.
Using this to bound ||A−1||1, we obtain
‖A−1‖1 ≤ 8b
4
ζ3
.
Hence, the second part of the claim also follows. 
Properties of Consumption Equilibria. We proceed by establishing that under Assumption 1,
at the consumption equilibrium all agents have nonzero consumption.
LEMMA 16. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and that p≤ p¯ · e. Then, in the corresponding con-
sumption equilibrium y, we have yi > 0 for all i∈ V .
Proof of Lemma 16. Assume for contradiction that there exists an agent iwhose equilibrium
consumption level is yi = 0. Note that the marginal payoff of this agent is given by
∂u
(t)
i (yi, y−i)
∂yi
= ai+ ξ
(t)
i − 2biyi+
∑
j
Gijyj − pi = ai+ ξ(t)i +
∑
j
Gijyj − pi ≥ ai+ ξ(t)i − pi.
Here the second equality follows since yi = 0, and the inequality follows since Gij , yj ≥ 0. By
Assumption 1, for any agent i ∈ V we have ai + ξ(t)i > p¯ ≥ pi. Thus, we conclude that the agent
can improve her payoff by increasing yi. Hence, we obtain a contradiction to the assumption
that y is a consumption equilibrium, and the claim follows. 
We next provide a bound on agents’ equilibrium consumption.
LEMMA 17. Let y(t) denote the consumption equilibrium under price vector p(t). We have
maxi |y(t)i | ≤ 1ζ maxi |ai + ξ(t)i − p(t)i |. In particular, if prices are nonnegative, then maxi |y(t)i | ≤
1
ζ
maxi |ai+ ξ(t)i |.
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Proof of Lemma 17. To simplify exposition, throughout the proofwe suppress the time index
t ∈ Z++. By Lemma 16, we have that equilibrium consumption levels satisfy y > 0. Hence, the
consumption levels are given by (3), and we obtain y = M−1(a + ξ − p). Note that ‖y‖∞ ≤
‖M−1‖∞‖a+ ξ − p‖∞. By Lemma 14, we have ‖M−1‖∞ ≤ 1ζ . In addition, by the definition of the
infinity normwe have ‖y‖∞ =maxi |yi| and ‖a+ ξ−p‖∞ =maxi |ai+ ξi−pi|. Hence it follows that
maxi |yi| ≤ 1ζ maxi |ai+ξi−pi|. Note that when prices are nonnegative, Assumption 1 implies that
|ai+ ξi− pi| ≤ |ai+ ξi|. Thus we conclude thatmaxi |yi| ≤ 1ζ maxi |ai+ ξi|. 
Finally, we leverage the matrix bounds of the previous subsection to show that the vO vector
that appears in the equilibrium characterization (see (5) and Lemma 1) is bounded.
LEMMA 18. ‖vO‖∞ ≤ 1ζ (2a¯+ p¯).
Proof of Lemma 18. Using (5) it readily follows that ‖vO‖∞ ≤ ‖H−1‖∞‖aO‖∞ +
‖H−1SOL‖∞‖(aL − pL)‖∞. On the other hand, by Lemmas 13 and 14, we have
max{‖H−1‖∞,‖H−1SOL‖∞} ≤ ‖M−1‖∞ ≤ 1/ζ. Finally, by Assumption 2 we have ‖aO‖∞ ≤ a¯ and
‖(aL−pL)‖∞ ≤ ‖aL‖∞+‖pL‖∞ ≤ a¯+ p¯. Together, these inequalities imply that ‖vO‖∞ ≤ 1ζ (2a¯+ p¯),
and the claim follows. 
G.2. Technical Lemmas
LEMMA 19. Suppose that C ′ log |VO| ≥ logn. Then, λ≤
√
C1
log |VO|
n
for some constant C1 > 0. Fur-
thermore, λ≥ c1
√
log(n|VO|)
n
for some constant c1> 0.
Proof of Lemma 19. The first desired inequality can be stated as Φ−1(1 − n−1/3|VO|2) ≤√
C1 log |VO|. Since Φ is a monotone function, this is equivalent to 1−Φ(
√
C1 log |VO|) ≤ n−13|VO |2 .
By applying the Chernoff bound to the standard normal we obtain
1−Φ(
√
C1 log |VO|)≤ e−(C1 log |VO |)/2 = |VO|−C1/2. (131)
Since C ′ log |VO| ≥ logn, we have |VO|−C′ ≤ n−1. Combining this with (131) for sufficiently large
C1 yields
1−Φ(
√
C1 log |VO|)≤ |VO|−C1/2 ≤ n
−1
3|VO|2 .
Hence, the first inequality follows.
Using the definition of λ, the second desired inequality can be stated asΦ−1(1−n−1/3|VO|2)≥
c1
√
log (n|VO|). This can equivalently be written as 1 − Φ(c1
√
log (n|VO|)) ≥ n−1/3|VO|2. Using
bounds on the complementary CDF of the standard normal (see, e.g., Chang et al. (2011)) we
have 1− Φ(c1
√
log (n|VO|)) ≥ α1 exp(−α2c21 log (n|VO|)) for some constants α1, α2 > 0. Choosing
c1 sufficiently small, this implies that 1−Φ(c1
√
log (n|VO|))≥ 1/3n|VO|. The claim follows since
1/3n|VO| ≥ 1/3n|VO|2. 
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LEMMA 20. Let ρ
(t)
1 , ρ
(t)
2 ∈R, and γ(t) ∈Rk be given real-valued scalars/vectors for t= 1, . . . , n. Sup-
pose that h(β) :=
√
1
n
∑n
t=1(ρ
(t)
1 )
2(ρ
(t)
2 −βTγ(t))2 for β ∈Rk. Then, |h(β1)−h(β2)| ≤Mγ · ‖β1−β2‖1,
whereMγ :=maxi
√
1
n
(∑n
t=1(ρ
(t)
1 )
2(γ
(t)
i )
2
)
.
Proof of Lemma 20. Observe that∣∣∣∣∣√n∂h(β)∂βi
∣∣∣∣∣≤ |
∑n
t=1(ρ
(t)
1 )
2γ
(t)
i (ρ
(t)
2 −βTγ(t))|√∑n
t=1(ρ
(t)
1 )
2(ρ
(t)
2 −βTγ(t))2
≤
√(∑n
t=1(ρ
(t)
1 )
2(γ(t)i )
2
)(∑n
t=1(ρ
(t)
1 )
2(ρ(t)2 −βTγ(t))2
)
√∑n
t=1(ρ
(t)
1 )
2(ρ
(t)
2 −βTγ(t))2
≤
√√√√( n∑
t=1
(ρ(t)1 )
2(γ(t)i )
2
)
,
(132)
where the second inequality follows from the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality. Using (132), it readily
follows that
‖∇h(β)‖∞≤max
i
√√√√ 1
n
(
n∑
t=1
(ρ
(t)
1 )
2(γ
(t)
i )
2
)
=Mγ. (133)
Thus, h is Lipschitz continuous, and using Lipschitz continuity we obtain
|h(β1)−h(β2)| ≤Mγ‖β1−β2‖1, (134)
as claimed. 
LEMMA 21. Let {Z(t)ij }t∈[n],i∈S1,j∈S2 , where |Sℓ| ≤ |V¯O| for ℓ ∈ {1,2}, be a collection of random vari-
ables, and c′,C ′ be some constants such that C ′> c′ > 0. Fix some L≥ 2. For each t∈ [n] denote by
X(t) a vector of length |S1|× |S2|whose entries consist of {Z(t)ij }i∈S1,j∈S2 . Suppose that the following
assumptions hold:
A1. E[Z
(t)
ij ] = 0,
1
n
∑n
t=1E[|Z(t)ij |2]≥ c′, and 1n
∑n
t=1E[|Z(t)ij |3]≤C ′ for all i∈ S1, j ∈ S2, t∈ [n].
A2. {X(t)}t∈[n] are independent random vectors.
A3. 1
n
∑n
t=1E[|Z(t)ij |L] ≤ C ′ for all i ∈ S1, j ∈ S2. Moreover, M¯L := E[maxt∈[n] ‖X(t)‖L∞], with
M¯L
log |VO |
n
= o(1).
A4. C ′ log |VO| ≥ logn and log |VO |n = o(1).
Then, with probability at least 1− o(1) the following hold:
i. λ ≥ maxi∈S1,j∈S2
(∣∣∣ 1n∑nt=1Z(t)ij ∣∣∣/√ 1n∑nt=1{Z(t)ij }2
)
, where λ = 1√
n
Φ−1
(
1− 1
3n|VO |2
)
, and Φ
denotes the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution.
ii. maxi∈S1,j∈S2
1
n
∑n
t=1 |Z(t)ij |L ≤C ′′ for some constant C ′′ > 0.
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Proof of Lemma 21. Observe that using the bounds on 1
n
∑n
t=1E[|Z(t)ij |2] and 1n
∑n
t=1E[|Z(t)ij |3],
A1 readily implies that
0<C ′1 :=
√
c′
(C ′)1/3
≤
{
1
n
n∑
t=1
E[|Z(t)ij |2]
}1/2/{ 1
n
n∑
t=1
E[|Z(t)ij |3]
}1/3
.
Since A1 also implies that E[Z
(t)
ij ] = 0, using Lemma 28 we obtain
P


∣∣∣∑nt=1Z(t)ij ∣∣∣√∑n
t=1{Z(t)ij }2
≥ x

≤ 2(1−Φ(x))(1+ A
ℓ3n
)
, (135)
where A is a universal constant (i.e., a constant independent of the model primitives), 0< ℓn ≤
C ′1n
1/6, and 0≤ x≤C ′1 n
1/6
ℓn
− 1. We let
ℓn =
C ′1n
1/6
1+
√
nλ
=
C ′1n
1/6
1+Φ−1(1−n−1/(3|VO|2)) and x=
√
nλ=Φ−1(1−n−1/(3|VO|2)).
Observe that this choice of ℓn and x implies that x=C
′
1
n1/6
ℓn
− 1. Moreover, since 1+√nλ≥ 1, we
also have ℓn ≤ C ′1n1/6. Thus, the bound in (135) applies with this choice of ℓn and x. Moreover,
for this choice of ℓn and x, it follows from Lemma 19 and (135) that
P


∣∣∣∑nt=1Z(t)ij ∣∣∣√∑n
t=1{Z(t)ij }2
≥√nλ

≤ 2n−1
(3|VO|2)
(
1+
C ′2(1+
√
nλ)3
n1/2
)
≤ 2n
−1
(3|VO|2)
(
1+
C ′3(log |VO|)3/2
n1/2
) (136)
for some constants C ′2,C
′
3 > 0. Using the union bound, we obtain
n−1
(
1+
C ′3(log |VO|)3/2
n1/2
)
≥ P

 max
i∈S1,j∈S2
∣∣∣∑nt=1Z(t)ij ∣∣∣√∑n
t=1{Z(t)ij }2
≥√nλ


= P

 max
i∈S1,j∈S2
∣∣∣ 1n∑nt=1Z(t)ij ∣∣∣√
1
n
∑n
t=1{Z(t)ij }2
≥ λ


(137)
Since log |VO|
n
= o(1) by A4, the first claim follows.
By A3, we have 1
n
∑n
t=1E[|Z(t)ij |L]≤C ′ for all i∈ S1, j ∈ S2. Thus, it follows that
m¯L := max
i∈S1,j∈S2
1
n
n∑
t=1
E[|Z(t)ij |L]≤C ′4, (138)
for some constant C ′4 > 0. Moreover, by A2, {X(t)}t∈[n] are independent vectors. Using these
observations and applying Lemma 25, we obtain
E
[
max
i∈S1,j∈S2
1
n
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
t=1
|Z(t)ij |L−E[|Z(t)ij |L]
∣∣∣∣∣
]
≤C ′5
log |V¯O|
n
M¯L+C
′
5
√
M¯L
log |V¯O|
n
, (139)
84
where C ′5 > 0 is a constant that depends on C
′
4, and M¯L =E[maxt∈[n] ‖X(t)‖L∞].
Using Markov’s inequality with (139), we obtain
P
(
max
i∈S1,j∈S2
1
n
(
n∑
t=1
|Z(t)ij |L−E[|Z(t)ij |L]
)
> c′1
)
≤P
(
max
i∈S1,j∈S2
1
n
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
t=1
|Z(t)ij |L−E[|Z(t)ij |L]
∣∣∣∣∣> c′1
)
≤ 1
c′1
(
C ′5
log |V¯O|
n
M¯L+C
′
5
√
M¯L
log |V¯O|
n
)
.
(140)
Note that (138) implies that 1
n
∑n
t=1E[|Z(t)ij |L]≤C ′4 for all i∈ S1, j ∈ S2. It follows from this obser-
vation and (140) that for some constants C ′6,C
′
7 > 0, we have
P
(
max
i∈S1,j∈S2
1
n
n∑
t=1
|Z(t)ij |L >C ′6
)
≤C ′7
log |V¯O|
n
M¯L+C
′
7
√
M¯L
log |V¯O|
n
. (141)
By A3we also have M¯L
log |VO|
n
= o(1). Hence, we conclude from (141) that with probability 1−o(1)
the following inequality holds:
max
i∈S1,j∈S2
1
n
n∑
t=1
|Z(t)ij |L ≤C ′6. (142)
Thus, the second claim also follows. 
LEMMA 22. Under Assumption 3 with probability 1− o(1)we have
‖En[εO(1;pO)T ]‖e,∞ ≤ C˜
√
log(|VO|)/n and ‖En[εOpTOH−T ]‖e,∞ ≤ C˜
√
log(|VO|)/n, (143)
as well asmaxi∈VO
1
n
∑n
t=1 |ε(t)i |2 ≤ C˜ for some constant C˜ ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 22. First note that by Lemma 14 we have ‖H−1‖∞ ≤ C ′1. Therefore, using
Holder’s inequality and the fact that the infinity norm of a matrix yields the maximum absolute
row sum, we obtain
‖En[εOpTOH−T ]‖e,∞ ≤
(‖En[εOpTO]‖e,∞)
(
max
i∈VO
‖(H−T )·,i‖1
)
≤ (‖En[εOpTO]‖e,∞)
(
max
i∈VO
‖(H−1)i,·‖1
)
= ‖En[εOpTO]‖e,∞ · ‖H−1‖∞
≤C ′1‖En[εOpTO]‖e,∞.
(144)
LetZ(t)ij = ε
(t)
i (1;p
(t)
O )j for t∈ [n], i∈ VO, j ∈ V¯O. Observe that by Assumption 3, we haveE[Z(t)ij ] =
0. Note that E[(1;p
(t)
O )(1;p
(t)
O )
T ] is a positive semidefinite matrix. Since Assumption 3 implies
that eigenvalues of Ψ¯ := E[(1;p
(t)
O )(1;p
(t)
O )
T ]−1 are upper bounded, it follows that eigenvalues of
E[(1;p(t)O )(1;p
(t)
O )
T ] are lower bounded by a constant strictly greater than zero. Hence E[(p(t)j )
2]≥
85
c′1 > 0 for some constant c
′
1. In addition, Assumption 3 implies that minj∈VO E[(ε
(t)
j )
2|p(t)O ] ≥ c.
Using these observations we obtain
E[(Z(t)ij )
2] =E
[
E[(Z(t)ij )
2|p(t)O ]
]
≥E
[
(1;p(t)O )
2
jE[(ε
(t)
i )
2|p(t)O ]]
]
≥ cE
[
(1;p(t)O )
2
j
]
≥ c′2 (145)
for some constant c′2 > 0. Moreover, using the fact that the prices are bounded by p¯, Assump-
tion 3, and Jensen’s inequality, we conclude
E[|Z(t)ij |3] =E
[
E[|Z(t)ij |3|p(t)O ]
]
≤E
[
p¯3E[(ε
(t)
i )
3|p(t)O ]
]
≤ p¯3E
[
E[(ε
(t)
i )
4|p(t)O ]]3/4
]
≤ p¯3C3/4 ≤C ′2,
(146)
for some constant C ′2 > 0.
For each t ∈ [n] denote by X(t) a vector of length |VO| × |V¯O| whose entries consist of
{Z(t)ij }i∈VO ,j∈V¯O . By Assumption 3 (and Jensen’s inequality) we have that {X(t)} are independent
vectors and that
E[max
t∈[n]
‖X(t)‖2∞] =E[ max
t∈[n],i∈VO ,j∈V¯O
(ε(t)i (1;p
(t)
O )j)
2]≤ p¯2E
[
max
t∈[n],i∈VO
(ε(t)i )
2
]
≤ p¯2E
[
max
t∈[n],i∈VO
(ε
(t)
i )
4
]1/2
≤ p¯2
√
Mε,
(147)
where Mε is such that Mε
log |VO |
n
= o(1). Since Assumption 3 also implies that log |VO|
n
= o(1), we
also obtain
√
Mε
log |VO|
n
= o(1). Note that Jensen’s inequality and (146) also yield
E[|Z(t)ij |2]≤E[|Z(t)ij |3]2/3 ≤ (C ′2)2/3, (148)
and hence 1
n
∑n
t=1E[|Z(t)ij |2]≤C ′3 for some constantC ′3 > 0. Finally,C ′ log |VO| ≥ logn by Assump-
tion 3. These observations collectively imply that Lemma 21 applies (with L = 2) and hence,
with probability 1− o(1), we have
max
i∈VO ,j∈V¯O
|En[ε(t)i (1;p(t)O )j]| ≤ λ max
i∈VO ,j∈V¯O
√
En[(ε
(t)
i )
2(1;p
(t)
O )
2
j ]. (149)
Note that Lemma 21 also implies that with probability 1− o(1), we have
C ′4 ≥ max
i∈VO ,j∈V¯O
1
n
n∑
t=1
|Z(t)ij |2 = max
i∈VO ,j∈V¯O
1
n
n∑
t=1
|ε(t)i (1;p(t)O )j |2 ≥max
i∈VO
1
n
n∑
t=1
|ε(t)i |2 (150)
for some constant C ′4 ≥ 0. Hence, the last claim follows. Moreover, (149), (150), and Lemma 19
imply that with probability 1− o(1)we have
‖En[εO(1;pO)T ]‖e,∞ ≤
√
C ′4λ≤C ′5
√
log |VO|
n
,
for some constant C ′5 > 0. Finally, using this inequality together with (144), we also conclude
that ‖En[εOpTOH−T ]‖e,∞ ≤C ′6
√
log |VO|/n for some constantC ′6 > 0, with probability 1− o(1). 
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G.3. Assumption 3 vs. Assumption 5
In this section we establish that Assumption 5 is more general than (and hence implied by)
Assumption 3. The main result of this subsection (Lemma 24) relies on the following auxiliary
lemma that relates to the restricted eigenvalue condition (see (29)), and is presented after the
proof of this lemma.
LEMMA 23. Under Assumption 3 with probability 1 − o(1) we have that En[(1;pO)(1;pO)T ]
has the restricted eigenvalue κc¯ satisfying κ
2
c¯ ≥ c˜ and that λMnsn/κ2c¯ ≤ 1/8, where Mn =√
1∨maxk∈VO 1n
∑n
t=1(p
(t)
k )
4, and c¯, c˜ > 0 are constants.
Proof of Lemma 23. Throughout the proof we assume that sn ≥ 2. This is so because if the
result holds for sn ≥ 2 , then it readily follows from the definition of restricted eigenvalues in (29)
that it holds for sn= 1 as well.
To prove the result, we first leverage Lemma 26 to show that En[{(pO − E[pO])Tβ}2] is lower
bounded by a fraction ofE[{(pO−E[pO])Tβ}2] (with probability 1−o(1)), for any vector β with at
most sn nonzero entries satisfying ‖β‖2 = 1. Then, we use this result with Lemma 27 to obtain a
characterization of βTEn[pOp
T
O]β. This characterization is in turn exploited to derive the desired
results on the restricted eigenvalues.
We start by providing a lower bound on En[{(pO −E[pO])Tβ}2]. Using Lemma 26 with X(t) =
p
(t)
O −E[p(t)O ], and observing that (E[maxt∈[n] ‖X(t)‖2∞])1/2 ≤ p¯, we obtain
E
[
sup‖β‖0≤sn,‖β‖2=1 |En[(βTX)2−E[(βTX)2]]|
]≤C ′1δ2n+C ′1δn sup‖β‖0≤sn,‖β‖2=1√EnE[(βTX)2],
(151)
where X = {X(t)}t∈[n], C ′1 > 0 is a constant, ‖β‖0 stands for the number of nonzero entries of
vector β, and
δn :=
p¯
√
sn√
n
(
log1/2 |VO|+(log sn)(log1/2 |VO|)(log1/2 n)
)
.
Note that Holder’s inequality implies that
sup
‖β‖0≤sn,‖β‖2=1
√
EnE[(βTX)2]≤ sup
‖β‖0≤sn,‖β‖2=1
√
EnE[(‖β‖1‖X‖∞)2]≤ p¯√sn.
Since (log |VO|)(logn)3s2n = o(n) we have log sn = o(logn), which, together with the previous
inequality, implies that
δn sup
‖β‖0≤sn,‖β‖2=1
√
EnE[(βTX)2]≤ δnp¯√sn = p¯
2sn√
n
(
log1/2 |VO|+(log sn)(log1/2 |VO|)(log1/2 n)
)
= o(1).
Since sn ≥ 1, this expression also implies that δ2n = o(1). Combining these observations with
(151), we obtain
E
[
sup
‖β‖0≤sn,‖β‖2=1
∣∣En[{(pO −E[pO])Tβ}2]−E[{(pO −E[pO])Tβ}2]∣∣
]
=O(δn
√
sn) = o(1). (152)
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By Assumption 3 eigenvalues of Ψ¯ are upper bounded by a constant. Hence eigenvalues of
Ψ¯−1 = E[(1;pO)(1;pO)T ] are bounded away from zero by a constant. We claim that this implies
that the eigenvalues of
P˜ :=E[(pO −E[pO])(pO−E[pO])T ] =E[pOpTO]−E[pO]E[pTO]
are also bounded away from zero. To see this, first note that this matrix is positive semidef-
inite. Suppose that for some vector β¯, we have β¯T P˜ β¯ = 0 or, equivalently, β¯TE[pOp
T
O]β¯ −
β¯TE[pO]E[p
T
O]β¯ =0. On the other hand, this implies that
(−β¯TE[pO]; β¯)T Ψ¯−1(−β¯TE[pO]; β¯) = (−β¯TE[pO]; β¯)TE[(1;pO)(1;pO)T ](−β¯TE[pO]; β¯)
= (β¯TE[pO])
2+ β¯TE[pOp
T
O]β¯− 2(β¯TE[pO])2
= β¯TE[pOp
T
O]β¯− β¯TE[pO]E[pTO]β¯ = 0.
(153)
Hence, we obtain a contradiction to the fact that the eigenvalues of Ψ¯−1 are bounded away from
zero. Therefore, the eigenvalues of P˜ are bounded away from zero.
This observation in turn implies that for any β such that ‖β‖2 = 1we have
E[{(pO −E[pO])Tβ}2]≥ c′1> 0 (154)
for some constant c′1. Thus, (152) together with Markov’s inequality implies that for any β such
that ‖β‖0 ≤ sn and ‖β‖2 =1, with probability 1− o(1)we have
En[{(pO −E[pO])Tβ}2]≥ (1− η)E[{(pO −E[pO])Tβ}2], (155)
where η = ω(δn
√
sn) = o(1). Note that the fact that this inequality holds for ‖β‖2 = 1 implies that
it holds for all β ∈R|VO| satisfying ‖β‖0 ≤ sn. Therefore, by Lemma 27 we conclude that
En[{(pO−E[pO])Tβ}2]≥ (1− η)E[{(pO−E[pO])Tβ}2]− ‖D
1/2β‖21
sn− 1 (156)
for any β ∈ R|VO|. Here, D is a diagonal matrix with nonnegative diagonal entries that can be
chosen so that for all j ∈ VO,
Djj =max
i∈VO
ηEn[(pO−E[pO])2i ] + (1− η)
(
En[(pO −E[pO])2i ]−E[(pO −E[pO])2i ]
)
. (157)
Note that by (155) and (157), we have Djj ≥ 0. Recalling that p(t)i ≤ p¯, we have that [(p(t)O −
E[p
(t)
O ])
2
i ]≤C ′2 for some constant C ′2 > 0 and for all t ∈ [n], i ∈ VO. Moreover, by using Hoeffding’s
inequality, we obtain
P
(∣∣En[(pO−E[pO])2i ]−E[(pO −E[pO])2i ]∣∣≥C ′4
√
log |VO|√
n
)
≤C ′3
1
|VO|k′
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for some constants C ′3,C
′
4 > 0 and k
′ > 2. Thus, using the union bound we conclude that with
probability 1− o(1),
max
i∈VO
∣∣En[(pO−E[pO])2i ]−E[(pO −E[pO])2i ]∣∣≤C ′4
√
log |VO|√
n
. (158)
Using these observations in (157) we obtain
|Djj | ≤C ′5n−1/2
√
logVO +C
′
5η (159)
for some constant C ′5 > 0. Similarly, by using Hoeffding’s inequality, with probability 1− o(1)we
have
max
i∈VO
|En[(pO)i]−E[(pO)i]| ≤C ′6
√
log |VO|√
n
(160)
for some C ′6 > 0.
Note that for any β ∈R|VO | such that ‖β‖0 ≤ sn, with probability 1− o(1)we have
βTEn[pOp
T
O]β = β
T
En[((pO−E[pO]) +E[pO])((pO−E[pO]) +E[pO])T ]β
= βTEn[(pO−E[pO])(pO−E[pO])T ]β+2βTEn[pO −E[pO]]βTE[pO] + (βTE[pO])2
≥ (1− η)βT{var(pO)}β− ‖D
1/2β‖21
sn− 1 +2β
T (En[pO]−E[pO])βTE[pO] + (βTE[pO])2
≥ (1− η)βT{var(pO)}β− ‖D
1/2β‖21
sn− 1 − 2p¯‖β‖
2
1‖En[pO]−E[pO]‖∞+(βTE[pO])2
≥ (1− η)βT{var(pO)}β− ‖D
1/2β‖21
sn− 1 −C
′
7‖β‖21
√
log |VO|
n
+(βTE[pO])
2,
(161)
where var(pO) :=E[(pO−E[pO])(pO−E[pO])T ] andC ′7 > 0 is a constant. Here, the first inequality
follows from (156), and the second one follows fromHolder’s inequality and the fact that p
(t)
i ≤ p¯
for all i∈ VO and t∈ [n]. Finally, the last inequality follows from (160).
Moreover, we have
(β˜;β)TEn[(1;pO)(1;pO)
T ](β˜;β) = β˜2+βTEn[pOp
T
O]β+2β˜En[p
T
O]β
≥ β˜2+(βTE[pO])2+2β˜En[pTO]β
+(1− η)βT{var(pO)}β− ‖D
1/2β‖21
sn− 1 −C
′
7‖β‖21
√
log |VO|
n
≥ (β˜+βTE[pO])2− 2|β˜|‖β‖1‖En[pO]−E[pO]‖∞
+(1− η)βT{var(pO)}β− ‖D
1/2β‖21
sn− 1 −C
′
7‖β‖21
√
log |VO|
n
.
(162)
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Here, the first inequality follows from (161), and the secondone follows fromHolder’s inequality.
Observe that by (160) and the fact that 2|β˜|‖β‖1 ≤ ‖(β˜;β)‖21 we have 2|β˜|‖β‖1‖En[pO]−E[pO]‖∞ ≤
C ′6‖(β˜;β)‖21
√
log |VO|√
n
. In addition, note that
βT{var(pO)}β+(β˜+βTE[pO])2 = βT{E[pOpTO]−E[pO]E[pO]T }β+ β˜2+2β˜βTE[pO] + (βTE[pO])2
= βT{E[pOpTO]}β + β˜2+2β˜βTE[pO]
= (β˜;β)TE[(1;pO)(1;pO)
T ](β˜;β).
(163)
Combining these observations and the fact that (β˜+βTE[pO])
2 ≥ 0with (162) yields
(β˜;β)TEn[(1;pO)(1;pO)
T ](β˜;β)≥ (1− η)(β˜;β)TE[(1;pO)(1;pO)T ](β˜;β)
− ‖D
1/2β‖21
sn− 1 −C
′
8‖(β˜;β)‖21
√
log |VO|
n
,
(164)
for some constant C ′8 > 0.
Let θ= (β˜;β), and suppose that J ⊂ V¯O is such that |J | ≤ sn and ‖θJc‖1 ≤ c¯‖θJ‖1. Note that this
implies that ‖θ‖1 = ‖θJ‖1 + ‖θJc‖1 ≤ (1 + c¯)‖θJ‖1. Using this observation together with (159) we
obtain that
‖D1/2β‖21 ≤{C ′5n−1/2
√
log |VO|+C ′5η}‖β‖21
≤{C ′5n−1/2
√
log |VO|+C ′5η}(1+ c¯)2‖θJ‖21
≤{C ′5n−1/2
√
log |VO|+C ′5η}(1+ c¯)2sn‖θJ‖22
≤{C ′5n−1/2
√
log |VO|+C ′5η}(1+ c¯)2sn‖θ‖22.
Using this inequality together with (164) and recalling that eigenvalues of E[(1;pO)(1;pO)
T ] are
lower bounded by some c′2 > 0, sn ≥ 2, η = o(1), and that sn
√
log |VO|
n
= o(1) by Assumption 3, it
follows that
θTEn[(1;pO)(1;pO)
T ]θ≥ (1− η)c′2‖θ‖22−{C ′5n−1/2
√
log |VO|+C ′5η}(1+ c¯)2
sn
sn− 1‖θ‖
2
2
−C ′8‖θ‖21
√
log |VO|
n
≥ c′3‖θ‖22−C ′8‖θ‖21
√
log |VO|
n
,
(165)
for some constant c′3 > 0. On the other hand,
‖θ‖22 ≥‖θJ‖22 ≥ ‖θJ‖21/sn ≥‖θ‖21/(sn(1+ c¯)2). (166)
Combining this with (165) and the fact that sn
√
log |VO|
n
= o(1) yields
θTEn[(1;pO)(1;pO)
T ]θ≥ c′3‖θ‖21/(sn(1+ c¯)2)−C ′8‖θ‖21
√
log |VO|
n
≥ c′4‖θ‖21/sn,
(167)
for some c′4 > 0. Since this inequality holds for any θ ∈ R|V¯O | and J ⊂ V¯O such that |J | ≤ sn and
‖θJc‖1 ≤ c¯‖θJ‖1, it follows that with probability 1− o(1)we have κ2c¯ ≥ c′4> 0, as claimed.
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Observe thatMn ≤ p¯2. Hence, by Lemma 19 we have λMnsn/κ2c¯ ≤C ′9
√
log |VO|
n
sn for some con-
stant C ′9 > 0. On the other hand, since sn
√
log |VO|
n
= o(1), it follows that λMnsn/κ
2
c¯ = o(1). Thus,
we obtain that λMnsn/κ
2
c¯ ≤ 1/8with probability 1− o(1). 
LEMMA 24. Assumption 3 implies Assumption 5.
Proof. It can be readily seen that Assumption 5ii. follows fromAssumption 3iii. and Assump-
tion 3iv., and Assumption 5iv. follows from Assumption 3iv.. Moreover, Lemma 23 implies that
Assumption 5iii. follows from Assumption 3. We proceed by establishing that Assumption 3
implies Assumption 5i.
Observe that by Assumption 3i. we have
E[(ε
(t)
O )(p
(t)
O )
T ] =E
[
E[(ε
(t)
O )(p
(t)
O )
T | p(t)O ]
]
=E
[
E[(ε
(t)
O ) | p(t)O ](p(t)O )T
]
= 0. (168)
Assumption 3ii. and iii. imply that
E
[
{(ε(t)k )(1;p(t)O )j}2
]
=E
[
E
[
{(ε(t)k )(1;p(t)O )j}2 | p(t)O
]]
≥ cE
[
(1;p
(t)
O )
2
j
]
≥ c/cΨ> 0, (169)
where cΨ > 0 denotes an upper bound on the eigenvalues of Ψ¯ = E[(1;p
(t)
O )(1;p
(t)
O )
T ]−1. The last
inequality makes use of the fact that 1/cΨ is a lower bound on the eigenvalues (and hence diag-
onal entries) ofE[(1;p(t)O )(1;p
(t)
O )
T ].
Similarly, by Assumption 3ii. and the fact that p¯≥ p(t)j for all j ∈ VO, we have
E
[ ∣∣∣(ε(t)k )(1;p(t)O )j∣∣∣4
]
= p¯4E
[ ∣∣∣(ε(t)k )∣∣∣4 | p(t)O
]
≤Cp¯4. (170)
Finally, by Assumption 3ii. we also have
E
[
max
t∈[n];k∈VO
|ε(t)k |4
]
=E
[
E
[
max
t∈[n];k∈VO
|ε(t)k |4 | {p(t)O }
]]≤Mε. (171)
On the other hand, Assumption 3 also implies thatMε
log |VO|
n
= o(1). This observation, together
with Assumption 3i., (168), (169), and (170), implies Assumption 5i.. 
G.4. Concentration Bounds and Other Useful Results from the Literature
The following technical lemma is a concentration bound; see Belloni et al. (2017c) for a proof.
In this result, and in the remainder of this subsection, a universal constant refers to a constant
that is independent of the primitives of the relevant setting.
LEMMA 25. Let {X(t)}t∈[n] be independent random vectors in Rp, where p ≥ 3. Define m¯k :=
maxj≤p
1
n
∑
t∈[n]E[|X(t)j |k] andMk ≥E[max
t∈[n]
‖X(t)‖k∞]. Then
E

max
j≤p
1
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
t∈[n]
|X(t)j |k−E[|X(t)j |k]
∣∣∣∣∣∣

≤ C˜2 logp
n
Mk+ C˜
√
logp
n
M1/2k m¯
1/2
k ,
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E

max
j≤p
1
n
∑
t∈[n]
|X(t)j |k

≤ C˜Mkn−1 log p+ C˜m¯k
for some universal constant C˜.
For the next two lemmas, we use the notation ‖β‖0 to denote the number of nonzero entries
of a given vector β. The first lemma is a variant of the main result in Rudelson and Vershynin
(2008); see Belloni et al. (2015b) for a proof.
LEMMA 26. Let X(t), t ∈ [n], be independent (across t) random vectors such that X(t) ∈ Rp with
p≥ 2 and (E[maxt∈[n] ‖X(t)‖2∞])1/2 ≤K . Furthermore, for k≥ 1, define
δn :=
K
√
k√
n
(
log1/2 p+(logk)(log1/2 p)(log1/2 n)
)
.
Then
E
[
sup
‖θ‖0≤k,‖θ‖2=1
∣∣En[(θTX)2−E[(θTX)2]]∣∣
]
≤ C˜δ2n+ C˜δn sup
‖θ‖0≤k,‖θ‖2=1
√
EnE[(θTX)2]
for some universal constant C˜ > 0.
The next lemma, whose proof is based on Maurey’s empirical method, is due to Oliveira
(2016).
LEMMA 27 (Transfer principle). Suppose that Σˆ and Σ are matrices with nonnegative diagonal
entries, and assume that η ∈ (0,1), d∈ [p] are such that
∀v ∈Rp with ‖v‖0 ≤ d, vT Σˆv ≥ (1− η)vTΣv.
Assume that D is a diagonal matrix whose elements Djj ≥ 0 and satisfy Djj ≥ Σˆjj − (1− η)Σjj .
Then
∀x∈Rp, xT Σˆx≥ (1− η)xTΣx− ‖D
1/2x‖21
d− 1 .
The last result, due to Jing et al. (2003), is leveraged in analyzing the performance of our algo-
rithm.
LEMMA 28 (Moderate deviations for self-normalized sums). Let Z1,. . ., Zn be independent,
zero-mean random variables. Let Sn =
∑n
i=1Zi, V
2
n =
∑n
i=1Z
2
i ,
Mn =
{
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[Z2i ]
}1/2/{ 1
n
n∑
i=1
E[|Zi|3]
}1/3
> 0
and 0< ℓn ≤ n 16Mn. Then for some universal constant A,∣∣∣∣P (|Sn/Vn| ≥ x)2(1−Φ(x)) − 1
∣∣∣∣≤ Aℓ3n , 0≤ x≤ n 16 Mnℓn − 1.
